

No.

205 Special message by P.M. Fitina

I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria,

V.N. Merkulov on the content

of the telegrams of the British

Ambassador to the USSR Cripps to the British For

12/14/1941

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO comrade STALIN, comrade
MOLOTOV,

comrade BERIA of the NKVD of the USSR

- comrade. MERKULOV December

14, 1941 British Ambassador to the USSR KRIPPS to the British
Foreign Office.

The content of the telegrams was received by the Intelligence
Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from

London undercover. "1. This morning I saw General SIKORSKY, he
told me the contents of his negotiations with STALIN and asked me to
convey it to you as soon as possible. He confirmed that my preliminary
outline of STALIN's likely views, which I had given him even before his
arrival in Moscow, proved to be more accurate and better than any he had
received here, and that his negotiations had been completely successful in
terms of turning the unstable relationship between the two countries into
such which will be held in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. At times
these negotiations were difficult and required great perseverance on the
part of the general. When he first raised the issue of the withdrawal of Polish
troops from the USSR to other, nearby countries, STALIN interpreted this
as a plot between the USA, Poland and us and told the general that the
whole world would laugh at him (STALIN) if such an event took place.

In this regard, SIKORSKY asked STALIN to give his alternative proposal (for which see below).

2. At dinner, STALIN made a very friendly speech, and the general is sure that STALIN, as he said, agreed with the idea of creating a strong army in Poland after the war. STALIN declared his agreement with every word of the speech given by Sikorsky on the radio. He saw the text and made this statement before the transmission. The already signed declaration was adopted almost without changes in the wording proposed by the Poles.

3. STALIN strongly insisted on the release of all Poles and declared his determination to accelerate this. He was so angry about the lack of food for the Polish troops, which he was told that he told General ANDERS that the Poles had to intervene in his conversation with a Soviet officer in order to moderate his anger. He told his quartermaster-general that the latter could not feed the troops by orders and decrees alone. Those Russian officers who had sympathized with the Poles before, in this regard, declared their satisfaction and expressed their confidence that things would change in the future.

4. The result of the negotiations is that, according to STALIN's proposals, the Polish military forces and the civilian population should be concentrated in Uzbekistan, mainly between Tashkent and the Persian border and partly east of Tashkent. The Russians talk about the possibility of supplying the Poles with food, but for weapons they rely mainly on us and the United States.

SIKORSKY saw the latest telegrams and understands that we can arm the Polish troops only for quite a long time, but he hopes that by May 1942 this will be done. SIKORSKY also hopes that the food situation will now be satisfactory, and, as far as I can judge, he does not at all count on our help in this direction. (Nevertheless, corresponding demands may well be made at a later date if the Russians prove unable to keep their promise.) I drew his attention to the difficulties of supply, and specifically asked him if he had in mind the last telegram concerning the carrying capacity of the Persian roads.

(I had, of course, informed him even before he left for Moscow of the essence of War Ministry telegram No. 53861 of November 24.) He assured me that he was aware of this. SIKORSKY considers it necessary, for the sake of future Soviet-Polish relations, to accept STALIN's proposal and not insist on the departure of the Poles from Russia.

5. STALIN agreed to the departure of 30,000 Poles. The additional 5,000, I believe, includes the aviation and naval personnel that SIKORSKY included in his original memo. Now SIKORSKY speaks of his desire to have up to 9,000 Poles in the Middle East and the rest in England. STALIN agreed to the creation in the USSR of 5-7 divisions that would make up the army.

6. In accordance with my proposals, SIKORSKY asked STALIN to appoint two of his advisers to visit the Polish camps together, which apparently pleased STALIN, and he appointed General PANFILOV and VYSHINSKY for this purpose.

7. General SIKORSKY will return and meet with STALIN on December 12th.

8. STALIN spoke very frankly about the military situation, said that the Soviet troops were fighting well on the Moscow front, and the complete defeat of General KLEIST's group had eliminated the threat to the Caucasus at the present time. A huge number of trophies were captured, especially vehicles (11 thousand). General von Bock disappeared from the Moscow front, either killed or removed from command. Now in his place is General LIST. STALIN is fully aware of how dangerous such an adversary is. 9. Around Moscow, STALIN has 70

thousand cavalry in reserve and hopes to soon be able to use it in operations against Germans.

10. According to SIKORSKY, there is no doubt that the Russians will continue to fight regardless of the fate of Moscow. According to STALIN, the winter conditions began to take their toll on the German troops. The German superiority in tanks is still great, but they have very little air superiority.

11. SIKORSKY was greatly impressed by the attention that STALIN paid to a large extent to the military in comparison with the civilians in his entourage. The general is quite sure that there is no danger of the collapse of the regime at the present time.

12. SIKORSKY informed me of the possibilities for improvement in the treatment of the Poles. For example, in Tashkent, the order to evict Poles from the area was canceled, and now the Poles have access to the

city. 13. He fully understands the possibility of certain practical difficulties in the future, especially in the matter of the liberation of the Poles in the far north, but assumes that sincere efforts will be made to resolve this problem. He also understands that some local authorities may be stubborn even after receiving appropriate instructions from Moscow. 14. The Polish embassy received permission to send its representatives to

various parts of the country with sufficiently broad powers to study the conditions in which the Poles find themselves and to provide them with possible assistance.

15. It was decided to provide the Poles, wherever possible, with work in accordance with their qualifications. For example, an inventor of a tank and an eminent chemist, now engaged in logging and cleaning roads, will get a job in their specialty. The General is now considering the question of sending these highly qualified persons to England: either to the south, or, if possible, through Arkhangelsk.

16. During dinner, STALIN began to talk about the eastern borders of Poland, but SIKORSKY refused to discuss this issue on the grounds that if he returned from Russia, having established new borders, "the whole world would laugh at him." STALIN

greeted this situation humorously, saying that there were no difficulties that could not be overcome at a peace conference, and expressed the hope that even before such a conference was convened, they would come to a mutual understanding. STALIN used strong language against HITLER, calling him crazy and a rabbit imitating a lion. However, he said that HITLER had a few good people around him from a military point of view.

17. I asked General SIKORSKY if he had any opportunity to judge Stalin's feelings towards the government

his majesty.

The general, under especially great secrecy, said that, on the basis of everything he had heard, he was absolutely sure of STALIN's deep distrust of the British government. In his opinion, this was partly due to the failure of attempts to harmonize military plans. He thinks that the tactics (mostly allied press speeches) that were used at the recent conference did not help, and therefore it is necessary to abandon pleasant and laudatory phrases, be able to use the real possibilities of existing relationships and frankly discuss the difficulties that arise, if they must be overcome.

18. SIKORSKY told me about his attempt to explain how much and versatile assistance we have already provided and how practically it is difficult for us to do anything to create a second front. He avoided all references to northern Persia and the Caucasus, as he saw too much danger in touching on such a topic. He also explained that there was nothing more we could do to increase industrial output, while America was lagging behind us in this respect, and therefore the Russians themselves should make every effort to achieve more serious results from America. 19. As an example of distrust of us, he cited STALIN's assumption

about our desire to use Polish troops in

Singapore. SIKORSKY rejected this assumption, declaring that even without the Poles we have a large number of our own troops there.

The general made STALIN understand his complete loyalty to Great Britain, after which there was no more talk on this topic.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR
FITIN

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No. 206

**Decree of the State Defense Committee on the
families of persons who collaborated with the
German
authorities**

12/27/1941

No. 1074-ss

To allow the NKVD families of persons who served in the administrative punitive bodies of the German authorities, as well as voluntarily retreated together with the Nazi troops, after the investigation, by the decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, to be evicted to remote areas of the Union. Leave the order of their eviction existing in relation to

sent administratively.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L.
152. Copy. Typescript.

No. 207 GKO resolution on the creation of filtration points

12/27/1941

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
DECISION No. GOKO-1069ss of

December 27, 1941 Moscow, Kremlin

In order to identify among the former Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy, traitors to their homeland, spies and deserters, the State Defense Committee

decides:

1. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Defense (comrade Khrulev) to create collection and transit points within the army rear for former Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy, found in areas liberated by Red Army units from enemy troops.

2. To oblige the Military Councils of

the fronts, armies and the command of formations and subunits of the military units of the Red Army, when cities, villages and other areas are liberated from enemy troops, former Red Army servicemen, both those who were in captivity and surrounded by the enemy, to be detained and sent to the disposal heads of collection and transit points of the People's Commissariat of Defense. 3. For the maintenance of the above categories of former

Red Army servicemen and providing them with filtration by the NKVD of the USSR, organize special camps: In the Vologda region - for the Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov and

North-Western fronts; In the Ivanovo region - for the Western and Kalinin fronts; In the Tambov region - for the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts; In the Stalingrad region - for the Southern Front, appointing

chiefs of camps for experienced operatives of the NKVD.

4. To ensure the work of checking the former Red Army soldiers and identifying traitors to their homeland, spies and deserters of the NKVD of the USSR among them, organize Special Departments in each of the above camps. 5.

Persons in respect of whom, after checking them by the Special Departments, no compromising materials are found, the heads of the camps should be transferred to the appropriate military commissariats - according to territoriality. 6. The provision

of the camps organized by the NKVD with premises, barracks equipment, bedding, food, heating, the necessary uniforms and sanitation should be entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Defense (comrade Khrulev). 7. Assign the transportation of

former Red Army servicemen from collection points to special camps of the NKVD to the Department of Military Communications of the Red Army (comrade Kovalev), and their escort along the route, as well as guarding the camps - to the troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

Chairman of the State

Defense Committee I. STALIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 506. L.

9-9 rev. Script. Typescript. The text contains a typewritten note

about the distribution: "t.t. Beria, Khrulev, Shaposhnikov - all; Military Councils of fronts and armies - 1, 2; Mikoyan - 1, 6; Kovalev (VOSO) - 1, 7".

No.

208 Memorandum of L.P. Beria, A.S. Shcherbakova, V.P. Pronina I.V. Stalin on the return of the evacuated population to Moscow

01/08/1942

Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN

During the war from

the mountains. Moscow evacuated to the eastern regions of the Union 2,200,000 people. Currently, 2,370,000 people live in the city. In connection with the changed

military situation, a significant number of evacuees have recently returned to Moscow

population.

In accordance with the decision of the State Defense Committee of September 20, 1941 "On Restricting Entry into Moscow", an order of the NKVD of the USSR of September 23, 1941 was issued, according to which only workers and employees of institutions and enterprises with special passes from the police are allowed to enter Moscow, issued but at the request of the relevant people's commissariats.

In connection with the measures being taken by the NKVD to expel evacuated citizens who arbitrarily returned to Moscow, some of the latter began to disembark from trains at stations near Moscow, from where they are sent by suburban trains or by passing cars and carts along highways to Moscow. So, for the time from December 19, 1941 to January 5 of this year. transport authorities

of the NKVD at railway stations [and] railway stations, the Moscow police and the guards of the Moscow zone of the NKVD on highways detained and expelled from Moscow 19,550 people who tried to return to live in Moscow.

In order to stop the entry into Moscow of previously evacuated citizens in an unorganized manner, we ask the State Defense Committee to accept the attached GKO draft, which determines the procedure for entering the city of Moscow. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of

the Union of the SSR L. BERIA Secretary of the MC of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
SCHERBAKOV Chairman of the

Moscow Council PRONIN Published: Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the USSR state security organs from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. M., 2002. S. 115-116.

No.

209 Decree on the transformation of the Third Directorate of the NKVMF into special departments[51]

01/10/1942

In order to improve management and agent-operational work on special service of bodies, fleets, flotillas and formations of the Navy, the State Defense Committee decides: 1. To transform the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NKVMF of fleets, flotillas

and formations into special departments. Subordinate: special departments of fleets and flotillas - to the Office of Special

Departments of the NKVD of the USSR; special departments of formations - to a special department of the fleet (flotillas) and the commissar of the formation; authorized by the special department on ships - the special department of formations and the commissioner of the ship. 2. To organize within

the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR a Department for servicing the Navy. 3. Oblige the NKVD of

the USSR to strengthen the special departments of the fleets, flotillas and formations of the Navy with qualified

Chekists.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN Published: State Security Organs of the USSR in Great Patriotic War: Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 1. M., 2003. S. 27

No.
210 Special message by P.M. Fitina
I.V. Stalin about W. Churchill's negotiations
with F. Roosevelt

01/25/1942

THE STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE
SSR

Comrade Stalin We are passing on the contents of the intelligence report received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London about the negotiations between

CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT in Washington. The message was compiled by a verified source based on familiarization with documents and conversations with various employees of the US diplomatic and other missions in England.

According to the source, the main issues of the negotiations were the following:

"1. CHURCHILL's main goal was to prevent the redeployment of American weapons and especially naval forces to the Pacific Ocean. CHURCHILL feared that the US War Department would insist on changing previous plans in order to pay more attention to ongoing events in the Pacific. For this reason, CHURCHILL, trying to forestall possible changes, hastened his departure for Washington. His mission was carried out with success, and the reports he brought about the new aggressive plans of the Germans played an important role in this. The British assumed that the fascist army would begin a new campaign immediately after the accumulation of the necessary funds and would be carried out on a large scale with the participation of sea, land and air forces. This campaign will have three phases: a) Providing transportation to Gibraltar and massing a large army on the European side. The crossing of troops across the strait will begin immediately after air superiority is achieved. The Germans have already deployed the necessary personnel in Spanish

airfields, built coastal batteries, giving them the ability to control navigation in the strait. Gibraltar itself will be bypassed and temporarily ignored. b) On the very first day of hostilities,

a simultaneous air and sea attack will be carried out against Casablanca, Marrakech and Dakar. The Germans assume that the French traitors in these ports will facilitate their occupation and provide real support. c) A rapid strike by mechanized units, aimed at eliminating French resistance, if any, in order to secure lines of communication leading to the indicated ports. Previously sent small garrisons, flotillas will have to repel attempts by the allies to restore the situation.

The second part of the German plan involves the capture of Madeira, the Canary Islands and Cape Verde in order to distract the Allied navy and inflict a heavy defeat on it in its attempt to capture these points. Basically, the Germans want to get at their disposal the coastal bases of the navy, the lines of communication to which they can fully provide.

According to existing British government opinion, this plan was shelved only because the Germans were unsure of the role to be played by the French fleet and the people of North Africa. At the present time it is assumed that the Germans feel completely confident of success, regardless of the cooperation of the French, in which they are not at all interested in achieving.

As American diplomacy had been playing with the French for several years and successfully keeping Germany in the dark, CHURCHILL insisted on taking appropriate countermeasures, even risking alienating modern France and throwing her wholly into the arms of the Germans. Finally, CHURCHILL wanted guarantees that military units intended for the occupation of certain North African points and the Atlantic islands would not be transferred to the Pacific Ocean. In November 1940, the United States created suitable shock troops specifically for this purpose, the task of which included the occupation of Iceland, the Azores, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands, Dakar and even Casablanca. These troops received special training and were reinforced, especially the groups intended to capture Dakar. Churchill feared that

due to the suitability of these troops for waging war in the Pacific possessions of America, they will be transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

To prevent the possibility of US diplomatic hesitation on the issue of determining the attitude towards France, de Gaulle's troops seized the islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, as a result of which there was a well-known change in the views of the State Department. Events have shown that, despite the American assurances given by Vichy regarding the French West Indies and the Atlantic possessions, no serious break has occurred, and the Vichy government will willingly take the side of the one who acts faster. 2. CHURCHILL declared a great danger to Atlantic

communications, which could be posed by German naval bases on the African coast. Noting the extreme importance of the sea routes across the South Atlantic and Cape Town, CHURCHILL insisted on maintaining this route in order to maintain economy, security and concentration of convoy forces, as a result of which the entire eastern part of the Pacific theater could remain in a defensive position and not require massive forces. He also emphasized the importance of preventing the Japanese fleet from contacting German naval forces to attack ships bound for the Far East, which could happen if the Germans managed to establish bases on the African coast.

CHURCHILL succeeded in persuading ROOSEVELT and the Commander-in-Chief to cede the shock troops destined for operations in the Atlantic Basin to be used in accordance with the plans of the military and naval leaders in the Pacific Ocean. On the contrary, these units will be strengthened numerically and materially.

3. The announced figures for the increase in industrial output, exceeding by 10% the original figures of the plan of the Office of War Production, express confidence that these figures could be met by the relevant branches of industry, with the exception of some of them, especially the automobile industry, which, desiring reorganize its peacetime production on a war footing, proposed an independent scheme for the construction of special military factories.

Vice-Chairman of the Office of War Production KNUDSEN objected to this scheme, and CHURCHILL, with the help of BEVERBROOKE, managed to break the opposition. The result was the announced program. However, during the first six months, no strong increase in industrial output is expected, and only in the last three months of 1942 will the announced program be completed by 40%. 4. In view of the fact that the planned program will not be carried out during the first six months of 1942, why not all

requirements for the supply of military materials can be satisfied, the question of their further redistribution was brought up for discussion. Then a number of possibilities arose for the implementation of this problem: a) Reducing the supply of England. b) Decrease in deliveries to the USSR. c) Postponement of offensive actions, for example, in the Pacific Ocean, and reduction of shipping even at the

expense of the loss of existing territories and positions. A

compromise solution was reached on this issue based on all the possibilities presented.

CHURCHILL agreed to some reduction in supplies to the USSR if the German offensive began to develop in North Africa or the Middle East, because then the Germans would be forced to take up defensive positions on the Russian front and the danger of any breakthrough there would be small.

The decisions taken have already had their effect, consisting in the fact that the Australians and the Dutch resisted this scheme of CHURCHILL and openly condemned it. However, the Americans found a compromise in sending the Australians and the Dutch their fully equipped and armed troops and some military materials. The same decision was made in relation to England, where American troops would be sent to replace trained British troops, which in this case could be transferred to active military theaters for joint operations with American Atlantic strike forces.

parts.

5. The latter is closely related to the decision to put strong pressure on Ireland and force her to transfer to the United States

Irish naval bases. First, American troops will land in Northern Ireland, where several bases have already been set up by the efforts of the Americans themselves. The implementation of this plan will ensure the passage of England's sea convoys across the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, American forces will be ready to enter Ireland either in the event of a German attack on her, or in the event of her decision to end her neutrality. American troops will be trained in England, and the latter undertakes to use its own troops in the first place. 6. It was decided to organize

bases located at the following points along the line of communications: Trinidad, Dakar, Cape Town, Falkland Islands, Delhi, Madras and Rangoon, where US naval and ground forces will be located. 7. It is also decided to open final negotiations with Portugal,

guaranteeing her the preservation of her empire and former borders after the end of the war and a number of secondary concessions, if she agrees to enter into a secret alliance with the allied governments. Portugal will have to guarantee the dispatch of her troops to her colonies in order to reinforce their garrisons in order to prevent a surprise attack and save a large part of the army in the event of a German invasion. In addition, negotiations were underway to create a flank threat to the Germans in Portugal if they tried to advance through Spain to Gibraltar. Although the British doubt the feasibility of this, the Americans attach great importance to such a movement. The reaction of Portugal to the proposal was favorable, and the necessary plans were drawn up, the effectiveness of which the future will show.

8. Finally, it was decided that America would put final pressure on the Vichy government and obtain from it guarantees to organize resistance in North Africa in the event of a German advance into Spain. Despite great opposition in Vichy circles, the Americans are confident that they have strong enough support among them to achieve what they want. In particular, the change in the mood of Vichy circles is explained by the successes of the Soviet resistance and the final establishment of a world coalition. On the other hand, the Germans insist on

decisive changes in the French army and navy, to which DARLAN apparently agreed.

One of the points of confusion in the Allied strategy is that the Americans cannot but expect a German attack in North Africa, although the British claim that the initiative of surprise and speed will be lost as a result. All this is still in the process of great controversy. Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the

USSR FITIN Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign

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No.

211 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the activities of the NKVD of the USSR behind enemy lines

02/13/1942

No. 191/

b On the basis of your instructions, the NKVD, together with the party organizations of the front-line regions, during the war launched work on the preparation and sending behind enemy lines of partisan detachments, fighter, sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

The best fighters and commanders of the fighter battalions of the NKVD, party and Soviet activists on the ground were the basis for the formation of detachments and groups transferred behind enemy lines.

The training of groups and detachments deployed behind enemy lines was carried out at courses at the regional administrations and district departments of the NKVD with the involvement of shooting instructors and demolition specialists.

Arming with personal weapons, grenades, incendiary liquid, explosives and ammunition was carried out at the expense of available resources in the NKVD departments, captured weapons and ammunition were used to a large extent. It should be pointed out that in a number of cases, handicraft and

anti-tank grenades, silent firing mortars, devices for throwing bottles with incendiary liquid, delayed-action mines and

etc.

In the areas of alleged actions of partisan detachments, bases of food, weapons and clothing were created in advance, and in cases where the area was occupied by the enemy, the partisan detachments, remaining in the areas occupied by the enemy, were provided for operations for 2-3 month.

In total, in the front-line regions and republics (Leningrad, Kalinin, Moscow, Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Tula, Ryazan, Rostov regions, Karelian-Finnish, Belorussian, Ukrainian SSR) 1600 partisan detachments numbering 27 thousand were left for operations behind enemy lines people and 500 sabotage groups numbering 2250 people. In addition, in the areas of the front line, work was systematically carried out to form new detachments and groups at the expense of the

fighters of the fighter battalions, Chekists and local Soviet party activists to throw them behind enemy lines. In total, 198 partisan detachments numbering 43,796 people and 1,033 sabotage groups numbering 4,893 demolition fighters were deployed behind enemy lines in the second half of 1941.

Thus, during the war, 77,939 operated behind enemy lines
Human.

Partisan detachments, fighter, reconnaissance and sabotage groups left on the territory captured by the enemy, and subsequently transferred to operate behind enemy lines, carried out mainly the task of destroying the enemy's manpower, his equipment and destroying railway communications, bridges, communications equipment and etc. Objects for destruction by partisans were planned mainly by the military command, which proceeded from the combat missions assigned to them. The most characteristic combat actions of partisan detachments sent by the NKVD during the war are as follows: 1. In September 1941, the NKVD of the USSR threw a partisan detachment behind enemy lines, consisting of NKVD officers in the amount of 34 people, led by the captain of state security

comrade Medvedev D.N. The area of operation of the detachment is the Oryol and Smolensk regions. For 4 months of being in the rear, the detachment increased to 230 due to the commanders and soldiers of the Red Army leaving the encirclement with weapons

Human.

The detachment conducted 50 combat operations, while destroying 425 soldiers and officers, including 2 generals, blew up 9 aircraft, 10 vehicles, 4 steam locomotives, 30 wagons, 10 bridges, disabled 6 factories and a lot of military property. The detachment organized the collapse of 3 military echelons.

During the raid of the detachment on the cities of Zhizdra and Khotimsk, Oryol region, the German commandant's offices and self-government burgomasters were defeated. For several days, Comrade Medvedev's detachment held these cities in their hands, and later, having eliminated traitors and traitors from among the local government, they supplied the food necessary for the detachment, took 600 thousand Soviet money and German marks and left for further operations in the forests.

During the military operations carried out by the detachment of Comrade Medvedev, there were losses in the amount of 8 people killed, including the chief of staff of the detachment, an engineer of the 3rd rank of the NKVD troops, Comrade Staroverov D.D. and the political instructor of the group of military technicians of the 2nd rank of the NKVD troops, comrade Bogolyubov A.F., who heroically fought to the last

bullet. Of the 16 people injured, 12 have recovered and are in service. After the fighting, the

detachment in January 1942 arrived in Moscow in full force - 230 people.

2. Two partisan detachments, formed by the Moscow NKVD, under the leadership of senior lieutenant of state security comrade Kaverznev and lieutenant of state security comrade Babakin, together with a partisan detachment under the command of lieutenant of the NKVD troops comrade Karasev, were transferred in November across the line of the Western Front with the task of eliminating the headquarters of 12- th army corps of the Germans, located in the village of Ugodsky plant, Moscow region.

During the attack, partisan detachments killed up to 450 German soldiers and officers, including one general; the premises of the headquarters and the units guarding it were destroyed, warehouses of fuel and firearms were burned, up to 120 vehicles and up to 150 combat horses were destroyed, communications were destroyed and headquarters documents were seized.

During the operation, 4 partisans were killed, 8 people were missing and 3 people were wounded. Among the wounded was the head of the partisan detachment, lieutenant of the NKVD troops Comrade Karasev. The successful actions of partisan

detachments are confirmed by a number of captured orders of the command of the German armies and formations.

So, in the order of the command of the 127th German infantry division of November 25, 1941, it is indicated: "Recently, in many places, the enemy has transferred single people and entire units behind the front line in order to systematically burn settlements in the rear. IN

On the night of November 24, a well-equipped fighter battalion of approximately 300 men attacked the Ugodsky plant, the seat of the 12th Army Corps. For the successful actions of

partisan detachments, the Military Council of the Western Front awarded orders and medals of the USSR to the most distinguished partisans and their leaders. 3. A partisan detachment

under the command of Major of the NKVD Troops Chaplin, thrown out in November 1941 by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, attacked the headquarters of the German unit located in x. Serebryanka of the Artemovsky district of the Ukrainian SSR, destroyed 36 German soldiers and captured 2 officers, while seizing staff documents and various military equipment.

The next day the partisans attacked the garrison. in the village of Bondaria, where 80 German soldiers and 2 officers were killed.

The guerrilla detachment of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR under the command of the commissar of the fighter battalion Comrade Saburov, who crossed from the territory of Ukraine to the Trubchevsky district of the Oryol region, united with four local detachments. A combined detachment of 151 people in late December 1941 and early January 1942 made a series of attacks and destroyed eight vehicles with enemy infantry, 25 German policemen and the entire local fascist administration in the Suzemsky region. At the same time, the partisans captured trophies: 2 machine guns, 2 machine guns, 50 rifles, 12,000 rounds of ammunition, a car and 12 bicycles.

After that, the partisans blew up 2 railway bridges in the Trubchevsk region, blew up the canvas and caused the collapse of the echelon with military cargo.

Comrade Saburov's detachment is still there. Communication with him supported by radio.

4. At the end of December 1941, the partisan brigade of the NKVD Karelo of the Finnish SSR, numbering 708 people, operating behind enemy lines in the Zaonezhsky region, made a number of successful attacks on the Finnish

garrisons. As a result of these operations, the entire territory of the Senogubsky village council was cleared of Finnish invaders, while the partisans killed 71 Finnish soldiers and officers, 13 Finns were wounded and 17 captured, of which 1 officer and 7 corporals.

Along with this, 12 heavy machine guns, 2 machine guns, 50 rifles, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, staff documents and various military equipment were recaptured from

the Finns. 5. A partisan group of 7 people under the command of an NKVD officer, Comrade Lopukhovskiy A.A., thrown out by the Kalinin UNKVD behind enemy lines, destroyed 100 German soldiers, successfully carried out two train wrecks, destroyed an ammunition depot, blew up 2 tanks, 4 motorcycles, 2 vehicles with ammunition and 1 staff vehicle, destroyed communications and captured one officer. 6. On December 27, 1941, a partisan detachment of

the Cherepetsky district of the Tula region under the command of police sergeant comrade Teterchev and commissar of the state security sergeant comrade Makeev blew up the railway track at the station. Myzhbor. This operation ensured the capture by the advancing

units of the Red Army of the Likhvin station, from which the Germans were unable to take out two echelons loaded with cars, motorcycles and bicycles, a large amount of food, rifles and ammunition.

Two of our divisions were replenished due to the captured weapons and food. In this operation,

the partisans destroyed 27 German soldiers, 5 officers and brought 4,500 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army out of the rear of the enemy. By decree of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the partisans were awarded orders and medals, and the fighter of the detachment Comrade Chekalin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of

the Soviet Union. At the same time, the partisans exterminated traitors and accomplices of the enemy from among the local residents. The partisans also carried out explanatory work and political agitation among the population in the areas where the detachments operated.

In total, as a result of the actions of partisan detachments, according to incomplete data from the Karelo-Finnish SSR, Leningrad, Kalinin, Moscow, Tula, Oryol, Kursk, Rostov regions and the Ukrainian SSR, the enemy lost from partisan raids: killed, wounded and captured - 21,180 people (of which 751 are officers); military headquarters destroyed - 52; combat aircraft destroyed - 33; destroyed tanks and armored vehicles - 180;

destroyed guns and mortars - 81; captured and disabled machine guns and machine guns - 267; disabled cars and motorcycles - 2005; destroyed bridges, warehouses and bases of the enemy - 398; destroyed sections of communication lines - 923; rifles captured - 1240; 127,400 rounds captured; seized bicycles - 132; radio stations destroyed - 12; Carriage with cargo destroyed - 449.

Significant work is being carried out by partisan detachments and sabotage groups in mining highways, railways, industrial enterprises, destroying the rolling stock of enemy railways, as well as in destroying food supplies and industrial raw materials in the territory occupied by the enemy.

During the war, the front-line organs of the NKVD carried out significant reconnaissance work behind enemy lines. For these purposes, the Chekists were included in the partisan detachments, who were assigned the task of reconnaissance. Only in the Kalinin, Moscow, Tula regions and the Ukrainian SSR, 3314 reconnaissance agents systematically crossed the front line, delivering information about the location of enemy headquarters, its firing points, airfields and deployment of troops. The data obtained by this agency was timely reported to the relevant military formations and headquarters for operational use.

Partisan detachments and reconnaissance

agents withdrew from the rear of the enemy up to 33 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who were surrounded.

The preparation and transfer of partisan detachments and sabotage groups to the rear of the enemy by the NKVD continues. From the regions whose territories have now been cleared of fascist invaders, partisan groups and detachments are being transferred to neighboring territories, where enemy troops are still present, to carry out subversive work. During the

war, by decrees of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as well as by decisions of the military councils of the fronts, 490 people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Of the awarded partisans of the Tula region, one was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In recent days, a number of partisan detachments have returned from the rear, whose actions to exterminate the enemy are considered by the NKVD of the USSR

successful, in connection with which he petitions for the award of 206 of the most distinguished leaders and

fighters. Of these: 5 people - the Order of Lenin; 42 people - the Order of the Red Banner; 79 people - the Order of the Red Star; 5 people - the Order of the Badge of Honor; 33 people - the medal "For Courage"; 42 people - the medal "For Military Merit".

Enclosing the draft Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I ask for your decision.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

BERIA Published: State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 1. M., 2003. S. 116-121.

No.

212 Special message by P.M. Fitina

I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria on

the secret memorandum of the British Foreign Office

02/20/1942

Copy

of the Soviet.

secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade

Stalin, comrade Molotov, comrade

Beria We are reporting the contents of the secret memorandum of the British Foreign Office dated January 15 of this year, which was sent out for familiarization to members of the government.

The content of the memorandum was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"Memorandum on the situation in Germany.

Since mid-December, many articles have appeared in the British press about the plight of the German army, about internal divisions and about the deterioration of morale in Germany. Therefore, not without obvious reason, the British public is beginning to think about the imminent German defeat and even about the end of the war in Europe before the summer. This way of thinking is very dangerous. In general, printing is based on the following provisions:

1. The conflict between HITLER and the generals, which found culminating expression in the removal of BRAUCHITZ on 21 December.

The retreat of the German army under strong pressure from the Russians.

Gathering winter things along with extremely gloomy Christmas performances by HITLER, GOEBBELS and company. New Year's

Information about the unrest in Germany, about the establishment of patrols armed with machine guns at the crossroads of streets, about the transfer by HITLER of his headquarters on the Eastern Front, about the recall from

Eastern Front of the SS units and the establishment of a cordon sanitaire between the army and eastern

Germany. Information about the increased number of deserters from the army, about the deplorable physical and moral condition of the units withdrawn from the Eastern Front for replenishment and reorganization, and about the executions of German soldiers in Besançon, Constanta,

Belgorod, and so on. Report on the spread

of typhus. Of course, the picture presented in this way is drawn favorable, but, unfortunately, many facts have not been verified and their interpretation is largely over-optimistic. Let us

consider all these provisions in order: It is certain that there have been disagreements between HITLER and his generals of late regarding the conduct of the Russian campaign, and relations between the army and the party are unhealthy. But how dangerous it is, we do not yet have enough data to draw a conclusion.

2. Having failed in their main aims, the German army began a planned retreat, and the degree of Russian success can only be judged by the degree of disorder they bring to the German retreat. By next spring the Germans will probably be in a position to launch an offensive which, once launched, will probably have considerable success. However, one can get the impression from newspaper reports that the German army is in great difficulty, that the Russians have already broken through the Nazi line of defense of Vyazma-Bryansk and are seizing a large amount of military material (for example, a recent report on the capture of military materials sufficient for 14 tank and 10 infantry divisions) and that the Germans are experiencing an acute shortage of oil. 3. As for the gloomy speeches of HITLER and GOEBBELS

before the new year and Christmas, this is probably due to the fact that HITLER came to the conclusion that it was impossible to hide the situation on the Eastern Front any further, hoping to make the collection of winter clothes more successful (they say that already more than 60 million warm clothes). This can only serve as proof of the remarkable confidence in the good morale of the German civilian population. According to the majority

our best sources, tangible signs of a decline in the morale of the population or any organized opposition in the country are not available. Undoubtedly, as a result of the eastern campaign, there is a certain decline in the morale of the German soldier. As far as the civilian population is concerned, apathy may have given way to uncertainty and even doubt. There is no doubt that depression and war weariness have increased among the elderly, but the discipline and fanaticism of people under 35, in our opinion, remain unshaken. Therefore, it remains a controversial

question that when the morale of the German people really begins to crack, it will happen, as in 1918, immediately, and not gradually.

4. The message about the withdrawal of SS units from the Eastern Front is incorrect. For rest and replenishment of the SS units, no more was allocated from the front than other active units. Already a few months ago, HIMMLER moved his headquarters to the Eastern Front, which he periodically visits. So far, there has been no serious unrest, except for occasional riots that have broken out (for example, in lines for food), and reports of a company of patrols with machine guns in the street have not been confirmed at all.

5. In fact, there is no significant increase in the number of deserters from the army. Naturally, with an army of 286 divisions, the German military authorities must from time to time act a little more severely with respect to the overblown soldiers in the occupied territories. German soldiers returning from the Eastern Front may speak, but they would prefer not to return there, but there is no evidence that the orders given to return to the Russian front would not have been carried out. Troops withdrawn from the front for replenishment are often in a pitiful condition, but if it were otherwise, they would continue to be in the first line. With regard to the spread of typhus, forty cases have so far been confirmed in the western regions as

far as Frankfurt an der Oder. However, it must be remembered that typhus is an epidemic disease in Eastern Europe, and it is natural that as a result of ongoing military operations, the spread of typhus will increase even more. Typhus intimidation with enthusiasm

was used by our propaganda in Germany and the occupied territories,
and therefore we must be careful not to fall into a trap set by ourselves."

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of

the NKVD of the USSR FITIN Published: Essays on the
history

of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6

vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 550-552.

No.

213 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the use of uranium atomic energy for military purposes

03/01/1942

Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE
SSR To Comrade

STALIN In a number of capitalist countries, in connection with the ongoing work on the fission of the atomic nucleus in order to obtain a new source of energy, a study was begun on the use of atomic energy of uranium for military purposes.

In 1939, intensive research work was launched in France, England, the USA and Germany to develop a method for using uranium for new explosives. These works are carried out in conditions of great secrecy.

From the attached top secret materials obtained by the NKVD of the USSR in England through intelligence, characterizing the activities of the Uranium Committee on the issue of atomic energy of uranium, it is clear

that: for military purposes.

b) The Uranium Committee of the War Cabinet, headed by the famous English physicist G.P. THOMSON, coordinates the work of prominent British scientists involved in the use of uranium atomic energy, both in terms of theoretical and purely applied, i.e. making uranium bombs with great destructive power.

c) These studies are based on the use of one of the isotopes of uranium, U-235, which has the property of efficient fission. For this, uranium ore is used, the most

significant reserves of which are found in Canada, the Belgian Congo, the Sudetes and Portugal.

d) The French scientists HALBAN and KOVARSKY, who emigrated to England, developed a method for separating the uranium-235 isotope by using uranium oxide treated with heavy water. English scientists,

Professor PEYERLS and Doctor of Physical Sciences BICE, have developed a method for separating the reactive isotope U-235 using a diffusing apparatus designed by Dr. SIMON, which is recommended for practical use in obtaining uranium, which is used to make a uranium bomb.

e) In mastering the production method for isolating U-235, in addition to a number of research institutions in England, the Woolwich Arsenal, as well as the Metro-Vickers firms, the chemical concern Imperial Chemical Industries, are directly involved. This concern gives the following assessment of the state of development of the method for obtaining U-235 and the production of uranium bombs:

“Research work on the use of atomic energy for uranium bombs has reached the stage where it is necessary to start work on a large scale. This problem can be solved and the necessary plant can be built.” f) The Uranium Committee seeks cooperation with

the relevant research organizations and firms in the USA (the DuPont firm), limiting itself to theoretical questions only. The applied side of the development is based on the following main provisions, confirmed by theoretical

calculations and experimental work, namely: Professor of the University of Birmingham R. PEYERLS theoretically determined that the weight of 10 kg of U-235 is a critical value.

The amount of this substance is less than critical, stable and completely safe, while in the mass of U-235, more than 10 kg, a progressive fission reaction occurs, causing an enormous explosion. When designing bombs, the active part must consist of two equal halves, in their sum exceeding the critical value. To produce the maximum explosive force of these parts of U-235, according to

according to Professor FERPOSSON of the research department of the Woolwich Arsenal, the speed of mass movement should lie within 6000 feet / second. With a decrease in this speed, the chain reaction of the splitting of uranium atoms is attenuated and the force of the explosion decreases significantly, but still many times exceeds the force of an explosion of a conventional explosive.

Professor TAYLOR calculated that the destructive effect of 10 kg U-235 will correspond to 1600 tons of TNT.

The whole complexity of the production of uranium bombs lies in the difficulty of separating the active part of uranium - U-235 from other isotopes, making a shell of a bomb that prevents disintegration, and obtaining the necessary speed of mass movement.

According to the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) concern, the separation of the isotope U-235 will require 1,900 devices of the Dr. SIMON system at a cost of 3,300,000 pounds, and the cost of the entire enterprise will be expressed in the amount of 4.5-5 million pounds.

With the production of 36 bombs per year by such a plant, the cost of one bomb would be £236,000 compared to the cost of 1,500 tons of TNT at £326,000.

The study of materials on the development of the problem of uranium for the military goals in England leads to the following conclusions:

The High Military Command of England considers the question of the practical use of atomic energy of uranium (U-235) for military purposes resolved in principle. The

Uranium Committee of the British War Cabinet developed a preliminary theoretical part for the design and construction of a plant for the manufacture of uranium bombs. The efforts and capabilities of the

most important scientists, scientific research organizations and large firms in England are united and directed to the development of the problem of uranium-235, which is especially classified.

English War Cabinet deals with the issue of a fundamental decision on the organization of the production of uranium

bombs. Based on the importance and relevance of the problem of the practical application of uranium-235 atomic energy for the military purposes of the Soviet Union, it would be advisable:

Work out the question of setting up a scientific advisory body under the USSR State Defense Committee composed of authoritative persons to coordinate, study and direct the work of all scientists and scientific research organizations of the USSR dealing with the issue of uranium atomic energy. To

provide secret acquaintance with the materials of the NKVD of the USSR on uranium to prominent specialists in order to give an assessment and appropriate use. Note: The

problems of

nuclear fission in the USSR were dealt with by Academician KAPITSA at the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician SKOBELTSIN at the Leningrad Physics Institute, and Professor SLUTSKII at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6 vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 673-675.

No. 214

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the book-album "The Truth about Religion in the USSR"" [52]

03/10/1942

Strictly secret 259

— About the book-album "The Truth about Religion in the USSR". Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to take the necessary measures to ensure the publication of the book-album "The Truth about Religion in the USSR" by the Moscow Patriarchate in accordance with the submitted plan. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 32. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 36. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Molotov.

No.

215 Special message by P.M. Fitina I.V. Stalin about the data received from a source in England

03/14/1942

The resident of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR in London, based on data from a verified source with connections in the American embassy in England, said

the following: "American circles are very concerned about the departure of the German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prince Eugene from Brest. According to the Americans, this is a partial fulfillment of the Nazi plan to cut off communication with Murmansk and Arkhangelsk at the very moment when most of the American war materials promised to the Soviet Union will be on their way to the USSR. It is believed that these ships will operate in conjunction with the Von Tirpitz and two other newly built battleships to prevent the transfer of large military supplies to the Soviet Union. Americans remember the successful Nazi attacks on caravans in the summer of 1940. They do not believe that the Nazis intend to attack Iceland or that they are preparing to invade England. This point of view was communicated to the British, and the Americans declared that it was necessary

to rectify the situation at once. The Americans doubt that all three ships were seriously damaged. They refer to the experience of bombing ships in Brest and say that photographs of ships in Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg may be fake. The British, on the other hand, say that when the ships passed through the canal, a period of very bad weather began in the North Sea. Fog, snowfall, rain, hail and storms meant that a week after the departure of the ships, visibility was so poor that submarines and ships could barely see anything at a distance of 200 yards.

The Admiralty believes that a torpedo hit the Prince Eugene" from a submarine under these conditions is simply a miracle.

Nevertheless, the Americans assume that the Germans staged a skillful staging in the canal to divert the attention and forces of the British from the German coast and allow their other large naval formations to pass from Oslo north to Trondheim and, possibly, even further to Narvik, Harstad and Tromsø, where the final preparations are being made for an attack on caravans and for establishing a blockade of the northern Russian ports. The Americans therefore propose to concentrate naval forces in this area in order to accompany the upcoming shipments to Russia with an appropriate convoy.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR
FITIN

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6
vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 560-561.

No.

216 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about "pro-fascist" sentiments among athletes

03/19/1942

Sov. secret

No. 444 /

b of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN * The NKVD of the USSR has materials indicating pro-fascist sentiments and enemy work * of athletes: Starostin Nikolai Petrovich, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Moscow city society "SPARTAK"; Andrey Petrovich Starostin, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, director of the SPORT and TOURISM factory, and Petr Petrovich Starostin, member of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks, director of the SPARTAK Production Combine. In 1937-1938. the investigation into the case of the liquidated spy organization, created by an employee of the German embassy in Moscow von Hervard among workers of physical culture and sports, established the involvement of

STAROSTINY Nikolai and Andrey in this organization. The arrested members of this organization Steblev V.N., Ryabokon V.N. and Krivonosov S.G. the investigation showed that Starostin N.P. was associated with Hervard and carried

Steblev V.N., Ryabokon V.N. and Krivonosov S.G. his testimony to court confirmed and convicted.

In the course of further development, reports were received that Starostin N.P. and his brothers are anti-Soviet and spread slanderous fabrications against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government. At the time of the tense martial law near Starostin's Moscow, Nikolai

and Andrei, spreading defeatism among their entourage, were preparing to stay in Moscow, hoping

in the event of the occupation of the city by the Germans, take a leading position in the "Russian sport". The political

sentiments of the Starostins during this period of time characterized by the following statements.

Starostin Andrei, among those close to him, said: "The Germans will occupy Moscow, Leningrad. The occupation of these centers is the end of Bolshevism, the liquidation of Soviet power and the creation of a new order ... The Bolshevik idea, which involved me

in the party in 1929, has completely disappeared by now, not a trace remains of it.

Special events held in November 1941 recorded the following statements by Starostin Nikolai and members of his family:

Starostin N. - "The 11th day of the German offensive, well, in a week they will be here. We need to hurry up with the apartment and arrange everything tomorrow. "... if you take rooms, then only from the Jews,

because they will not come here anymore." Wife - "... Golitsyno is located 10 kilometers from Moscow, Lyalechka

(Starostin's daughter) is going to learn German, I will also learn, otherwise the Germans will come, but I don't even know how to speak ... "

Starostin: "Yes, life is beginning to be interesting." Wife - "It was interesting in 1917, they fought for life, and now they are destroying everything.

Starostin: "What was interesting then?" Wife - "The overthrow of tsarism." Starostin: "And now

communism is being overthrown." Wife - "I would rather ..." In preparation for cooperation

with the German occupation authorities and having grouped around themselves a class-alien element, the Starostins began to accumulate material assets (currency, gold) and food supplies. It has been established that the Starostins are connected with a branched group of plunderers of socialist property in the system of

Industrial Cooperation and industrial enterprises of the sports society "SPARTAK".

The predatory activities of this group assumed a wide scope, especially during the war. Of the members of the group, 15 people have been arrested so far. The testimony of the accused Starostin Nikolai is exposed as one of its leaders. Using his

connections among individual senior officials of Soviet and economic bodies, Starostin Nikolai, receiving large bribes, illegally booked persons to be mobilized into the Red Army, and organized registration in Moscow of a class-alien and criminal element. * The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest

Starostin N.P. and Starostin A.P. I ask for your instructions*. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the

USSR General Commissar of State Security

BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 96-98. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "For currency speculation and

plundering the property of industrial cooperation - to arrest. I. St.

— Underlined in pencil.

No.

**217 Special message by P.M. Fitina
I.V. Stalin about the review of
British political intelligence**

03/21/1942

We present some excerpts from the review of British political intelligence for the week ending March 1, received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

“Germany

The morale of the population and the army. In a letter dated January 13, 1942, a Baltic officer in Berlin informs the Japanese military attache of one of the European countries: “... It is obvious that the morale of the German troops is not very high, and in the rear it is even worse. The German population has been spoiled by news of continual victories and cannot bear the news of defeat. Due to failures on the Eastern Front, the morale here is not very good, no one believes that the war will end soon ... ”. A source who arrived in Germany four weeks

before the beginning of January and had the opportunity to receive information reports: “The morale of the troops on the Eastern Front has noticeably deteriorated, and as a result of this, the fighting qualities have decreased, especially due to the ever-growing conviction in the superiority of Russian troops over Germanic. The irregular supply of foodstuffs, the lack of warm clothing

and the lack of winter quarters also have a great influence on morale. There were cases when slightly wounded soldiers, leaving the front line, threw their weapons and equipment. However, there are no cases of open uprisings or mass desertion, and the fresh units arriving at the front, consisting of young people, are still full of enthusiasm.

Although, perhaps, one should not attach serious importance, it is still interesting to note what the Wilhelmstrasse officials talk about among themselves. Data refer to mid-January.

According to them, a crisis should be expected in Germany around April. Differences within the party are growing stronger. Relations between HIMMLER and GOERING deteriorated, and the SS has recently stepped up espionage in the army. The resignation of von BRAUCHTITZ frightened many. Some of these officials think that HITLER is no longer delving into everything as he used to be, and that the indecision of some quarters may affect the possibility of a crisis. The Baltic officer, whose letter we quoted above, also mentions that the left wing of the party is pursuing its policy, with the aim of reaching an agreement with the Russians. He also says that the prestige of the party has fallen in the eyes of the population.

Finland

Eastern Front. We have received information that the Germans are partially replacing the Finnish troops on the Southern Front, as part of the Finnish troops must return to agricultural work, and part is sent to the Northern Front. From the Finnish staff officers, we know the following version: the Finns told the Germans that the Finnish troops should be withdrawn from the front to carry out agricultural work. The Germans agreed to send their troops to the Svir on the condition that in March the Finns would launch an offensive to secure access to the White Sea, after which they could withdraw their troops.

Preparing Axis Countries for a Compromise

Peace In mid-February, information was received from the French embassy in Berne that since the beginning of February, the diplomatic circles of the Axis countries in Bern had begun intensive activities related to plans for a compromise peace. Fascist diplomats emphasize that if Russia is not defeated by the summer of 1942, then Bolshevism will spread throughout the continent. Germany exerts strong pressure in this direction on Switzerland and France, and also on almost all neutral countries through their missions in Switzerland. The Germans declare that the Vichy government agrees to act as an intermediary in Washington. There is also an indication that

Switzerland intends to discuss a peace plan with Portugal

campaigns.

Italy

The Romanian Prince Nicholas, upon his arrival in Switzerland, reported the following about his impressions of Italy. The Duce still enjoys personal popularity, although he is looked upon as the Gauleiter of Germany. However, the fascist regime is hated by the masses and the intelligentsia. The entire population is weary of the war, but the possibilities of revolution are still remote. 10,000 Sicilians were

evicted to Piedmont in order to free up houses in Sicily for German air personnel, and also because of their anti-war sentiment (these reports are consistent with available reports from other sources).

Germany and the Baltic states A possible change in German policy. Lithuanians and Estonians were given permission to celebrate Independence Day on February 16 and 24 and even to express some national feelings about it. This may be a sign of an emerging change in German policy towards the Baltic states. The recruitment of the labor force among Estonians for Germany takes place in various ways. Until the beginning of February, about 700 Estonian workers left for Germany (earlier it was reported that by mid-January 6,000 people had left).

Bulgaria

German secret agents report that the Communists have recently made unsuccessful attempts to blow up the house of the Bulgarian War Ministry. The attempt was also directed against the German press attache, who lived in this house.

Turkey

Turkey and the impending German offensive. Bulgarian The military attache reported to Sofia the following:

1. Anticipating the possibility of a German attack and subsequent Russian attempt to save their fleet by seizing the straits,

using land and sea forces for this, the Turks are preparing to take appropriate measures, namely: a) as soon

as the Germans begin the offensive, the Turkish army will be regrouped and the troops on the Caucasian border and on the Black Sea coast will be significantly

strengthened; b) Turkish foreign policy will gradually be guided by friendship with Germany.

2. The newly appointed Turkish ambassador to England is an Anglophile, but not to the same extent as the ARAS, which was considered too pro-British and for this reason was recalled. Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR FITIN

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6 vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 561-563.

No.

**218 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about
the detention of German [53]
saboteurs**

04/25/1942

No. 732/

b Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO COMRADE
STALIN * In March-

April 1942, the NKVD detained 76 agents of German military intelligence, deployed on planes as part of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and alone for espionage and sabotage work * in the cities. Vologda, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Alexandrov (Ivanovo region), Penza, Molotov, Tambov, Kuibyshev, Stalingrad, Kazan, Gorky and in the military rear of the Western Front. *21 portable transceiver radio stations were confiscated

from the detainees, through which they were supposed to transmit the collected information in a cipher and report the results of sabotage actions*.

All *these German agents are former Red Army soldiers* who were captured by the Germans, where they were recruited and trained in intelligence schools. * Of these, 25 people are former middle commanders * of the Red Army, 19 junior commanders and 32 ordinary soldiers.

* Part of the deployed agents (23 people) voluntarily turned themselves in to the NKVD

with a confession *. In order to limit the activity of German intelligence agencies in the cities mentioned above and create the appearance of the work of deployed spy groups and individuals on assignments from German intelligence, we managed to establish radio contact with German intelligence agencies in 12 captured enemy radio stations in the cities.

Warsaw (center of German military intelligence), Pskov, Dno, Smolensk, Minsk, Kharkov, Poltava.

The NKVD of the USSR believes that *captured German radio stations can be used in the interests of the High Command of the Red Army to misinform the enemy regarding the deployment and regrouping of Red Army units*. Therefore, if this

measure is deemed expedient by you, we consider it necessary ** to instruct the Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, comrade. BODIN and the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate comrade. PANFILOV to develop a procedure for developing materials on disinformation of the enemy and transferring them to the NKVD of the USSR for implementation through captured German radio stations **.

The transmission of disinformation to the enemy through captured radios will be ensured by reliable control. *I

ask for your instructions*.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 404. L. 60-61. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T-schu Beria. I agree that t.t. Bodin and Panfilov previously showed me their disinformation instructions. I. Stalin. *—* Underlined in pencil. **—** Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

**No.
219 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin
about the arrest of the head
of the "counter-revolutionary"
group M.P. Mgar [54]**

04/28/1942

No.

748 / b Top secret

GKO - to Comrade STALIN In

February of this year. the NKVD of the USSR received undercover information that the instructor of the Political Department of the Moscow branch of the traffic service of the Yaroslavl railway MGAR Mikhail Prokofievich, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1939, is conducting anti-Soviet conversations and

groups dissatisfied people around him. Further verification found that MGAR M.P. draws up counter-revolutionary documents for the purpose of their reproduction

and distribution. Based on these data, MGAR was arrested by us. Produced by a search at MGAR MP. a number of counter-revolutionary documents compiled by him were discovered. In particular, "The country of modern slavery", theses on the drafting of the c.r. document on the war and a list of practical tasks in the fight against Soviet power.

Documents are attached.

Preliminary investigation established that MGAR M.P. Together with his like-minded people, he intended to create a counter-revolutionary organization called the "People's Party of Working People" and outlined himself as a member of the Central Committee of this "party".

Counting on the failure of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany, MGAR, through a member of the counter-revolutionary group Shokin I.P.

took steps to establish contact with the Germans to obtain funds and instructions for conducting enemy work. Five people were arrested in

this case: 1. MGAR Mikhail Prokofievich. 2. SHOKIN

Ivan Petrovich, member of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, editor-in-chief of the newspaper "On the Stalinist Way" of the Political Department of the Moscow Branch of the Traffic Service of the Yaroslavl Railway. 3. AZOV Alexander

Illarionovich, member of the CPSU (b), deputy head of the 10th section of the track service of the Yaroslavl railway. 4.

BULYGIN Vasily Vasilyevich, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, former construction technician of the Kalinin

railway, retired. 5. CHISTYAKOV Sergei Andreevich, former member of the Komsomol, from 1919 to 1922 dropped out of his own free will, pom. platoon commander of the VNOS Service Directorate of the North-Western Front.

The investigation continues.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP

RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 96-98. Script. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a resolution: "Arrest. St.".

No.

**220 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin on the activities of partisan
detachments in the territory of the
Smolensk and Oryol regions temporarily
occupied by the enemy**

05/10/1942

No. 839/

b Behind enemy lines on the territory of the Smolensk region, on May 1, 1942, communication was established with 40 active partisan detachments with a total number of 15,520 people.

Four large partisan detachments are directly subordinated to the command of the Red Army: the detachment "Grandfather" numbering 5200 people, which occupies the city of Dorogobuzh and the Glinka station; detachments named after Lazo - 2143 people and F.D. - 2363 people operating in the area of the city of Yelnya, and a Jabot

detachment of 1608 people. These detachments are staffed mainly by military personnel being surrounded by the enemy.

The rest of the partisan detachments consist mainly of the local population and operate under the leadership of the NKVD or employees of local party and Soviet bodies.

Of these detachments, the largest was Lukyanov's detachment in 1500 people. The number of other units is from 226 to 23 people.

In the German-occupied areas of the Oryol region, 65 partisan detachments operate. As of May 1, 1942, communication was established with 47 detachments with a total number of 10,700

people. Five partisan detachments numbering from 36 to 68 servicemen operate under the command of the commanders of the Red Army. One detachment of 600 people operates in the Dyatkovo region under the command of Captain Orlov, who was transferred by the headquarters of the Western Front to the rear of the enemy to organize a headquarters for

the leadership actions to districts Lyudinovo, Dyatkovo, of Ordzhonikidzeograd,

Bryansk. The partisan detachments of the Dyatkovo district under the command of the NKVD officer Sentyurin are holding the city

of Dyatkovo. 9 partisan detachments with a total number of 8,000 people under the command of an NKVD officer Yemlyutin control the territory of the Navlyansky, Trubchevsky, Sevsky and Brasovsky districts. On April 24, 1942, the

villages of Seredina-Buda, Bukarevka, Chernatskoye and others were occupied by the southern group of these detachments. During the battle, partisans defeated 3 Hungarian battalions. The

partisan detachments of the Dyatkovo, Ordzhonikidzeograd, Zhukovsky and Lyudinovsky districts are armed with 11 guns, 15 mortars, 23 heavy and 43 light machine guns.

Partisan detachments of the Oryol region mobilized and transported across the front line 15,000 people to be drafted into the Red Army; 650,000 rubles were collected for the country's defense fund and a subscription was made to a military loan for 1,000,000 rubles; 600,000 rubles were collected in cash upon subscription. Along with the fighting, the

partisans of the Smolensk and Oryol regions constantly conduct military and undercover intelligence. All operations of partisan detachments are connected

with the fulfillment of the tasks of the military command of the Red Army and are carried out in accordance with the interests of our troops operating at the front and behind enemy lines.

Separate partisan detachments are supplied with essential food, medicines and ammunition by air. In order to form new and in order to activate existing partisan

detachments, operational groups of the NKVD, commanders and political workers, as well as partisans who previously operated in areas now liberated from the invaders, are transferred behind enemy lines.

Measures are being taken to establish reliable communications with all partisan detachments and to provide the largest of them with radio equipment.

In addition, in the territory of the Smolensk region there are 8 and in the territory of the Oryol region - 5 partisan detachments organized by the NKVD of the USSR. The number of

these detachments is 35 people each. The main task of the partisan detachments of the NKVD of the USSR is undercover and military intelligence behind enemy

lines. The detachments regularly transmit to the military command and to the center valuable intelligence data on the deployment of enemy military units, the construction of defensive lines, the location of airfields, ammunition depots, the results of enemy bombing by our aircraft, etc.

These detachments also organize sabotage on communications enemy.

A partisan detachment of the NKVD of the USSR under the command of Comrade Voropaev, operating 15 km from Smolensk, from April 9 to April 20, 1942, on the Rudnya-Smolensk railway line, 3 echelons with manpower and equipment of the enemy were derailed, a bridge was blown up and an armed policeman was destroyed group of 11 people.

A detachment under the command of Comrade Bazhanov, operating on the Smolensk-Orsha line, in the area of the Krasnoe-Osinovka stations on April 13, 1942, blew up a train on mines. As a result of the train crash, a locomotive, 10 wagons were destroyed and train traffic was disrupted from April 13 to

April 25. April 21, 1942 a detachment under the command of comrade. Khvostov, operating in the area of the Lelekvinskaya - Ploskaya stations along the Vitebsk - Smolensk railway line, blew up two echelons with artillery and enemy manpower on mines. There were many casualties as a result of the explosions.

From February 24 to May 1942, a partisan detachment of the NKVD of the USSR under the command of Comrade Shestakov, operating in the Lyudinovo district of the Oryol region, destroyed 4 enemy officers and 122 soldiers, 6 policemen, blew up the railway bridge, destroyed the railway track in three places, captured the German food warehouse . People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR BERIA Published: State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 1. M., 2003. S. 421—

423.

No.

**221 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about
liberation
specialist prisoners**

06/16/1942

No. 1051/

b Sov. secret

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
Comrade

IV STALIN Appointed in

accordance with your instructions as the chief designer of plant No. 500 NKAP A.D. On June 4, Charomsky began work on fine-tuning the M-30 diesel engine. At the same time, I gave instructions to send a group of specialists from the 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR to this plant, working under the leadership of A.D. CHAROMSKY for the design and production of the M-20 diesel engine and those who also know the production of the M-30 diesel

engine. During the period of work in the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR A.D. CHAROMSKY and individual specialists working with him showed a very conscientious attitude to the duties entrusted to them and showed a useful initiative and perseverance in solving important

technical issues. Considering the above, and also the need to provide A.D. CHAROMSKY of all opportunities to independently resolve various technical and organizational issues related to the refinement of the M-30 diesel engine, * I consider it appropriate to file a petition with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for early release, with the removal of a criminal record, A.D. CHAROMSKY and 8 imprisoned diesel specialists sent to work at plant No. 500*. Attaching a list of specialists, I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: List for 9 people.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

<i>LIST</i>

imprisoned specialists of the 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR, submitted for early release.

1. Alexey Dmitrievich CHAROMSKY 2.

Afanasy Antipovich SHUMILIN 3.

Andrey Dmitrievich GRACHEV

4. Stepan Gerasimovich STETSKII

5. Leonid Semenovich TATKO

6. Fedor Matveevich VEREVKIN

7. Stepan Maksimovich KORSAKOV

8. Ivan Ivanovich SIDORIN 9.

Mikhail Arsentievich MOLCHANOV V

E R N O:

Head of the 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the

USSR V. KRAVCHENKO of the AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 111-113. Script.

Typescript.

— Crossed out in the margins with two lines with a resolution: "I agree. I. Stalin.

No.

222 Cipher telegram B.A. Dvinsky I.V. Stalin on the eviction of families of traitors from the Rostov region

06/16/1942

No. 3994

sh From Rostov-on-

Don Moscow, to the Secretary of the Central

Committee comrade. STALIN First. In the areas of the Rostov region, which were occupied by the Germans, there are still families of traitors who left with the German troops when they were driven out of Rostov and a number of regions. Now units of the Red Army are stationed in these areas, defensive fortifications have been built, and these families, whose mood is, of course, bad, must be evicted, and quickly, since it is becoming more and more dangerous to keep them here. *Total of such families in areas liberated

from occupation and

we assigned 1447 to the city of Rostov.

I ask you to expedite the decision in the GOKO on the eviction of such families in the coming

days*. Second. If we are evicting dangerous people from the left bank of the Don, then it is all the more necessary to evict such persons from the cities on the right bank, which are the nearest rear of the army (Rostov, Novocherkassk, Shakhty, Novoshakhtinsk, Kamensk, Millerovo, Krasny Sulin, Zverevsky district - Likhaya station and the areas that were occupied occupiers). The total number of such families is determined by us to be about a thousand. I ask

you to expedite the consideration of this issue.

Secretary of the Rostov Regional Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks DVINSKY RGASPI. F. 558. Op.

11. D. 66. L. 47. Original. Typescript. There is a resolution on the sheet: "T-schu Beria. Your opinion? I. Stalin.

No.

223 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about repressions against family members of traitors to the motherland

06/18/1942

No. 1066/

b Top secret Ex. No.

1 STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO COMRADE

STALIN 1. On the

basis of existing laws and decisions of government bodies, family members of traitors convicted under Art. 58-1 "a" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code of other union republics for flight or flight abroad are exiled to remote regions of Siberia for 5 years (Article 58-1 "c" of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and the decision of the Central Committee of the

CPSU (b) and SNK USSR from 7.XII-1940). In addition, on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army No. 270 dated August 16, 1941, members of the families of commanders and political workers who tear off their insignia during battle and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy are held

accountable. The repression of family members of traitors to the homeland of this category is carried out on the basis of the sentences of the Military Tribunals sent for execution to the NKVD bodies at the place of residence of family members of traitors to the homeland.

During the war, NKVD authorities received 2,305 verdicts from the judiciary, according to which 1,852 people were held accountable by the NKVD. 650 families were not found or turned out to be living in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The NKVD bodies also took measures to repress family members of military personnel who, having committed the murder of their commanders, went over to the side of the enemy. In total, during the war period, there were 16 such cases on various fronts, for which 45 families are subject to prosecution, of which 24 families were repressed, the rest are being established.

II. However, the families of persons convicted of espionage or treason and assistance to the German occupiers, for serving in the punitive or administrative bodies of the German occupiers in the territory they have occupied, and of persons who voluntarily left with the occupying forces during the liberation of the areas occupied by the enemy - within the meaning of existing legal provisions and government orders are not held accountable.

The NKVD bodies registered this category of persons in the areas liberated from the enemy. 10,298 such families were identified with a total of 37,350 people (including 2,244 men, 15,251 women and 19,855 children).

In addition, in the rear areas of the Soviet Union, 1,220 people were convicted of spying for Germany and the countries at war with us, and 2,917 people are under investigation for the same crime.

In parts of the Red Army, over 23,000 people were arrested by the Special Departments for espionage, an attempt to treason, and for treasonous intentions.

The NKVD of the USSR considers that the families of these persons, if the latter are sentenced to capital punishment, are also subject to repression. While presenting a draft resolution of the State Defense Committee, I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: according to
the text. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 59. L. 68-70. Script. Typescript.

No. 224

GKO resolution on family members

traitors to the motherland

06/24/1942

SOV. SECRET

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

DECISION No. GOKO-1926SS of June

24, 1942 Moscow, Kremlin On family members of traitors to the motherland, the State Defense Committee decides: punishment under Art. 58-1a of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code of other Union republics: for espionage in favor of Germany and other countries at war with us, for going over to the side of the enemy, betraying or assisting the German occupiers, serving in the punitive or administrative bodies of the German occupiers in the territory occupied by them and for an attempt to treason and treasonous intentions - are subject to arrest and exile in remote areas of the USSR for a period of five years.

2. Establish that the families of persons sentenced in absentia to capital punishment by the judiciary or by the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR for voluntarily leaving with the occupying forces during the liberation of the territory occupied by the enemy are also subject to arrest and exile to remote areas of the USSR for a period of five years.

3. The use of repression against family members listed in paragraphs. 1 and 2 persons are produced by the NKVD bodies on the basis of the verdicts of the judiciary or decisions of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. Father, mother,

husband, wife, sons, daughters, brothers and sisters are considered family members of the traitor to the motherland, if they lived together with the traitor to the motherland or were dependent on him by the time

the commission of a crime or by the time of mobilization into the army in connection with

the outbreak of war. 4. The families of those traitors to the motherland, in whose composition, after due verification, the presence of Red Army servicemen, partisans, persons who assisted the Red Army and partisans during the period of occupation, as well as those awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union, are not subject to arrest and exile.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN AP RF. F.

3. Op. 57. D. 59. L. 67. Original. Typescript. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Bochkov, Ulrich, Vyshinsky, Golyakov, Vasilevsky, Chadayev.

No. 225

Decree of the GKO on military [\[55\]](#)

censorship

06/28/1942

SOV. SECRET

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

DECISION No. GOKO-1938SS of

June 28, 1942 Moscow, Kremlin

On Military

Censorship

decides:

1. Extend the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 6, 1941 No. GOKO-37ss on the introduction of military censorship on all postal and telegraph correspondence to all regions, territories, republics of the USSR. 2. Allow the NKVD of

the USSR to further increase the staff of the military censorship on 3800 political

controllers. Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN

Published: State Security Organs of the USSR in
Great Patriotic War: Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 1. M., 2003. S. 572.

No.

226 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the encirclement of the command of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front by enemy troops

07/21/1942

According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, from the employees of the Special Department and the commanders of the 2nd Shock Army who left the encirclement, information was received about being surrounded by the command of this army.

The military council of the 2nd Shock Army, having lost control of the southern and western groups of troops, on June 23 of this year. decided to withdraw the army headquarters to the location of the 59th army.

By order of the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, all radio stations were destroyed on the same day, as a result of which communication with the northern group of troops was also lost.

At 23 o'clock. On June 23, the Military Council and the army headquarters moved from the command post of the Drovyanoe Pole region to the command post of the 57th Infantry Brigade on the eastern bank of the river. Glushitsa, closer to the place of the breakthrough of the enemy units, and the next day at night, together with the employees of the Special Department, lined up in a column, under the cover of a group of soldiers of the company of the Special Department, headed for the exit from the encirclement. Not reaching the river

Polist, the column went astray and, advancing to the north, stumbled upon enemy bunkers, which opened machine-gun, artillery and mortar fire on it. The deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the army, Gorbov,

who headed the forward combat guard, did not accept the order of the battle command, deviated to the right and continued to move forward, while members of the Military Council of the army and a group of commanders lay down in the funnel and remained in place.

When the shooting subsided, the commander of the army, Vlasov, and the chief of staff of the army, Colonel Vinogradov, returned to the command post of the 382nd Infantry Division and hid in the forest, while other members of the Military Council and commanders dispersed in different directions. In particular, members of the

Military Council of the Army Zuev and Lebedev, head of the political department, regimental commissar Garus and deputy. Sokolov, head of the Special Department of the Army, joined the remnants of the soldiers of the 382nd Infantry Division, commanded by the regiment commander, Colonel Bolotov. On June 27, Zuev, Lebedev, Garus and Sokolov

with a detachment of fighters of up to 600 people moved forward to get out of the encirclement, but Bolotov was seriously wounded on the way in battle, lost control of the detachment, and the fighters, having fallen under enemy artillery fire, dispersed through the forest, and some of the fighters surrendered.

Members of the Military Council Zuev and Lebedev also went into the forest, deputy. head of the Special Department of the Army Sokolov and head of the Novgorod regional department of the NKVD Grishin.

Having gone on reconnaissance to establish the whereabouts of the army commander Vlasov with a group of fighters and commanders, Sokolov and Grishin did not find them anywhere, they returned back, but Zuev and Lebedev were also not found on the spot and on July 5 of this year. got out of the way on one's own.

From conversations with commanders whose names Sokolov does not know, he knows that Zuev is supposedly wounded.

In addition, Sokolov, Grishin, as well as the head of the artillery supply of the 57th rifle brigade, Zubkov, who had left the encirclement, stated that in their presence the communications officer of the General Staff, Khamov, reporting the situation to the commander of the 267th rifle division, Colonel Potapov, said that Shashkov, head of the Special Department The NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, being seriously wounded, committed suicide, and his documents were confiscated by Khamov. Immediately, the documents were handed over to the deputy. head of the Special Department Sokolov, and the latter destroyed them.

Khamov and Potapov did not leave the encirclement.

The chief of staff of the 3rd battalion of the 57th rifle brigade, senior lieutenant Kozyr, who left the encirclement on July 8, said that from the commander of the communications battalion of the 46th rifle division, Major Rosenberg

(he has not yet left the encirclement) he knows that Lieutenant General Vlasov, Army Chief of Staff Vinogradov and commander of the 46th Infantry Division Colonel Cherny on June 28 were in the forest near the river.

Glushitsa. On July 14, German radio broadcasting in the summary of the high command reported: "During the cleaning of the recent Volkhov ring, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was found in his shelter and captured."

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA Published: State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 2. M., 2003. S. 61-65.

No.

227 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the situation in Stalingrad

09/23/1942

No. 1614 / b

of the NKVD of the USSR reports the report of the Special Department of the South-Eastern Front: "In the sector of the 62nd Army, during September 22, the enemy, with the strength of up to an infantry division, supported by 70-80 tanks and in cooperation with aviation, conducted offensive battles in the center of Stalingrad, along the valley of the Tsaritsa River, in the area of the railway bridge and along the Krutoy ravine, took possession of the elevator area, the railway at the 3rd embankment, the area of the central pier and went to the Volga. Thus, the 62nd Army was cut by the enemy into 3 parts, as a result of which a number of commanders

expressed the opinion that it was necessary to create a 3rd group of troops from units of this army, subordinate to the headquarters of the 62nd Army. On the sector of the 64th Army, the enemy, advancing, by the end of the day, after heavy street fighting with varying success, pushed our units and

captured the southern outskirts of Kuporosnoye and Kuporosnaya Balka. Enemy aviation throughout the day, in small groups of aircraft, continuously bombed our battle formations in the aforementioned directions of attack. Our units inflict heavy losses on the enemy. Only in one district of the city center 25 enemy tanks were destroyed.

As a result of many days of stubborn fighting, our units also suffered heavy losses, mainly from enemy aircraft. So, in the 13th Guards Rifle Division, 500 active bayonets remained; in the 10th division of the NKVD troops - 60 active bayonets; in the 42nd page brigade - 20 bayonets. A similar situation in a number of other formations of the front. Due to the small number of formations in the 62nd Army in

Currently, there are only up to five thousand people.

Military experts consider it expedient to withdraw the directorates of small formations for reorganization, and to turn their personnel to recruiting more full-blooded formations, with a total of up to 10 formations, and this will facilitate the management of troops. On September 22, a company of the 3rd

battalion of the 62nd Army, consisting of 23 people. An investigation is underway.

Today, during an offensive breakthrough by the enemy, two companies of the 13th Guards Division faltered and began to retreat. The commander of one of these companies, Lieutenant Mirolyubov, also fled the battlefield in a panic, leaving the company behind. The barrage detachment of the 62nd Army delayed the retreat of the units and restored the situation. Lieutenant Mirolyubov was shot in front of the formation. An employee of the Special

Department, Pavlov, who worked in the detachment of the 62nd Army, with a group of fighters of 13 people from this detachment in the area of the central crossing, gathered up to 400 soldiers from various units and led them into battle. Barrage

detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies detained 659 people during the day, of which 7 cowards and 1 self-mutilator were shot in front of the formation. 24 people were arrested, including: spies - 1, traitors to the Motherland - 3, cowards - 8, deserters - 4, self-mutilators - 8. The rest of the detainees were sent to units. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Published: State Security

Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War:

Sat. doc. T. 3. Book. 2. M., 2003. S. 282-283.

No. 228

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on Poland [\[56\]](#)**

10/14/1942

Top Secret 224

- Issues of the NKID and NKVD
active form:

<...>

b) The following 78 people, arrested employees of representative offices and authorized representatives of the Polish embassy, should be expelled from the USSR by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR:

.....>

c) Release all other arrested employees of missions and proxies of the Polish embassy (15 people) by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, and stop the cases against them:>

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 56-61. Script.

Typescript.

Protocol No.

38. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Molotov, Beria.

No. 229

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks on amnesty for violators of the state border**

11/19/1942

Strictly secret 12

- On amnesty for violators of the state border from Hungary to Carpatho-Russians and Ukrainians of former Czechoslovak citizenship and on the staffing of Czechoslovak units formed on the territory of the USSR with this contingent and Slovaks by nationality, who
were in Czechoslovak citizenship before the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

2. To instruct the NKVD of the USSR to release the Carpatho-Russians, Ukrainians and Slovaks who are currently imprisoned on Soviet territory as convicted investigative prisoners, interned, or on other sufficient grounds, violators of the border from Hungary, who were before the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in Czechoslovak citizenship. These categories are not subject to amnesty b. Czechoslovak citizens

held on the territory of the USSR as prisoners of war in the armies of countries at war with the USSR, members of anti-Soviet, Ukrainian nationalist and Russian White Guard organizations and persons suspected of espionage against the USSR.

3. Send all persons of military age fit for military service to the city of Buzuluk at the disposal of the commander of the Czechoslovak brigade, providing them with travel documents and all types of travel allowances according to the rear rations No. 3 of the Red Army.>

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 66. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 39.

No.

**230 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin with the application of
intelligence on the post-war
structure of Europe and the role of Poland**

12/23/1942

No. 2114/b

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to
Comrade STALIN

BENES summoned Comrade CHICHAYEV, adviser to the USSR embassy in London, and handed over for review the report of the Polish Minister and Chairman of the Polish Commission for Post-War Reconstruction, Dr. leading Polish circles in London on the future structure of Europe and the role of Poland, and warned of the need to maintain strict secrecy. The report is written in English, dated September this year, contains 35 printed pages with 4 sketch maps, and is entitled: "Poland and Germany and the post-war reconstruction of Europe." The preface states

that these materials are intended to sum up the discussions in Polish political and economic circles about the post-war problems of Europe and Polish-German relations. Below is a summary of the report. The report is divided into 5 sections: 1. Basic

provisions. 2. Disarmament of Germany and reparations. 3. Problems of borders (Polish-German borders, the Baltic Sea and Polish-Russian borders). 4. Organization of Central and South-Eastern Europe and the organization of the world.

5. International economic cooperation. 1. The "Basic

Provisions" section states that the casualties and destruction that have been caused during the present war must not go unpunished. Germany and the main partners of the Axis Powers must be brought to such a position that in the future they will not be able to plunge humanity into an even more terrible catastrophe. The post-war arrangement must guarantee the peaceful prosperity of **all

nations** and states. Such an order is not conceivable without sufficiently well-organized international cooperation. German imperialism and militarism, together with Japanese predation, created a threat to peace between 1919 and 1939. The author refers to the mistakes made in the Treaty of Versailles,

the failure of the League of Nations to prevent this war, and so on.

Poland, as a state of East-Central Europe, was in a difficult and dangerous position on all sides, with the exception of the southern border. Under the Treaty of Versailles, she did not receive such strategic borders that would provide her with adequate defense against Germany. Western states showed little interest in investing in the

poor countries of central and southeastern Europe, especially Poland, on the contrary, they invested huge capitals in German industry and thus contributed to the restoration of the German military machine. International treaties differentiated western and eastern Europe in terms of security. An example is the Locarno Pact, which provided Germany with free hands in the east of Europe. The lack of close cooperation between the countries of central and southeastern Europe, the antagonism between them and the myopia of their policy, which was used by the Germans, are pointed out. Germany and her main Axis partners after this war must undergo effective and lasting disarmament in accordance with Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter, with full reparations paid to the countries affected by the war. It is necessary to reorganize the borders in accordance with the political, military and economic situation of the countries bordering Germany, especially

those threatened by the movement of Germany to the east. A corresponding organization is needed in central and southeastern Europe, a general international organization and a firm regulation of international economic relations. 2. Disarmament of Germany. The necessity of the ***moral

disarmament*** of Germany through the long-term occupation by the Allied troops of the entire territory of Germany for the psychological impact on the minds of the German population is pointed out. **** The territory of Germany must be occupied: in the west - by the Western allied states, in the east - by Poland, the areas bordering Czechoslovakia - by Czechoslovakia ****. Just as in the west the main frontier of the occupied territories should be the Rhine, so in the east the rivers Oder and Neisse should be the natural frontier. ***Material disarmament*** should be expressed in the disbandment of all land, sea, air forces, in the destruction or transfer of all military materials to the victorious powers. In addition to the occupying armies, a small German police force, lightly armed and without central control, should be created to maintain internal order in Germany. All factories and factories directly producing war materials must be destroyed or transferred to the allied

states. For more effective disarmament of Germany, the following branches of industry must be destroyed or handed over to the victorious powers: 1) The production of electric steel and light metals in full. 2) Production of ordinary steel - partially. 3) Manufacture of machines, especially automatic machines, -

partially.

4) Chemical production - partially. In order to absorb the labor force, it is necessary to provide Germany with the opportunity to develop light industry - textile, leather and food. Germany must restore all the destruction that she has caused to other states. Poland, as the first country to be attacked and devastated, should be granted special privileges in this respect. Payment for reparations must be made from the national capitals and national revenues of Germany. *****Poland should receive

most industrial enterprises. Germany must transfer to her most of the equipment of railways, sea and air communications. The territories that have been devastated must receive from Germany various types of building materials - timber, cement, etc. Germany must return all objects of art and cultural property which have been taken away by her, or replace those destroyed with equivalent objects from her own collections*****. 3. The question of boundaries. This section details the history of events

in relations between Germany and Poland; examples are given when the current territory of eastern and northeastern Germany belonged to Poland; it is proved that in order to counteract the German desire to the east, Pomerania, Poznan and Silesia, together with East Prussia, should become part of post-war Poland. The inclusion of East Prussia and Danzig in Poland would shorten Poland's borders with Germany from 1263 to 785 miles. Leaving Upper Silesia in German hands, which is a fortified wedge between Poland and Czechoslovakia, would mean creating difficulties for Poland and Czechoslovakia in their desire to have a compact territory, which is an elementary condition for a federation or confederation and their security. It is recommended that the population question be resolved by resettling Germans in Germany.

a) the Baltic Sea. Satisfaction of Poland's demands regarding its borders and access to the shores of the Baltic, to which it has a natural inclination, cannot yet ensure the national security of Poland, central and southeastern Europe, unless at the same time the freedom of sea routes from the Baltic to the North Sea is ensured. To create a guarantee of security, it is recommended to give the Kiel Canal under control; the mandate for the administration and defense of the canal to be transferred to England. All the Baltic states and England must operate the canal jointly. On both sides of the canal, a defense zone that is not part of German sovereignty should be created. England should receive naval and air bases on the islands of the North Sea located near the German coast, especially at the mouth

Elbe, as well as on the islands of the Baltic Sea. Poland should also have bases in the western part of the Baltic Sea.

b) Polish-Russian border. Poland must keep its former borders in the east. Only long-term friendly cooperation between Poland and the USSR can ensure their security against Germany. But before that, both countries must recognize the principle that they are great nations with their own spheres of influence. The relationship between them must be based on complete equality. Any ideas of "patronage" or "leadership" must be discarded. None of them should enter into an agreement or combinations directed against the others. The Treaty of Riga of 25 March 1921 must be recognized as the basis for resolving the old Russian-Polish territorial disputes. By concluding this treaty, Poland decided, in order to achieve the normalization of its relations with its eastern neighbor, to give up almost half (120 thousand square miles) of the territory that belonged to the partitions of 1742, 1793 and 1895. Thus, Poland made a huge sacrifice. Further, various evidence is given regarding the need to return to Poland the territories and cities "occupied by the USSR in September 1939." These territories belonged to Poland for many centuries. Russia never owned them or did for a short period when Poland was under foreign domination. "For centuries, Poland planted Christianity and Western civilization in its eastern regions, and the flowers of Polish chivalry perished there, defending the ideals of the West." The establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the USSR on the basis of the voluntary recognition of the Treaty of Riga will not only be in the interests of both states, but also of general peace and the stability of all of Europe.

4. Organization of central and southeastern Europe. The Polish nation, located on the borders of central and eastern Europe, is the largest nation in the area. It carried on political and economic work for centuries, and the alertness against the German danger became its tradition. Even within the borders mentioned above, Poland alone is unable to cope with the difficult tasks that have always stood in the east of Germany and on the line from the Balkans to the south. That's why

the nations of central and southeastern Europe must put aside their old disputes and attend to their economic, cultural, political and military tasks. These nations are: Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, and to some extent Turkey. In the north, this zone borders on Denmark, Sweden, Norway and three Baltic states: Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Although these states have always maintained and will continue to maintain close relations with central and southeastern Europe, they nevertheless differ in their economic and political originality. The bloc of states of central and southeastern Europe can only be created on the basis of a reform, a confederation, in close cooperation with these forms. However, the best form for central and southeastern Europe would be a federation of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, and for the Balkans a federation of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and possibly Turkey.

If two political associations were created, the countries belonging to both federations could have a close economic relationship with each other. Lithuania should also find its place in such an association; close relations between her and Poland would be an absolute guarantee of the national and state existence of Lithuania. Economic and political considerations favor the inclusion of Rumania in this federation, but the most difficult question in southeastern Europe, the Transylvania dispute, which must be resolved between Hungary and Romania as states belonging to the same federation or confederation, must first be settled. Not only Poland, but all the countries of central and southeastern Europe should positively cooperate with Russia in maintaining peace, which, however, does not mean that they should be under the "leadership" of Russia. The Russian "leadership" in central and southeastern Europe would be a source of the greatest weakness for these states to please Germany. Moreover, the inclusion of the Soviet Union in autarky would not be in the interests of the economic exchange of goods for most European states, because this would exclude them from international economic exchange. Central and southeastern Europe must not remain isolated from Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. The Anglo-Saxon powers must play a prominent role in maintaining

security not only in the west, but also in central and southeastern Europe. 5. General

international organization. This part says that there are a number of plans for the organization of the world, but not all of them are real. A European federation on a continental scale would inevitably lead to German domination of the Continent and new attempts to achieve world domination. An Atlantic federation comprising the United States, Great Britain and the countries of northern Europe could not guarantee permanent peace, would isolate the continent and inspire Germany to expand. Thus, there would be a direct threat to the central and southeastern European countries and the world in general. After the war, security issues must be defended by the united nations. Cooperation in wartime will lay the foundation for a world organization that will not be limited to the continent. Hostile nations can now be admitted into the world family only after a certain period has elapsed, which will prepare such cooperation on the basis of democratic freedom and equality. "The permanent political and economic cooperation of the English-speaking nations with the central and southeastern European countries, with Germany and Russia, is an essential condition for peace and prosperity for countries large and small." The role to be played by Great Britain in the future organization of the European continent will be very large, and in some areas even leading. The political and moral authority acquired everywhere, especially in the course of the war, will be of great help to the fulfillment of this task. 6. International and economic cooperation.

This chapter discusses the reconstruction work after the war, the necessary assistance from Britain and the United States in the provision of credit, raw materials, machinery,

equipment, etc. The author opposes the division of the world into industrial and agricultural countries, defends the ideas of developing the industry in each country as needed. Trade and industrial production must be planned internationally. Issues of money, population, transport, etc. should be resolved through international cooperation.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA RGASPI. F.

558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 35-42. Script.

Typescript.

— Crossed out by Stalin in the margins with one line. **—**

Underlined by a wavy line. On the margins of the litter: "And Ukraine?" ***—*** Underlined and numbered

1), 2), respectively. ****—**** Crossed out in the margins with a single line. On the margins of the litter: "And the USSR?"

*****—***** In the margins of the litter: "Poles".

**No.
231 Note by V.M. Molotov and A.I.
Mikoyan I.V. Stalin about the
creation of a troika in Uzbekistan**

03/12/1943

Comrade STALIN I.V. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, comrade Yusupov and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Uzbek SSR, comrade Kobulov, report that the number of cases of theft of industrial and food products has significantly increased on the territory of the Uzbek Republic, especially at food and textile enterprises, as well as in the trading

network. So, for the second half of 1942, only the organs of the NKVD were 2423 criminal cases were initiated against plunderers of goods.

T.t. Yusupov and Kobulov are asking for decisive suppression of theft and squandering of goods to allow the creation of a republican troika consisting of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan comrade Yusupov, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs comrade Kobulov and the Prosecutor of the Republic comrade Belyaev, giving her the right to consider cases out of court and sentence 50 robbers to death with confiscation of their property, followed by the announcement of the verdict in the press on behalf of the Prosecutor's

Office. Having considered the proposal of T.T. Yusupov and Kobulov, we propose: Instead of the republican troika, all cases of embezzlement and squandering of industrial and food products in the Uzbek SSR are considered in the established judicial order, obliging the Prosecutor of the USSR Comrade Bochkov, the People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR Comrade

a) ensure the investigation and consideration of cases of theft and squandering of industrial and food products in an expedited manner; b) apply capital punishment to

malicious plunderers of goods (up to 20 people) - execution with confiscation in person

property belonging to them, followed by the announcement of the content of the sentences in the local press on behalf of the Prosecutor's Office of the Uzbek

SSR; c) carry out the sentences immediately.

12.03.43 V. MOLOTOV

A. MIKOYAN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 211-212. Copy. Typescript. On the first page there are resolutions: "Robbers are not just thieves, but enemies of the state. I am against the proposal t.t. Molotov and Mikoyan. I am for the proposal of Yusupov and Kobulov. I stand by my proposal. I. Stalin"; "For - A. Mikoyan";

"T. Molotov for Comrade Stalin's proposal. A.P"; "T. Kalinin - for.

No. 232

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
"the question of Yusupov and Kobulov" on the
creation of a republican troika in Uzbekistan**

03/14/1943

MOST SECRET 372

- Question of Yusupov and Kobulov

Accept the following proposal, vol. Yusupova and Kobulova:

To decisively suppress the theft and squandering of socialist property in Uzbekistan and strengthen repressions against the plunderers, create a republican troika consisting of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan comrade Yusupov, the people's commissar of internal affairs of the Uzbek SSR comrade Kobulov and the prosecutor of the Uzbek SSR comrade Belyaev, giving the troika the right to consider out of court cases of theft and squandering of socialist property and sentence 50 robbers to death with confiscation of their personal property, followed by the announcement of the troika's sentences in the press on behalf of the Prosecutor's

Office. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 72. Original. Typescript. Protocol No.

39. In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Molotov, Beria, Gorkin, Yusupov, Kobulov, Bochkov, Rychkov, Golyakov, Chadaev.

No.

**233 Note by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin,
sent by the Central Committee of the
CPSU (b) on the elimination of
spies, saboteurs and German accomplices in the**

03/19/1943

Strictly secret TO

THE MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES OF THE POLITBURO

OF THE CC AUCP(b): vol. Andreev, Beria, Voznesensky,

Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Malenkov,

Mikoyan, Molotov, Stalin, Khrushchev,

Shvernik, Shcherbakov On behalf of comrade. Stalin, a note is sent to you for information by the deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Merkulov dated March 18, 1943 on the identification and elimination of spies, saboteurs, German accomplices and gangs in cities and regions liberated by the Red Army from enemy troops.

Application: 20 sheets. Head

Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist

Party of Bolsheviks A. POSKREBYSHEV Sov.

secret STATE DEFENSE

COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN In the cities and districts liberated by the Red Army from enemy troops, local authorities and operational groups of the NKVD arrested 30,750 people as of

March 10, 1943. Stalingrad

region A total of 2450 people were arrested, including: agents of German intelligence agencies and suspected of espionage - 479 people, German accomplices - 1423, bandits and deserters - 78, other anti-Soviet elements - 470 people.

In the city of Stalingrad, the operational groups of the NKVD, together with military units, during the period from February 2 to February 8 of this year. raided, checking cellars and combing beams and ravines in the city.

At the same time, more than 5,000 German soldiers and officers were identified and detained, in a number of cases, during the arrest, they offered armed

resistance. In with. Rychkovsky, the village of Chirsky district, the enemy residency was liquidated, headed by the former headman of the village - KLENIN Maxim Antonovich. The residency included 7 people who, during the period of occupation with. Rychkovsky carried out the tasks of the German commandant's office to identify partisans, communists and Soviet activists. During the retreat, the residency was left by the Germans for espionage work in

the rear of the Red Army. It has been established that the former White Guards, as well as relatives of those who were repressed and dispossessed in the past, carried out especially

active treacherous work. In the village of Sirotinskaya, a group of former White Guards Gusev Ya.E., Vasilyev P.D., Balychev F.K., DONETSKOV D.V. (all arrested), being in the service of the Germans, they identified and handed over the party and Soviet activists, the Red Army soldiers and commanders who were surrounded, distributed German appeals among the population, under the threat of weapons they

drove the population to defense work. In the Perelazovsky farm, in the service of the Romanian gendarmerie was IV SERGEEV, the son of a White Guard punisher, who was sentenced in 1937 to death for the K.-r. activity.

Sergeev took an active part in all the activities of the invaders, identified and extradited partisans, party and Soviet activists (arrested). Voronezh

Region 3,926 people

were arrested, including 218 German intelligence agents and those suspected of espionage, 2,861 German accomplices, 319 Red Army deserters, and 528 other anti-Soviet elements. Among those arrested

were 16 members and candidate members of the CPSU (b) and 47 members of the

Komsomol. According to the captured materials of the police department in the city of Rossosh, 53 members of the CPSU (b) were identified, who, in their biographies submitted to the police, characterized themselves

persecuted by the Soviet government, and in every possible way renounced the party.

Among these documents, in particular, the following statement to the police by former. member of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the CPSU (b) mountains. Rossosh, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, an order bearer - KREKOTEN, who worked as the director of the Rossoshinsky MTS.

"I did not speak at general meetings on collective farms, party
I did not carry orders, did not conduct agitation against the German army.

I ask the great German people to give me a free life, I will work honestly, I will not have any connections with anyone, I will honestly comply with all the laws of the German people. As it turned out, during interrogations in the Gestapo,

KREKOTEN issued
all the communists known to him who remained behind enemy lines.

It also turned out that when he joined the party, KREKOTENI hid that he came from a kulak family, that his parents were dispossessed. Despite this, KREKOTEN was shot by the Gestapo.

In the cases of the headman of the Radchensky district, 35 similar
statements were also found from 28 members and 7 candidates for members of the CPSU (b), including from the former. director of the Marievskaya MTS of the Radchensky district, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks GVOZDENKO, with the following content: "To the district headman,

Mr. ZAVERUKHA. I, GVOZDENKO, ask for your
permission to be allowed to work on the collective farm. I evacuated, but returned to the Radchensky district, I wish to work honestly and follow all the instructions of the higher authorities. The membership card was destroyed." GVOZDENKO is arrested.
From among the prominent

German-Italian accomplices
and agents
arrested:

BARANNIKOV - ex. responsible instructor of the Voronezh Regional Executive Committee. On

the instructions of the German-Italian invaders, BARANNIKOV created false partisan detachments in the Kantemirovskiy, Radchenskiy and Pisarevskiy regions, where he fraudulently attracted Soviet patriots, communists and Komsomol members, and then betrayed them.

VIDUSHCHENKO, a former engineer-economist from the city of Ordzhonikidze, was appointed head of the housing department by the Germans

city government, then moved to the Italian secret police, on whose instructions he conducted provocative work. Together with the Italian

troops, VIDYUSHCHENKO arrived on the territory of the Voronezh region, where he worked in the police. During the retreat of the invaders, he was left by them for espionage work. A group of teenagers (FILIPPOVICH P.I., born in 1931, FILIPPOVICH V.I., born in 1928 and SHEVCHENKO N.M., born in 1930) was detained in the Kantemirovskiy district, which was thrown by the Germans across the line front with the task of blowing up the ammunition depots left by the Germans and collecting intelligence data on the units of the Red Army. Identified 208 accomplices of the German-Italian invaders,

who fled with them during the retreat, including such persons:

PUSHKAREVA, former secretary of the Bogucharsky Komsomol Committee. With the arrival of the invaders, she brought them lists of the Komsomol organization, and then married an Italian officer.

NOVOSHITSKY, former propagandist of the Radchensk Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

He was appointed by the occupiers as an accountant at the Boguchar grain farm. Rostov Region 2,804

people were arrested, including: 221 German intelligence agents and those suspected of espionage, 1,807 German accomplices, 121 deserters and a bandit element, 655 other anti-Soviet elements. Including those arrested: members and candidates VKP(b) - 34 people,

members of the Komsomol - 95 people.

In the mountains In Rostov, the German command took steps to create a "government of the Cossack federation of the Don, Kuban and Terek." In this regard, in November 1942, the White Guard General KRASNOV, who was in Germany, addressed a special appeal to the Don Cossacks. However, this "government" was not formed by the Germans. In order to attract the Cossacks for the armed struggle against the Red Army in Rostov, the

"Headquarters of the Don Cossacks" was created, headed by the Cossack ODNORALOV V.M., who called himself a colonel (he fled with the Germans). Active members of the headquarters were - a former cornet

CHAUSOV and mining engineer KRASNIANSKY (both arrested).

As they showed, the headquarters managed to form a hundred in the city of Rostov and two incomplete Cossack hundreds in the city of Kamensk. The Germans announced that the Cossack units would be used for police service, but as soon as they were formed, the German command sent them to the front and they were used in battles against the Red Army. In the mountains Novochoerkassk opened the station of the Gestapo, headed by the former. Novochoerkassk City Committee of the CPSU (b) instructor SUHORUCHENKO T.S. (arrested).

SUKHORUCHENKO, being the commander of a fighter detachment, in the summer of 1942, being surrounded, returned to Novochoerkassk, where he was arrested by the Germans. During the investigation, he gave detailed testimony about the communists known to him and the fighters of the extermination detachment who remained behind enemy lines. Soon he was recruited and released from custody, after which he personally identified and handed over to the Gestapo 20 communists hiding in the city and surrounding villages.

On the instructions of the Gestapo, SUKHORUCHENKO, for provocative purposes, wrote an appeal to the communists, allegedly on behalf of the

underground committee of the CPSU (b). Sukhoruchenko was in touch with a local resident, a member of the CPSU (b) BUTURLINOV, recruited by him for provocative work, and a former. director of the Khlebokombinat, member of the CPSU (b)

CHEREMISOV (both arrested). The investigation continues. The second opened station of the Gestapo in the mountains. Novochoerkassk was headed by a former accountant of the military registration table of the mountain police department. Novochoerkassk F.I. Zemlyansky, dismissed from the police in 1942 for abuse of service. (Wanted.)

Members of the residency identified and handed over to the Gestapo Soviet patriots.

The arrested were connected with ZEMLYANSKII through espionage work - N.A. BARITONOV. - former a candidate member of the CPSU (b), who worked as a shoemaker in the artel "Kozhkoopremont"; Donbayak S.D. - foreman of the sausage shop of the meat-packing plant; SENINA E.V. and KOZLOVA N.M. - former typists of the City Department of the NKVD, who evaded the evacuation.

The investigation continues.

Among the agents and accomplices arrested:

SAFONOV A.S. - former Red Army soldier 5 KP 35 KD, who went over to the side of the enemy near Rostov in August 1942, where he was recruited by the Gestapo for provocative work and sent to the Volosat'y farm of the Selivanovskiy district as a resident of German intelligence.

After the liberation of the farm by parts of the Red Army SAFONOV A.S. under the guise of an escapee from captivity, he tried to penetrate the Red Army to conduct espionage work, he was exposed.

KOVALENKO A.M. - a member of the CPSU (b), a former technician of the anti-plague station, was the chief of police in the village. Kiselevka, Zavetinskiy district, at the same time was a resident of German intelligence. During

the occupation of the village of Kiselevka, he gave the Germans 4 members VKP(b) and 27 servicemen leaving the German encirclement.

Borshcheva A.N., former teacher of the elementary school of the Kryukov farm, Kyiv region. During the occupation of the farm, she was recruited by the Romanian counterintelligence for provocative work. Twice she was transferred across the front line to the rear of the Red Army with reconnaissance missions.

Obukhov S.D. - a resident of the village of Chernyshevskaya, from the peasants. During the fighting at St. Chernyshevskaya by signaling indicated to the German troops the direction of withdrawal of the Red Army units, as a result of which the Germans burned 11 Soviet tanks. Under the Germans, he conducted provocative work.

Stavropol Territory

5,216 people were arrested, including 312 German intelligence agents and those suspected of espionage, 4,652 German accomplices, and 252 deserters and bandits. Among those arrested were

members of those left behind by the Germans retreat in our rear of the spy groups.

In the city of Georgievsk, 3 groups of German agents were arrested in the amount of 13 people who graduated from the Warsaw and Valga German intelligence schools: SIDORENKO, HARE, CHERNY, BEGLORYAN and others, all former. soldiers of the Red Army who were captured by the Germans. They had the task of conducting intelligence work in the rear of the Red Army and transferring the obtained information to the Germans by radio.

In the city of Stavropol, German agents ABAKAROV and UMAROV were arrested, left by German intelligence with the task of infiltrating the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to carry out espionage and sabotage work. Pistols, compasses, binoculars and 94,000 rubles of money were confiscated from the arrested.

In the same place, during a search in the premises that were occupied by the German intelligence school, among other captured documents, a list of German agents for 212 people who were trained was found. According to this list, 3 spies were identified and arrested: GASPARYAN, ARTYUNOV and ANTONYANTS, left by the enemy for intelligence work in the rear of the Red Army. In the village of Nikolaevskaya and the city of Pyatigorsk, where the reconnaissance groups of the

101st enemy reconnaissance department were stationed, 12 German agents were arrested. Among those arrested were the keepers of safe houses of the German intelligence STEPANOVA and CHERNETSKAYA. In the mountains In Stavropol, 10 members of the nationalist group of Armenians, created by a

former German who arrived from Germany, were arrested. general of the Dashnak army - an emigrant of the DRO. The group, which called itself the "Organizing Committee", included: ex. Professor of the Pedagogical Institute AGAMYAN, who collaborated in the fascist newspaper "Morning of the Caucasus"; doctors: KHALADZHIEV, BOGDANOV and ex. teacher MUSAELIAN, who worked under the Germans in the city government. The group campaigned among the Armenian population for help to the occupiers. Krasnodar Territory 6,000 people were arrested, including 309 spies and those suspected of espionage, 3,011 German accomplices, 1,480 deserters and bandit elements, 1,200 other a/s elements

Human.

From among the prominent German accomplices arrested:

Chief of Police of the city of Armavir SOSNOVSKY - b. employee of the City Trade Department.

Investigator of the secret police department NOVIKOV, former member of the defense council.

Head of the secret police unit PODBEREZHNY, ex. teacher of physics of a pedagogical college. Secretary of the German

newspaper Vestnik Kuban

CHENTIMIROV, ex. secretary of the editorial board of the Armavir Commune.

Head Housing Administration of the Armavir City Council Potapov, member of the CPSU (b), former. head City Housing Administration.

Gestapo officer Mikhailov, ex. head shop "Dynamo". In the mountains In

Armavir, the residency of the German intelligence was liquidated, consisting of 4 people: YANSHAKOV, OSENYANTS, ASATURYANTS and AGHASYAN, left before the retreat by the Germans b. commander of the Dashnak army, General DRO for espionage work in our rear. Ukrainian SSR Arrested 1768 people. Of these: agents of

German intelligence and

suspected espionage - 94 people, German accomplices - 1591 people, deserters - 21, other anti-Soviet elements - 64.

In a number of cities in Ukraine, the Germans attracted prominent Ukrainians to leading work in various administrative institutions. nationalists.

In the mountains In Voroshilovgrad, active German accomplices were Ukrainian nationalists - the mayor GANCHIN, the head of the administrative department of the city government YAKOVLEV, the manager of the estates of the region DAVYDOV, his deputy DOBOVENKO, beg. labor exchange SOBOKAR, beginning. police KURAK (all arrested). It has been established that individual communists sent behind enemy lines to organize partisan detachments turned out to be traitors.

Former In August 1941, the instructor of the Kolkovsky RK CP (b) U, LOTVIN, was sent by the Central Committee of the CP (b) U to the rear of the enemy with a group of communists in August 1941 with the task of creating an underground party organization in the Kolkovsky district and organizing a partisan detachment. In

the Kolkovsky district, LOTVIN was detained by the Germans and, during interrogation, spoke about the assignment received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the password, according to which a messenger was supposed to come to him, after which he was recruited under the nickname "Eduard" and released from custody. Soon LOTVIN betrayed the signalman STEPANOV, who had come to him, ex. instructor of the Volyn Regional Committee

of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. On the instructions of the Gestapo, LOTVIN made trips to the Volyn, Zhytomyr and Kyiv regions of Ukraine, where he identified and betrayed to the Germans 10 communists, 29 Komsomol members and 12 partisans.

LOTVIN was transferred to the rear of the Red Army with the task of appearing at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, reporting on the work allegedly done according to the legend developed by the Germans, and obtaining instructions and passwords to underground party organizations operating

in the occupied

territory. LOTVIN is arrested. The

investigation into the

case is ongoing. Leningrad region Arrested 109 people. Of these: agents of German intelligence and suspected of espionage - 19 people, German accomplices - 60 people, other anti-Soviet elements - 30 people.

In the city of Shlisselburg, the spy station left by the Germans, headed by b. Deputy of the Shlisselburg City Council - KONDRASHEV. Kondrashev P.A. (arrested) ex. the burgomaster of Shlisselburg,

during the occupation of the city, was a resident of the German secret police, was engaged in identifying partisans, Soviet activists and highlighting the mood of the population.

KONDRASHEV recruited former employees of the Sevzaprechparokhodstvo P.P. KORNEV, P.I. TERESHENKOV, P.I. DMITRIEV into the provocateur network. (all arrested).

It was established that on the basis of a denunciation by KONDRASHEV and other members of the residency, the Germans arrested 15 Soviet patriots. During the retreat, the Germans set the task for the residency to carry out subversive espionage work in the rear of the Red Army. In order to encrypt KONDRASHEV, the Germans removed him from the post of burgomaster of the city and took him into custody in the detention facility of the commandant's office, allegedly for assisting the family of a resident of Shlisselburg

LAPOCCHKIN in escaping to the rear of the Red Army. The investigation established that the Lapochkins (father and son) are agents of German intelligence. At the beginning of January 1943, they were transferred to the rear of the Red Army for sabotage and espionage work in the front-line zone, while the escape of the entire Lapochkin family, consisting of

4 people, was staged. (LAPOCHKINS are arrested.) The investigation continues.

Gestapo agent GD BATURIN, a former employee of the Sevzaprechparahodstvo, who had previously been sued for anti-Soviet activities, gathered from the believers in the mountains. Shlisselburg icons and organized a chapel, where he himself performed worship. Baturin ascertained the mood of believers and identified Soviet patriots and betrayed the Gestapo (arrested). In the Kirishi region,

a group of Gestapo agents was exposed, who during the occupation of the region carried out active treacherous work to identify partisans and Soviet activists. The following were arrested from this group: N. I.

LOSEV, a former member of the CPSU

(b), expelled in 1939 for domestic decay, a worker of the Kirishi district consumer union, and Kh. M. MOGAZOV, a non-party, former groom of the Kirishi District Council. On the denunciation of LOSEV and

MOGAZOV, the Germans arrested the partisan MALOV, the chairman of the village council of RAZHEVA and the chairman of the collective farm of the village of Lug STOLBOVSKY.

During the offensive of the Red Army units, LOSEV and MOGAZOV tried to escape, but were detained. From

among the German proteges in the Tosnensky region, the following were arrested: HILDEBRANT, a German, a resident of the village of Krasny Bor in the Tosnensky region, who was the head of the

village police. HILDEBRANT under the Germans arrested and personally shot 6 people of Soviet patriots.

RUDOV, a resident of the village of Popovka in the same region, on whose denunciation the Germans shot in the same village the family of a collective farmer-partisan KOZAKOV and a mechanic of the Izhevsk partisan plant KONDRATOV.

It was established that the Germans carried out work to identify persons of "German and Finnish blood." 30 families that submitted certificates of the racial affiliation of their ancestors to the Germans or Finns, the invaders evacuated to the rear, solemnly arranging their farewell.

Kalinin region 176

people were arrested, including 30 German intelligence agents, 122 German accomplices, and 24 other Soviet elements. Velikie Luki from among the German agents and active accomplices arrested: CHURILOV B.I., from the nobility, a former

officer of the tsarist army, b. senior agronomist of the office "Sortsemovoshch", was the mayor

Great Luke.

FILIPKOV, b. a major of the Red Army, having been captured by the Germans, was appointed head of the camp police, identified among the prisoners of war communists, political workers and Jews. Subsequently, he was the head of the city police, directly led the punitive expeditions against the partisans.

KOSYREV, a former lawyer, entered the service of the Germans as the head of the district police, then was appointed by the occupiers as chairman of the city court.

PANTELEEV, from 1929 to 1932. was a member of the CPSU (b), expelled from the party in connection with the conviction for malfeasance, the former head of the security of the radio station in the city of Velikiye Luki. As an assistant to the chief of the city police, he personally tortured the arrested Soviet patriots.

Ershov, ex. Red Army soldier of the internal troops of the NKVD, was captured by the Germans in Velikiye Luki, joined the police as an investigator. Conducted up to 60 investigative cases, in which the Gestapo shot 20 people of Soviet citizens, for which Ershov was awarded a fascist icon.

The materials of the investigation established that many persons who worked in German administrative bodies were at the same time

Gestapo agents.

Arrested b. the translator of the gendarmerie KRLYATIS showed that the beginning. YURGENSON prison, deputy. Burgomaster YU.I. GUDOVSKII, police officers ANDREYEV, GAVRILOV and FIRSANOV were at the same time secret informers of the Gestapo (all were arrested).

According to the testimony of the arrested pom. early city police PANTELEEV, the task of this category of German agents was to identify unreliable persons among the administrative police

composition.

Oryol region Arrested

4844 people. Of these: agents of German intelligence and suspected espionage - 227, German accomplices - 1449, deserters - 2037, other anti-Soviet elements - 1131.

Among the arrested accomplices 88 people. former soldiers of the Red Army who deserted or fell into

captured by the Germans and voluntarily entered the armed detachments created by the invaders, designed to fight the partisans.

Of the arrested German agents and accomplices, the following are of interest:

SOPIN S.P., during the occupation he worked as the head of the Kolpnyanskaya district government. Among the captured documents of the district commandant's office were found papers signed by SOPIN, characterizing his treacherous work.

Vasyukova R.Ya., ex. a member of the Komsomol, a former forwarder for the Kolpnyansky regional communications department, worked as an interpreter in the German commandant's office, worked to identify partisans and other Soviet

patriots. Kalmyk

ASSR 303 people were arrested, including 28 German agents and those suspected of espionage, 243 German accomplices, 16 deserters and a bandit element, and 25 other a/s elements.

The German command, playing on nationalistic feelings, tried to form a volunteer Kalmyk cavalry corps in Kalmykia. The enemy managed to create 10 volunteer Kalmyk cavalry

squadrons of 40 to 300 people each, mostly deserters from the Red Army.

These units were entrusted with the task of protecting roads in the front line, reconnaissance of the nearest rear of the Red Army and the fight against partisan detachments.

The organizer of the Kalmyk squadrons was the German DOLL, who called himself "the future ruler of Kalmykia." During the retreat of

the Germans, most of these squadrons did not have time to withdraw with the German army and remained in the rear of the Red Army, hiding in the steppes of the Chernozemelsky, Troitsky and Ketchenerovsky uluses. As a result of the

measures taken by the NKVD of the Kalmyk ASSR, 334 people surrendered voluntarily, 30 people were captured with weapons. and 46 people were killed. Machine guns and machine guns - 7, rifles - 133, cartridges for them - 5018 pieces were

confiscated. From among the prominent German accomplices arrested:

Mayor of Elista PIPE N.P., ex. agronomist GORZO, has a white emigre brother abroad. Mayor for the

Kalmyk population of the city of Elista TSUGLINOV V., ex. bank employee, White Guard - ex. emigrant. Head Department of Municipal Economy

POSTOLANIKOV P.I., ex. royal army officer. Editor of the newspaper "Svobodnaya Zemlya"

MANUYLOV V., b. fist. Commissioner of the City Administration for the supply of the German army
Tarasov, ex. member of the CPSU (b), expelled for a / c activities.

Deputy early city police KUSHKIN, in the past was arrested on suspicion of espionage. It

was established that the invaders intended to form the "Government of Kalmykia". In early

December 1942, White Kalmyk émigrés arrived in Elista from Germany: BOLDANOV S.Sh. and his son BALINOV, both in officer uniforms of the German army. While in

Elista, they studied the situation of Kalmykia and stated that after the German troops took the cities. Astrakhan and Stalingrad, the German command will create a "Kalmyk government", headed by the 24-year-old son of Prince TUNDUTOV Dazan, who now lives in Berlin. Flirting with the Kalmyks, the German command placed them in a privileged position compared to the Russians. For example, the Kalmyk population is exempt from taxes - milk, eggs, meat, while the Russians were obliged to pay; Kalmyk policemen were armed with rifles; Russian policemen were not given weapons. Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 1,729 people were

arrested, including: German intelligence agents and those suspected of espionage - 10 people, German accomplices - 538, deserters and a bandit element - 524, other anti-Soviet elements - 507.

It was established that in November 1942 in the city of Palchik, the German invaders created the so-called. "Representation of the interests of Kabardino-Balkaria" headed by the former. Prince KELEMETOV and local lawyer SHADOV (wanted), in whose task

included the maintenance of "order in Kabardino-Balkaria and the management of agriculture."

With the advent of the occupiers, local nationalists, on the initiative of a certain Tsaraev (a land worker, former member of the CPSU (b), arrested), under the leadership of white émigrés who arrived with the Germans, created an organization with a program of "expelling Russians from Kabardino-Balkaria and connecting it with Karachay." The

"Committee for the Unification of the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban and Terek", created by German intelligence, was opened in the Maisky district. The "committee" was headed by b. kulak IVANOV V.A. (arrested).

The task of the "Committee" included: espionage work, propaganda and agitation in favor of supporting the German army.

At the same time, the "Committee" referred to the promise of the German command "to return to the Cossacks after the war all the privileges they enjoyed in Tsarist Russia." The Germans, before

leaving the regions of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in a number of places formed armed gangs from among the deserters from the Red Army and accomplices of the invaders, setting them the task of organizing an insurrectionary movement in the rear of the Red Army. In the Cherek region,

during their retreat, the invaders from among the deserters, formerly. Red Army soldiers and German accomplices formed a gang of up to 300 people, armed it with rifles and machine guns, and, declaring that they would return in 2 months, set the task for the gang to keep this time in their hands the gorge. The leaders of the gangs were OSMANOV Khadzhidaut - formerly. worker of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who had a medal "for labor valor", Khazir ZAMAEV - b. people's judge of the district, ZHANGURAZOV Mohammed - former. head Raizo, MECHUKAYEV - ex. prev. Rika, and ZANKISHIEV - ex. pre-collective farm, expelled in the past from the CPSU (b).

As a result of the measures taken, 245 members of the gang were arrested, including ZAMAEV, ZHANGURAZOV and MECHUKAYEV. During the arrest, 119 rifles and about 2,000 rounds of ammunition were taken away.

Work to eliminate the remnants of the gang continues. Before the retreat in the settlements of the Elbrus Gorge, the Germans spread provocative rumors that the Soviet

the troops will destroy all the local residents who remained in the occupied territory, while urging them to go to the mountains and wait for their return.

As a result of this provocation, up to 200 inhabitants of the gorge - men, women and children - went to the mountains, taking collective farm cattle with them. Some of the men were armed with rifles and machine guns. By the measures taken by the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKVD of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, all those who left were returned to their homes, and their weapons were taken away.

North Ossetian Autonomous

Soviet Socialist Republic A total of 942 people were arrested, of which: German agents and suspected espionage - 100, German accomplices - 506, deserters - 298, other anti-Soviet elements - 38.

In the mountains Alagir opened the spy station left by the Germans, headed by the former teacher VODOPYANOV (arrested). It has been established

that even before the arrival of the Germans, VODOPYANOV created an anti-Soviet organization from among persons hostile to Soviet power, people from a socially alien environment, setting the task of collecting espionage information for the Germans and creating insurgent cadres in the rear of the Red Army.

After the invaders arrived, VODOPYANOV connected this organization with German intelligence.

5 people were arrested in the case, the rest of the residents wanted. The spy

station left by the Germans was also eliminated. rebel organization in the village of Kadgoron, Ardon region.

As the head of the organization, the Germans left a certain ELGANOVA V.Kh., formerly. member of the CPSU (b) and deputy. political officer of the communication company

1165 joint venture, 345 division. It was established that the organization included 57 people, 15 of them were arrested (including ELGANOV), the rest are wanted. In

Alagir, a group of Gestapo agents was identified, whose members handed over to the Germans communists, partisans and their families, as well as all persons opposed to the

Germans. Of these, the

following were arrested: POLTORATSKAYA, German, nurse;

DATEEVA - ex. secretary of the Komsomol organization; KUPEEVA
- former. member of the CPSU (b), b. head of the archive of the Alagirsky RO
NKVD;

DZHEMBEKOVA - former. farm accountant. As
established, at first the German occupiers did not commit violence against
the local population, calling on the population, who had gone to the mountains and
forests, to return home and take care of their household. The German orders state
that persons who do not return home within the prescribed period will be considered
as partisans and, upon arrest, will be immediately shot. The Germans also tried to
win over the elderly and with their help to influence the population.

In fear of responsibility, part of the population returned from the mountains to
their homes, after which the German punitive detachments began to massacre
them. Groups of

operational workers of the NKVD of the USSR were sent to help local NKVD
bodies in restoring proper order in the cities and regions liberated by the Red Army
from enemy troops and clearing them of spies, saboteurs, German accomplices
and gangs left behind by the enemy. Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs
of the USSR MERKULOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 159-175.

Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet of the note there is a resolution: "Distribute to members and

candidates of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. I. Stalin.

No. 234

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union

**Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the organization of the People's Commissariat
state security" [57]**

04/14/1943

Sov. secret 91 -

On the organization of the People's Commissariat of State
security

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks DECIDES: 1. Separate from the composition of the People's Commissariat
of Internal Affairs of the USSR operational-Chekist departments and departments and, on
their basis, organize the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB). 2.
Entrust the

People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR with the tasks of ensuring the
state security of the USSR: a) conducting intelligence work abroad; b) the fight against
subversive, espionage, sabotage, terrorist

activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR (with
the exception of units and institutions of the Red Army and the Navy and the NKVD
troops);

c) the fight against all kinds of anti-Soviet elements and manifestations among various
sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications,
agriculture, etc.;

d) the protection of [leaders] of the leading cadres of the party and
government.

3. Establish that the People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR is exempt
from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in paragraph 2 of
this resolution.

4. Approve the structure of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR
in accordance with the appendix.

5. Appoint comrade comrade as the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR. Merkulov V.N., releasing him from the duties of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

The first deputy of the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR to appoint comrade. KOBULOVA B. Z., releasing him from the duties of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. 6. To

organize people's commissariats of state security in the union and autonomous republics, and departments of the People's Commissariat of State Security in the territories and regions. The

organization of republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the People's Commissariat of State Security should be carried out on the basis of the separation of operational-Chekist departments, departments and branches from the existing apparatuses of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, building them in relation to the structure of the People's Commissariat of State Security approved by this resolution.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. BERIA L.P. and People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR comrade. Merkulov V.N. submit their proposals on the appointment of the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR and the NKGB of the USSR, respectively.

7. To complete the organization of the People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR within a month, submitting the regulation on the People's Commissariat for State Security within the same period for approval by the Council of People's Commissars

of the USSR. Published: Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka—OGPU—NKVD—MGB—MVD—KGB. 1917-1991: Handbook / Authors-comp. A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov. M., 2003. S.

622-623. Protocol number 40.

No. 235

**Decree of the GKO on the approval of the regulation
on the Smersh State Defense Committee of the
NPO of the USSR**

04/21/1943

Sov. secret
Of particular

importance Approve the regulation on the Main Directorate of
Counterintelligence "SMERSH" - (Death to spies) and its local bodies (see
appendix).

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin APPENDIX
To GKO Decree

No. 3222ss / s of April
21, 1943 "I APPROVE"

Chairman of the
State Defense Committee I. STALIN April 21, 1943 Sov. top secret

POSITION

on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People's

Commissariat of Defense ("Smersh") and
its local bodies I.

General Provisions Defense Commissariat.

The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO
("Smersh") is the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, subordinate

directly to the People's Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders. The Smersh

bodies are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, the Smersh bodies (the Smersh Directorates of the NPO of the fronts and the Smersh departments of the NPO of the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other units and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their own higher authorities. The

Smersh organs inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: on the results of the fight against enemy agents, on the anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the army, on the results of the fight against treason and treason, desertion, self-mutilation.

II. The tasks of the Smersh

bodies 1. The following tasks are assigned to the Smersh

bodies: a) combating espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army; b) the fight

against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other (through the command) measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) the fight against treason and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army (going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and, in general, facilitating the work of the latter); e) the fight against desertion

and self-mutilation on the fronts; f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were in captivity and

surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.

2. Smersh

bodies are exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section.

III. Rights and obligations of Smersh bodies

1. For the implementation of the tasks specified in Section II, the Department counterintelligence NGO ("Smersh") and its local authorities have the right: a) to conduct intelligence and information work. b) to seize, search and arrest soldiers of the Red Army, as well as persons associated with them from the civilian population, who are suspected of criminal activity, in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Note: The procedure for arresting military personnel is defined in Section IV of this Regulation. c) Conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or the Special Conference under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

d) Apply various special measures aimed at revealing the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements.

e) Summon without prior agreement with the command in cases of operational necessity and for interrogations the private and commanding staff of the Red Army.

IV. The procedure for the production of arrests by the Smersh bodies soldiers of the Red Army

1. Bodies "Smersh" make arrests of the military personnel of the Red Army in the following order: a) Arrests of ordinary

and junior command personnel - in agreement with prosecutor.

b) Middle command personnel - in agreement with the commander and the prosecutor of the connection, part.

c) Senior commanders - in agreement with the Military Councils and a prosecutor.

d) The highest command staff - with the approval of the People's Commissar of Defense.

V. Organizational structure of the Smersh bodies

includes:

Assistants to the Chief of the Main Directorate (according to the number of fronts) with groups of operational workers attached to them, on which

the duty of directing the work of the Smersh bodies on the fronts is assigned.

1st

Department - intelligence and operational work on central

bodies of the Red Army - the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

2nd Department - work among prisoners of war of interest to the Smersh bodies, checking the Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy. 3rd Division - fight against enemy

agents (paratroopers),
thrown into our rear.

4th Department - counterintelligence work on the side of the enemy in order to identify channels for the penetration of enemy agents into units and institutions of the Red Army. 5th

Department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies of the military districts.

6th Department - investigative.

7th Department - operational accounting,

statistics. 8th Department -

operational equipment. 9th Department - searches, arrests,

installations, surveillance. 10th Department "C" -

work on special

assignments. 11th Department - cipher communication. Personnel department - selection and training of personnel for

Smersh bodies, formation of new Smersh bodies. Admfinkhozotdel - financial and material and economic services of

the Office, the commandant's office. Secretariat. 2. On the

ground, the following Smersh bodies are organized: a) the

Counterintelligence Department of the NCO ("Smersh") of the fronts; b) Counterintelligence departments of NGOs ("Smersh") of armies, districts, corps, divisions, brigades, reserve regiments,

garrisons, fortified areas, institutions of the Red Army. The structure of the local authorities "Smersh" is established in relation to the structure of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO ("Smersh") and is approved by the Pe

To ensure operational work, escort, protection of those arrested and places of detention, the Smersh bodies on the ground are allocated from the Red Army units: a) the Smersh Front

Department - a battalion;

b) Department "Smersh" of the army - a company; c) Department "Smersh" of the corps, division, brigade - a platoon.

VI. The personnel of the Smersh

bodies 1. The Smersh bodies are staffed by the operational staff of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and a special selection of military personnel from among the commanding and political staff of the Red Army. 2.

Personnel training for the Smersh bodies is provided through the creation of special schools and courses under the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (Smersh).

3. Employees of the Smersh bodies are assigned military ranks, installed in the Red Army.

4. Employees of the Smersh bodies wear uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the respective branches of the Red Army.

VII

Bodies "Smersh" in their work maintain, as necessary, close contact with the relevant bodies of the NKGB of the USSR, the NKVD of the USSR and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, exchange information and orientations.

VIII

Any kind of changes to these "Regulations" may be produced only at the direction of the State Defense Committee.

Published: Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka—OGPU—NKVD—MGB—MVD—KGB. 1917-1991: Handbook / Composers: A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov. M., 2003. S. 623-626.

No.

236 Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin about the trip of D. Davis

05/19/1943

No. 244/

m Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN

*Joseph DAVIS and his

entourage arrived in the mountains. Kuibyshev May 17 this year at 14 o'clock. 30 min*. With the exception of an

hour and a half walk around the city, DAVIS and his entourage spent the rest of the day at the American embassy mansion.

During the walk, DAVIS visited a thrift store and an Innsab store, where he bought silk linen for a suit. From the original intention to inspect the aircraft plant number 1 refused, citing overwork. In the evening, DAVIS had a conversation with the 1st Secretary of the American

Embassy, PERKINS, about the rupture of Soviet-Polish relations, and DAVIS spoke negatively about the policy of the Polish government, calling it "stupid and untimely", which he allegedly also spoke to the Polish ambassador in Washington.

At 22:00 DAVIS received the Mexican Ambassador QINTANILLA, with whom he was not of particular interest. May 18 this year at

8 o'clock. 50 min. DEVIS flew from Kuibyshev to Stalingrad, where, accompanied by the Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade CHUYANOV, he examined the destroyed buildings in the city center, factories, and the house in which PAULUS was captured. When inspecting the field, where there were about 5 broken German aircraft, DEVIS was photographed several

times against the background of these aircraft. ** At the mass grave of the fighters who fell for Stalingrad, DEVIS, laying flowers on the grave, lined up all the persons accompanying him in two lines, himself stood in the center and, addressing the a

fighters and Stalingrad residents, delivered a speech as follows:

"Dear comrades! I came to visit the city of heroes. The people who defended the city managed to stop the Germans. I have come to lay flowers at the graves of fallen heroes on behalf of US President ROOSEVELT and the people of the United States. The peoples of the Soviet Union, America and Great Britain will be able to defeat Hitler under the leadership of their leaders. Glory to the Soviet soldiers **. Having received information that enemy reconnaissance aircraft sometimes fly into the

Stalingrad region, DAVIS asked if fighters would accompany him, and personally checked the presence of fighters at the airfield. Before departure from Stalingrad, a small breakfast was arranged for DEVIS and those accompanying him in the regional executive committee, at which he thanked

for his care for him and announced the "indelible impression" from visiting Stalingrad. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR MERKULOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 70-71. Script.

Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Why is this matter not published? Where are the correspondents of our newspapers? *

—* Underlined in pencil. **—** Underlined

in pencil and crossed out in three strokes in the margins.

No.

**237 Special message L.P. Beria,
V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin on the
composition of the special meeting**

05/20/1943

No. 431/

b Top secret Comrade

STALIN We ask you

to replenish the composition of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR with employees of the People's Commissariat for State Security and the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO - "Smersh". We present a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks. We ask for your decision. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.

MERKULOV Draft

DECISION of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "" May 1943 On the

composition of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR Introduce additionally to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR: a) People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR replacing him with a first deputy;

b) Head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" with replacing him with his first deputy.

Secretary of the Central Committee of

the CPSU (b) STALIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 8. L. 28-29. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**238 Memorandum of A.S. Shcherbakova
I.V. Stalin about the work of the special
department of the 7th separate army**

05/22/1943

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF
DEFENSE MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION Comrade STALIN

I.V. *According to your personal order, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army investigated the report of the commander of the 7th separate army, Major General Comrade. Krutikov about the work of the Special Department of the Army*. I report on the

results: I 1. The Military Council of the 7th separate army questioned the correctness of Nikulin's and Shvedov's accusations of espionage. According to the materials of the investigation conducted by the Special Department of the Army, the case was drawn as follows:

German intelligence resident Nikulin, who was supplied by German intelligence with weapons (pistol and grenades), received from German intelligence the task of conducting extensive espionage activities in the Red Army - recruiting spies, blowing up bridges, setting fire to military depots, Soviet institutions, etc. Nikulin had communications agents at his disposal, who, crossing the front line, passed on to the Germans the espionage information collected by Nikulin. Among other spies, Nikulin recruited the commander of the Red Army, junior lieutenant Shvedov*.

The verification of this case gave the following results: Nikulin I.A., born in 1910, served in the Red Army in 1939, participated * in battles with the White Finns, was wounded, after which he was declared unfit for military service. Nikulin is completely illiterate (he can only sign), he worked before the war and during the war as a carpenter at the Tikhvin timber exchange. Four Nikulin brothers serve in the Red

Army*. During the occupation, Nikulin lived for a month and a half in the territory occupied by the Germans. Nikulin met Shvedov at a time when the military unit in which Shvedov was located was located in the neighborhood where Nikulin lived. According to the materials of the investigation, Ekaterina

Ivanova, 15 years old, is a communications agent recruited by Nikulin. Three brothers and sister Ivanova serve in the Red Army.

Junior Lieutenant Shvedov, after several weeks of acquaintance with Nikulin, left with his unit for the Volkhov Front, near Sinyavino, from where he deserted. * Shvedov was detained by the Special Department of the 7th Army, he was initially charged with desertion, and then with espionage. Some time after his arrest, Shvedov confessed to being a spy and testified that he had been recruited as a spy by Nikulin*. During interrogation me and comrade. Shvedov told Abakumov that after investigator

Ilyayinen demanded that he name his accomplices, *he, Shvedov, named two Red Army soldiers from the platoon he commanded. But Ilyayinen rejected these people and demanded to name other persons. After that Shvedov slandered Nikulin*. Being arrested, Nikulin pleaded not guilty to anything, after being in the cell he pleaded guilty to

espionage.

The investigation established that there are no objective facts to accuse Nikulin and Shvedov of espionage. * So, for example, Nikulin, who was illiterate in all respects and lives in a remote village, was allegedly given the following tasks by the Germans *: "I had to collect information: engineering, special

and rear units of the Red Army. 2. On

the deployment of headquarters, military units and formations. 3. On the location of warehouses with ammunition, weapons, explosives, food, fodder, fuel and lubricants and other military equipment. 4. On the location and composition of defense

installations. 5. On the location of airfields and the number of aircraft on them.

6. On the location of air defense systems. 7. On the condition of roads and the intensity of traffic on them. 8. On the construction of new roads. 9. On the political and moral state of the personnel of the Red Army units and the civilian population. Along with the collection of espionage information, the officer instructed me to carry out acts of sabotage, organize explosions of bridges, set fire to military depots and Soviet institutions. *

This part of Nikulin's testimony was written in its entirety by the senior investigator Ilyainen, and Nikulin, who barely knew how to sign, signed such an interrogation protocol *.

The special department of the Army had a full opportunity to check the activities of the "signalman" Ekaterina Ivanova. However, Ekaterina Ivanova *not only was not arrested, but was not interrogated either, although there was ample opportunity for this, since she continued to live without a break in the same place*. The investigation established that Ekaterina Ivanova did not receive espionage assignments from Nikulin and did not cross the front line. The special department had

every opportunity to find out how the pistol and grenades got to Nikulin. The investigation into how the weapon got to Nikulin established that Yekaterina Ivanova's brother, a boy of 13, once told Nikulin that he had trophy grenades and a pistol. Nikulin took away the weapon from the boy Ivanov, Nikulin gave the gun to Shvedov for bread, and used the grenades for jamming and catching fish. *Employees of the Special Department could easily find out the issue of the origin of weapons by calling and questioning the boy Ivanov, brother of Ekaterina Ivanova. This was also not done. Thus, as a result of an unscrupulous attitude towards the investigation, Nikulin and Shvedov were charged with espionage*.

Shvedov should have been arrested and tried as a deserter. Nikulin is guilty of illegal possession and failure to hand over captured weapons, but there were no facts and materials to accuse him of espionage. The military tribunal of the 7th Separate Army rejected the charge of espionage.

The investigative case of Nikulin and Shvedov was led by the senior investigator of the Special Department, Ilyainen, a Finn by nationality. Ilyainen previously worked in the NKVD and was fired.

Curzon, Deputy Head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, directly supervised the investigation and actively participated in it. * Curzon from 1929 to 1938 worked in the NKVD. In 1938 he was arrested on suspicion of belonging to a counter-revolutionary organization. Then he was found not guilty and since 1939 he has been working again in the NKVD. Ilyainen and Curzon are guilty of dishonest conduct of the investigation against Nikulin and

Shvedov. 2. Similar to the case of Nikulin and Shvedov is the case of

accusation of espionage of Efimov*.

On November 29, 1942, the Red Army soldier Yefimov was summoned by the investigator of the Special Department for interrogation as a witness. During interrogation, Efimov told the investigator of the Special Department that he, Efimov, was captured by the Germans in 1941 and fled from there. This aroused suspicion and, in fact, was the basis for his detention. On November 30, Yefimov confessed to espionage during interrogation.

An analysis of the investigative materials showed that the investigation into the Efimov case was carried out extremely superficially and in bad faith. All accusations are built only on the confession of the defendant himself. Moreover, all these confessions are full of contradictions and implausibility. The Special Department had every opportunity to verify

Yefimov's personality and collect more in-depth material about him. However, this was not done. The only objective evidence of Efimov's guilt is his surrender, being surrounded, captured in September 1941 and his stay in the territory occupied by the Germans. After Efimov returned from captivity and the Red Army liberated the territory where Efimov lived (Toropetsky district), he was again, after checking him in the NKVD camps, was drafted into the Red Army, where he served for 8

months.

As a result of Efimov's categorical refusal at the meeting of the military tribunal on April 30, 1943, from his testimony and the absence of any other materials in the case that testify to his guilt, Efimov was acquitted. To check the behavior of Efimov during his residence in the occupied territory, subsequently liberated by the Red

The army, in the Toropetsky district of the Kalinin region, was sent by the senior inspector of the GlavPURKKA, Colonel Comrade Dolin, and the senior investigator of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, Major Comrade Kovalenko. By checking on the spot (interrogated a number of people who knew Efimov), they found that Efimov came from German captivity at the end of December 1941, lived all the time with his father, never left the village, did not have them, did not conduct anti-Soviet agitation and did not betray any of the Soviet activists. Meanwhile, according to the materials of the investigation, the case was portrayed in such a way that Yefimov, living in the Toropetsky district, was allegedly closely connected with the Germans, drank with them in a restaurant, betrayed to the Germans the political instructor's wife Nikiforova Maria and conducted anti-Soviet agitation among the local population*.

Guilty of creating an unsubstantiated accusation of Efimov of espionage are the senior investigator of the Special Department of the Army Captain Sedogin and the head of the investigation unit, he is also the deputy head of the Special Department of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Curzon.

3. After the case of Nikulin, Shvedov and the case of Efimov, the military tribunal of the 7th Army and its chairman, Comrade Sevostyanov, began to express doubts about the correctness of the investigation carried out in relation to a number of people who had already gone through the tribunal and were convicted by the tribunal for espionage. Thus, the military tribunal began to express doubts about the correctness of the investigative materials on charges of espionage of Pyshnov and Lyalin, Maslennikov and Nikitin, and Stafeev. It is not possible to conduct a proper investigation into these cases, since the convicts (except for Lyalin) were shot.

II

As a result of checking all the cases on other counter-revolutionary crimes cited in the memorandums of the Military Council and the military prosecutor of the Army, it was established that the Special Departments of the Army, * with the connivance of the military prosecutors, really committed perversions in the conduct of the investigation and violations

Soviet laws.

So, for example:

1. Red Army soldier Yakovlev, born in 1923, a member of the Komsomol, has been serving in the Red Army since November 1941. On April 25, 1942, together with two other fighters, he was called to

interrogation as a witness to Comrade Nikolaev, authorized by the Special Department of the battalion. On the way to the Special Department, Yakovlev found a Finnish leaflet and immediately, at the end of the interrogation, handed it over to authorized Nikolaev. This was enough to arrest Yakovlev and start an investigation against him on charges of anti-Soviet agitation. During the investigation, the following forgery was committed. When compiling the protocol of the search at Yakovlev's, on the instructions of the senior investigator of the Special Department of the Army, Captain Izotov, the leaflet was entered into the search protocol as being found during the search at Yakovlev's. The accusation against Yakovlev is far-fetched from start to finish, and the military tribunal correctly acquitted

Yakovlev. 2. Red Army soldier Gusev, born in 1922, member of the Komsomol, since December 1942, was arrested by the Special Department of the 162nd fortified region for systematic anti-Soviet agitation and treasonous intentions. On March 6, 1943, the military tribunal of the army, after examining the case of Gusev, acquitted him. An audit established that Gusev made unhealthy, politically incorrect, sometimes bordering on anti-Soviet, statements, which gave rise to the Special Department for his arrest. The investigation into the case was conducted in bad faith. The specific facts that took place in reality received a political generalization in the materials of the investigation, which distorted the essence of the matter. The testimonies of the witnesses, the operational commissioner of the Special Department, Solovyov, were clearly distorted.

3. Lieutenant Grigoryan, a member of the Komsomol, has been serving in the Red Army since 1939; on September 26, 1942, he was arrested by the Special Department of the 3rd Naval Brigade on charges of leaving the battlefield, voluntarily surrendering and expressing sabotage intentions. Checks established that Grigoryan really was in June 1941, i.e. in the first days of the war, being sent with seven fighters for reconnaissance, he came under heavy enemy fire, was confused and surrendered to the Germans. On the same day, 5-6 hours after the capture, he escaped from captivity. After recovering from a wound received during the flight from the Germans, Grigoryan served in the 110 Infantry Division, participated in the battles for Moscow, was wounded a second time and, upon leaving the hospital, continuously serves in parts of the 7th separate army. During this time, repeated

participated in battles, has more than two dozen killed Finns on his combat account and is characterized as a strong-willed and courageous commander. There were no anti-Soviet and subversive statements and intentions on the part of Grigoryan, and these accusations are completely fictitious. The case was dismissed by the Military Tribunal, and Grigoryan was released 3 months after his arrest.

4. Red Army soldier Chernetsov, born in 1896, participant in the first imperialist war. Three Chernetsov brothers are now serving in the Red Army. Chernetsov was arrested in June 1942 by the Special Department of the 368th Rifle Division on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and treasonous intentions. The basis for the arrest and prosecution of Chernetsov was the message of the Red Army soldier Porazhinskiy, who was a secret informant of the Special Department. During the investigation, Porazhinskiy gave obviously confusing testimony and, at a confrontation with Chernetsov, he eventually retracted it. Then, at the direction of the head of the Special Department of the division, he was arrested. After serving 11 days under arrest, Porazhinskiy again confirmed his initial testimony that Chernetsov was carrying out anti-Soviet agitation and intended to go over to the Finns. At the court session, Porazhinskiy got confused again and changed his initial testimony. According to all reports, Porazhinskiy is a provocateur. The military tribunal acquitted Chernetsov. 5. Guards foreman gunner-radio operator Fedorovtsev, a candidate member of the CPSU (b), has been serving in the army since 1937, from the first days of

World War II he has been at the front. For participation in the Finnish campaign he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, during World War II he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. During the war he made 128 sorties and the regiment commander is characterized as a brave fighter, ready at any moment to fulfill the task of the regiment commander. On August 6, 1942, Fedorovtsev was arrested by a special department of the 4th aviation-based area on charges of anti-Soviet

agitation.

The audit established that Fedorovtsev was transmitting to other fighters the content of the fascist-White Guard program he listened to on the radio. Thus, the grounds for the arrest of Fedorovtsev were, but,

given his combat work in the fight against the Germans, the military prosecutor dropped the

Fedorovtsev case. 6. The facts set forth in the memorandum of the military prosecutor of the 7th separate army about bringing Kosmatykh, Lazarenko, Korolev, Goryachev to court without sufficient grounds also took place. All listed persons were

acquitted by the court. The fact that in some formations of the 7th separate army the attitude towards arrests is rather light, is evidenced by the following facts. * During the first quarter of 1943, 15 people were arrested by a special department of the 272nd rifle division, and they were charged with counter-revolutionary crimes. Of the 15 cases, 8 cases were terminated in the Special

Department and 2 cases by the military prosecutor's office *. In the 4th Rifle Corps in the second half of 1942, 215 people were arrested for counter-revolutionary crimes. 43 people, or 20% of those arrested, were released due to lack of evidence. At the same time, it should be noted that the head of the Special Department of the 272nd Infantry Division, Major Bozhichko, at one of the meetings, said that there was nothing wrong with these arrests and summoning witnesses, since the call of the Red Army soldiers to the Special Department is a kind of political work.

III

Check showed that the Special Departments in the methods of investigation allowed perversions and violations of laws. In particular, the Special Departments used persons already convicted of espionage to the VMN as chamber agents. So, in the case of the Red Army soldier Goryachev, who was accused of conducting anti-Soviet agitation, after the investigation did not collect sufficient materials for the prosecution, the spy Zheludkov, convicted on January 29, 1943, was called to be shot as a witness. On February 8, 1943, this Zheludkov testified during interrogation that Goryachev, being with him in the cell, was carrying out anti-Soviet agitation. It is characteristic that the investigator of the Special Department of the 4th air base area, Vinogradov, wrote about Zheludkov in the protocol of interrogation that he "has no criminal record," i.e. Vinogradov committed an obvious forgery.

In the case of Maslennikov, who was convicted of espionage, the spy Karnyshov, who was sentenced to VMN, was involved as a chamber witness.

The fact that chamber witnesses of this kind were also used in other cases is evidenced by the following fact: on February 2, 1942, the Military Tribunal of the 114th Infantry Division for preparing a group transition to the side of the enemy condemned the Red Army soldiers Kucheryavy and Gushel to the Navy. The Red Army soldiers, who were involved in the same case together with Kucheryavy and Gushel, were sentenced to execution two days later, on February 4, while Kucheryavy and Gushel were not executed for several months. And when, at the beginning of May 1942, the Military Council of the Army began to wonder why the sentence was not carried out on these persons, the head of the Special Department of the Army, Colonel Comrade Dobrovolsky, filed a petition with the Military Council of the Army to replace the VMN with imprisonment for exposing other persons. In the practice of the work of the Special Department of the Army, there were facts

* when the defendants, before being sent to the court session, were summoned to the investigation unit to give instructions so that they showed what they showed during the investigation in the Special Department *. This was confirmed by the senior investigator of the Special Department, Ilyainen, who admitted that, on Curzon's orders, the defendants were summoned to the investigation unit before the court and there they were instructed how to behave in court. Lieutenant Colonel Curzon at first denied these facts, then stated that perhaps there were such facts, but he was not aware of this, and then admitted that the defendants were summoned to the investigation unit, but allegedly for the purpose of instructing the convoy, although it is known that the briefing of the convoy is carried out by the head of the preliminary

conclusions.

In the practice of the work of the Special Departments, there were facts of annoying and unnecessary presence of investigators from the Special Department of the Army at the court session. The fact that the senior investigator Ilyainen was removed from the court during the hearing of the case of Shvedov and Nikulin and that the clerk of the investigation department Karnachev was sent to court as an escort, cited in the report of the commander of the 7th separate army, Major General Krutikov, is true. This was done by order of the Deputy Chief of the Special Department of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Curzon.

Lieutenant Colonel Curzon denies the fact of serving cigarettes to the defendants during breaks in the court session. Senior investigator

Special Department Nekrashevich said that once he treated the defendants with cigarettes. The secretary of the military tribunal, Zaitsev, claims that senior investigator Nekrashevich and twice Lieutenant Colonel Curzon did this systematically.

IV

Conclusions: The report addressed to you by the commander of the 7th Separate Army *Major General Krutikov regarding the specific facts of perversions in the work of the Special Department of the Army is basically correct*. As for the generalizations in the report, they are wrong. The audit showed that in a number of espionage cases,

the accusations were based only on the confessions of the defendants themselves. However, the generalization made in the commander's report that a common feature of most espionage cases was the complete absence of objective evidence and that all accusations of espionage and sabotage were based on the confession of the defendants themselves is incorrect. The Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, in general, did a significant job of exposing the German and Finnish agents, and it is wrong to say that all accusations of espionage and sabotage were based only on the confession of the defendants themselves.

The generalization made in the report of the commander of the 7th separate army that the investigating authorities are not taking measures to search for and arrest residents of foreign intelligence services is inaccurate. Thus, out of 30 agents and residents who passed according to the testimony of the defendants in 1942-43, 5 were found and sentenced to capital

punishment. *Thus, checking the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army showed that there were major and serious shortcomings, as well as distortions, in the work of the Special Department of the Army and the Special Departments of the formations. The specific culprits are *: 1.

Deputy Head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, he is also the head of the investigative unit - Lieutenant Colonel Curzon;

2. Senior Investigator of the Special Department of the Army Senior Lieutenant Ilyainen, Finnish by nationality; 3. Senior

investigator of the Special Department of the Army Sedogin; 4.

Investigator of the Special Department of the 162 fortified area - Captain Izotov;

5. Detective of the Special Department of the 162nd fortified area Solovyov. At the

same time, it was established that if the errors in the work of such people as Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov, Nikolaev (killed) could be the result of inexperience and are really investigative errors, then the errors in the work of Curzon and Ilyainen are perversions dictated by careeristic considerations. I was particularly convinced of this by Curzon's dishonest behavior. In the case of Nikulin and Shvedov, Curzon told me that he was "let down by the investigator", that he interrogated Nikulin only once and no more than 15 minutes, while he interrogated Nikulin many times. Curzon at first said that the accused were not summoned for briefing to the investigative unit, then he said that they were summoned, but that the investigators did this without his knowledge, and so on. Thus? Curzon lies and locks himself in trifles, and after that it is difficult to believe him in more serious matters*.

The head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, Colonel Dobrovolsky, did not control the investigation well and entrusted too much to Curzon. It should be

noted that when investigating the materials of the Military Council of the Army, some employees of the Special Departments either denied the facts already established, or softened them in every possible way and smeared the witticism, * adhering to the principle "do not wash dirty linen in public." Even the head of the Special Department, Comrade Dobrovolsky, declared: "And why did Comrade Stalin have to be disturbed, they would have told me, everything would have been corrected and eliminated on the spot"*.

It should be noted another major shortcoming in the work of the punitive organs of the 7th separate army - this is actually * the lack of prosecutorial supervision over the investigation by the military prosecutor Colonel of Justice Gerasimov and his assistant Major of Justice Vasiliev. Gerasimov withdrew himself from supervision, blaming this activity on his assistant Vasiliev*. Vasiliev, as well as the prosecutors of the compounds, to a large extent churned out indictments without getting into the essence of the case. In the work of the military tribunals, there was a reinsurance, a fear of

taking full responsibility when considering cases. Evidence of this is the large number of unconfirmed verdicts of the Military Tribunals by the commanders of the formations, the Military

Council and Military Collegium. So, for 1942-43. out of 1529 sentences to CMN in 577 sentences or 37%, CMN was commuted to imprisonment. In many cases, these changes were the result of the actual pardon of the convicts, but in a number of cases these changes were the result of disagreement on the merits of the case. Among the employees of the Special Departments (now SMERSH) there are many inexperienced, illiterate people. This shortcoming should be corrected by the transfer of several thousand political workers to counterintelligence agencies. ****Suggestions**** I offer: ****1.** For perversions in the investigative work, Curzon and Ilyainen are dismissed from the counterintelligence

agencies and condemned by

the decision of

the Special Meeting to 5 years in the camps. 2. For criminal errors in investigative work - Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov to be dismissed from the counterintelligence agencies and sent to the active army ****.** RGASPI. F. 558.

Op. 11. D. 461. L. 21-35. Script.

Typescript.

— Underlined in pencil in the margins. ****—****

Crossed out and entered in paragraph 2 by Stalin: "penal battalion under the Chief of Logistics K.A."

No. 239

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks "Issue of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of
Kyrgyzstan and the NKVD of the USSR"**

05/25/1943

MOST SECRET 251

— Question of the Central Committee of the CP(b)
of Kyrgyzstan and the NKVD of the USSR Vagov and the NKVD of
the USSR: 1. In order to

suppress banditry, robberies, malicious hooliganism and large-scale
theft of socialist property and to strengthen repression against those
responsible for the above crimes in the Kirghiz SSR, to create a
republican troika consisting of: Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party (b) of Kyrgyzstan Comrade . Vagov, People's
Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kirghiz SSR comrade. Pchelkin and
the Prosecutor of the Republic comrade. Komolov, who will be granted
the right to consider out of court cases of banditry, robbery, malicious
hooliganism and theft of socialist property.

2. To allow the specified trio to apply capital punishment to 150
people, the perpetrators of the above crimes - execution with confiscation
of their personal property and subsequent announcement of sentences
in the press on behalf of the Prosecutor's Office. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D.
212. L. 215. Copy.

Typescript. Protocol No. 40. The text contains a
typewritten note

about the distribution: "T.t. Molotov, Beria, Vagov, Bochkov, Gorkin.

No. 240

**Order of the People's Commissar of
Defense on the 7th Separate Army**

05/31/1943

Sov. secret

ORDER

OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF

DEFENSE No. 0089 May

31, 1943 Moscow Checking the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army revealed certain facts of perversions and criminal errors in the investigative work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army.

I ORDER: 1) For

perversion in the investigative work, the deputy head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, the head of the investigative unit, senior investigator Ilyainen, be dismissed from the counterintelligence agencies and sentenced by the decision of the Special Conference to 5 years in the camps.

2) For criminal errors in the investigative work of investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov, dismiss them from counterintelligence agencies and send them to a penal battalion under the head of Logistics K.A.

3) To the head of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, Comrade Dobrovolsky, for the lack of control over the work of the investigative unit, as a result of which gross errors and distortions took place in the investigative work, to announce a reprimand *with a warning*. 4) Help army

prosecutor Major of Justice Vasiliev for poor implementation of prosecutorial supervision of the investigation in the Special Department, to be removed from work with a demotion in position ** and rank ** and sent to the disposal of the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army.

5) To the Military Prosecutor of the Army, Colonel of Justice Gerasimov, for self-removal from supervision and for the lack of control over the work of his assistants - to announce a reprimand ** with a warning **. People's

Commissar of Defense I. STALIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 461. L. 19-21. Script.
Typescript.

— Inserted by Stalin instead of the crossed out "and transfer to work in another army."

— Inscribed by Stalin.

No. 241

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the costs of foreign work of the NKGB of the USSR

06/04/1943

Top secret 287 -

Merkulov's question Issue

the NKGB of the USSR for the costs of foreign work of the 1st

Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR in the first half of

1943: a) 1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand) rubles in foreign currency different countries;

b) 400,000 (four hundred thousand) German rubles occupation marks and Polish zlotys.

RGASPI F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 79. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 40.

No. 242

**Order of NPOs on the organization of schools and
courses of the Smersh Main Educational Institution**

06/15/1943

Top secret "" June

1943 city. Moscow CONTENTS:

On the organization of schools and courses of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO "SMERSH" and the creation of a reserve of operational personnel under the Directorates and departments of fronts and military

districts 1. To train and retrain the operational staff of the SMERSH bodies, organize 4 permanent schools: 1st Moscow - for 600 people, 2nd Moscow - for 200 people, Tashkent - for 300 people, Khabarovsk - for 250 people. * with a training period of 6 to 9 months * and courses with a 4-month training period in the years. Novosibirsk - for 200 people. and Sverdlovsk - for 200 people. 2. For students of schools and courses, establish a monetary

content:

a) persons of middle and senior commanding staff according to earlier positions held;

b) a stipend of 400 rubles per month for private and junior commanding officers. 3. To the head of the Main

Directorate of the Logistics of the Red Army, Colonel-General of the quartermaster service comrade. Khrulev to provide schools and courses with all kinds of allowances.

4. In order to staff the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies with new formations and replenish the loss of operational staff, create a permanent reserve of personnel **50-100** people at the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH, the Directorates and departments of the fronts and military districts.

The reserve should be replenished with a new recruitment from among the junior and middle command and political composition of the army.

Maintain the personnel of the reserve at the expense of the general shortage of SMERSH counterintelligence and charge at the rates established for the positions of the operational staff of the SMERSH bodies.

People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN

Published: "Smersh": Historical essays and archival documents. M., 2003. S. 78.

— Inscribed by Stalin. **

—** Entered by Stalin instead of the crossed out "from 50 to 100".

No.

**243 Special message by V.S.
Abakumova I.V. Stalin and A.M.
Vasilevsky about the reasons for the
disclosure of the upcoming offensive
operations on the sector of the Bryansk Front**

06/24/1943

Top secret According to

the Smersh Directorate of the Bryansk Front, held in May and June of this year. preparations for offensive operations in the sectors of the 61st and 63rd armies were carried out without sufficient observance of military secrecy and camouflage during the concentration of troops, which made it possible for the enemy to guess about the measures we were taking on this sector of the front.

So, for example, the chief of artillery of the 61st Army, Major General Yegorov, being aware of the preparations for an operation to break through the enemy's defenses in the army sector and warned by the front command to observe the strictest secrecy, informed some commanders about this, including Lieutenant Colonel Lazarev and Major Sergievsky . May 4 this year Yegorov organized a military game "Offensive" in the breakthrough

sector with the chiefs of artillery of divisions and commanders of artillery regiments. To develop a plan to break through the enemy defenses, Yegorov involved the entire operational department of the army headquarters, including the typist Domnina and the draftsman Afonin.

May 27 this year Egorov handed out the offensive plan to the corps commanders, brigades and artillery regiments.

Despite instructions from the front command not to bring newly arriving artillery units to firing positions and not to intensify artillery fire in the army sector, Yegorov ordered

commanders of artillery units to take up firing positions and zero in with one gun from the battery. As a result of the zeroing of the

guns, massive artillery fire was formed in the army sector. This made it possible for the enemy to guess about the

activities of our units, since after this he led large fire raids on our areas of firing positions. The concentration of troops in the area of planned actions took place without sufficient camouflage.

The remains of the columns and a large number of vehicles moved to the concentration area during the day, which unmasked the location of our troops. Preparatory measures, reconnaissance of the terrain, preparation of firing positions were carried

out without sufficient secrecy, which made it possible for the enemy, as established by radio interception, to detect a significant amount of our artillery and firing positions.

So, radio interception recorded that in the period from May 29 to June 6 of this year. enemy air reconnaissance in the Gudovishchi-Polyany-Tshlykovo sector (north of Mtsensk) discovered 62 artillery and 30 mortar positions. In the Zadushnoye-Novosel area, enemy air reconnaissance discovered 17 artillery batteries. In May of this year. on the section

Novosel - Orlovka - Gvozdyanoye enemy discovered 5 built bridges across the river. Zoosha.

In parts of the 2nd Artillery Corps, reconnaissance work and work on equipping engineering structures were carried out without masking. The enemy, having discovered by aerial reconnaissance the preparation of some work and the revival of work on the front line of the corps' defense, bombed our artillery positions, damaging 11 guns. In addition, German intelligence agents arrested during the transition to our side,

as well as Germans captured by our troops, testified that the enemy became aware of the preparation of an offensive by our troops in the sector of the 61st and 63rd armies. So, arrested on May 29 of this year. when the front line crossed to our side, the German intelligence agent

Strelkov testified that there was talk among the German command and soldiers that the Russians were preparing

offensive, as told by the Russians themselves, captured by the Germans in captivity.

Sergeant Major of the 110th Infantry Regiment of the 112th Infantry Division of the German Army Kronauer, taken prisoner by our troops in June of this year, testified:

"With regard to the offensive of the Red Army units in this sector, I heard from company commander Reingolz, who informed the soldiers that in early June of this year. two soldiers of the Russian army were captured, who informed the German command that the Red Army units were preparing and expect an offensive.

In addition, Reingoltz reported that the Focke-Wulf aircraft on the territory of the Red Army units discovered new artillery firing positions and a large movement of troops in this area.

The senior corporal of the same division, Paul Gunter, during interrogation said: "The platoon

commander, Lieutenant Mendel, announced to the soldiers that around the beginning of June of this year. in this area, a Russian offensive should be expected, since the reconnaissance aircraft detected a large accumulation of Russian artillery and increased movement of troops.

Among the soldiers there was talk that a defector had crossed from the Russian side in the Bolshaya Kargashenka area, who reported on the impending Russian offensive in this direction.
ABAKUMOV Published: "Arc of Fire": Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka / Comp.

A.T. Zhadobin, V.V. Markovchin, V.S. Khristoforov. M., 2003. S. 28-30.

No.

**244 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about
the detention of a deserter - a
member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR**

07/14/1943

591/

b Top secret To the

State Defense Committee Comrade STALIN July 5 of this year. The NKVD of the Turkmen SSR liquidated an armed group of deserters in the Khadzhambas district of the Chardjou region. The detained leader of the group turned out to be Djumaev Allan, born in 1902, a native of the village council of Beshir, Khadzhambas region, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who deserted from the Red Army in April 1943. With the sanction of the Supreme Council of the Turkmen SSR, Dzhumaev was detained. The NKVD asks to authorize the arrest of

Dzhumaev. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 176. Original.

Typescript. There is a resolution on the sheet: "I agree. I. Stalin.

No. 245

**Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the
work of prisoners
specialists**

08/09/1943

665/

b Sov. secret

to the Chairman of the state. Defense Committee comrade

STALIN I.V. In the 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR there is a group of specialists who took part in the design of the Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft and participated in the serial production of these aircraft.

At present, in connection with the work assigned to Comrade. MYASISCHEV on the modification of the Pe-2 aircraft, and the work assigned to comrade. Tupolev for the introduction of the TU-2 aircraft into the series at the plant No. 23 of the NKAP, N.K.A.P. t. SHAKHURIN, together with the chief designers t.t. TUPOLEV and MYASISCHEV, filed a petition for the early release of some of the specialists who took part in the development and implementation of the Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft into mass production, and for the direction of these specialists to work in the NKAP.

Taking into account the great experience of the work of imprisoned specialists in the creation of Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft, the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient for these specialists to participate in further work on Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft and petitions for early release with the removal of a criminal record of 38 specialists who have distinguished themselves during design and construction of Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft. I am

enclosing a list and characteristics of these specialists. APPENDIX:

According

to the text. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR BERIA Sov.

secret LIST

Particularly distinguished specialists of the 4th special department of the NKVD of the USSR 1. ASTAKHOV Ivan Petrovich, born in 1902, former chief. mechanic of plant No. 21. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940

under Art. 58-7-11 for 10 years ITL. An experienced process engineer, he participated in the development of the technology for the production of aircraft 102 and worked directly at the production site to

introduce this aircraft into a series. 2. BABIN Igor Borisovich, born in 1914, former design engineer of plant No. 70. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on May 20, 1938, to 5 years in labor camp.

Capable, proactive engineer. He did a lot of work as a leading engineer of the general view brigade on linking and constructive development of the Tu-2 aircraft and its modifications.

3. BAGRIY Viktor Fedorovich, born in 1898, former technical director of plant No. 32. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 30, 1940 under Art. 58-6-7-11 for 10 years. A

qualified, enterprising engineer who participated in the design and construction of the Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft. He knows the technology of these aircraft well, he successfully worked on the introduction of the TU-2 aircraft into a series. 4. BOCHAROV Nikolai

Fedorovich, born in 1897, former head. chemical engineering department of VIAM. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 for 10 years ITL.

Process engineer, head of the Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 machines group. Carried out a number of research work on substitutes. Does the job assigned well.

5. BUDKEVICH Pavel Vasilievich, born in 1904, former chief. serial design bureau of the aircraft plant No. 43. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art. 58-6-7-10-11 for 10 years.

Executive and proactive engineer. He carried out all the main work on the layout and coordination of the propeller group of the TU-2 aircraft. Performs assigned work flawlessly.

6. BURAKOV Nikolai Nikolaevich, born in 1900, ex. head of laboratory VIAM. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 for 10 years.

Qualified, conscientious engineer. Participated as a technologist in the design and manufacture

Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft.

7. VLADYSHEVSKY Vladimir Leontievich, born in 1902, former senior VIAM engineer. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940 under Art.

58-7-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years of labor camp. Experienced woodworking engineer. Developed and put into production a number of parts made of bakelized wood. Works with passion. The assigned tasks are carried out conscientiously and proactively.

8. GALIN Nikolai Evgenievich, born in 1892, former design engineer of plant No. 32. Convicted of Spec. collegium of the Moscow City Court on 08/10/37 under Art. 58-10 h. 1 for 8 years ITL.

Initiative and executive engineer. He did a lot of work on the development and production of working drawings for the Pe-2 and TU-2 aircraft. 9. GELLER Timofei

Markovich, born in 1904, former head. shops of the Gorky Automobile Plant. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on December 23, 1940 under Art. 58-7-9-11 to 5 years of ITL.

Highly qualified process engineer. Possessing great knowledge of various methods of stamping parts in the automotive industry, he successfully transferred his experience to aircraft production, which greatly simplified and accelerated the production of aircraft in mass production. 10. IVANOV Alexander Sergeevich, born in 1893,

former chief engineer of the automobile plant. Molotov. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on December 23, 1940 under Art. 58-6 hours 2, 58-7-11 for 5 years labor camp.

Highly qualified engineer and capable organizer. Developed and implemented a plan to equip production with special stamps, which simplified and accelerated the production of aircraft. Thanks to his excellent organizational skills, he enjoys great prestige among specialists. 11. KALGANOV Yuri Vasilyevich, born in 1899, former chief engineer of plant No.

125. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years of labor camp.

Design engineer with good knowledge of pilot aircraft production. He did a lot of work on the introduction of the TU-2 aircraft into mass production. Hardworking and persistent at work.

12. MARKEVICH Petr Petrovich, born in 1893, former designer of plant No. 43. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art.

58-6-7-11 for 10 years. Highly qualified designer who developed a number of very successful designs for the Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft.

13. MIROSLAVSKY Pavel Andreevich, born in 1908, former shop manager of plant No. 22. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on 2.06.38 for espionage for 8 years in labor camp.

An experienced process engineer, he carried out all the main work on the design and manufacture of fixtures for the production of aircraft 103, TU-2. Works in good faith. Performs assigned tasks proactively and accurately. 14. MITREVICH Konstantin Stanislavovich, born in 1902, former head

of the engine shop of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 30, 1940 under Art. 58-7-8-9-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years of labor camp.

A mechanical engineer who is well versed in the organization of mass production of aircraft. He made many improvements in the technology of manufacturing hydraulic systems for the TU-2 aircraft.

15. NEKRASOV Alexander Ivanovich, born in 1883, former deputy. early TsAGI for the scientific part. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art.

58-6-7-11 for 10 years. Qualified engineer with great theoretical knowledge. Developed a number of theoretical questions on the study of aircraft wing vibration, flutter, etc. Possesses good mathematical abilities and knowledge.

16. Evgeny Ivanovich SAVKOV, born in 1884, former professor at the military engineering academy. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on August 15, 1939 for participation in an anti-Soviet organization and sabotage for 8 years in labor camp. Qualified

Calculation Engineer. Carried out the main work on the calculations of the wing and ailerons of the Tu-2 aircraft and its modifications. He also did a lot of work on substitutes for scarce materials. 17. SAKHAROV Viktor Panteleymonovich, born in 1909, former head.

sound recording department of the Mosfilm film factory.

Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR for activity on December 22, 1937, for 10 years in labor

camp. Energetic, capable engineer. As the lead engineer of the brigade, he independently performed a number of works on the design of the TU-2 aircraft. 18.

SERMAN Eduard Iosifovich, born in 1905, former consultant of the GUUZ NKAP. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 30, 1940 under Art. 58-6 on 10 years.

A capable engineer who completed a number of responsible tasks for the design of Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He did a lot of work on introducing TU-2 aircraft into mass production. 19. SIPRIKOV Vasily Grigorievich,

born in 1899, former chief engineer of plant No. 124. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 for 10 years ITL. Design engineer,

developed a number of critical designs of the Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He did a lot of work on introducing the TU-2 aircraft into mass production. 20.

SOLOMAKHIN Arseniy Nikolaevich, born in

1903, former Ch. mechanic of plant No. 18. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 30, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years. Design engineer

who took part in the design and manufacture of the Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He did a great job as the head of the workshop for the introduction of the TU-2 aircraft into mass production.

21. Mikhail Alexandrovich USACHEV, born in 1909, former director of plant No. 156. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on June 20, 1939 under Art. 17-58-7 of

the Criminal Code for 15 years of labor camp. An initiative and executive engineer, he took part in the development of the Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He did a lot of work on introducing the TU-2 aircraft into mass

production. 22. FAINSTEIN Abram Samoylovich, born in 1891, former deputy. early Glavplastmasy. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940 under Art. 58-1a-58-7-11 for 10 years ITL.

Chemical engineer, experienced specialist in the field of plastics production. Performed a number of works on substitutes for metals with plastics. Organized and ensured the production of these parts for TU-2 aircraft.

23. BILDYUG Boris Iosifovich, born in 1909, former design engineer of plant No. 89. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on June 2, 1938 under Art. 58-6 for 8 years ITL.

A qualified design engineer, he performed design design work on the Pe-2 and 102 aircraft. He treats the assigned duties in good faith. 24. DYAKONOV Leonid Alexandrovich, born in 1909, former senior Engineer of the

Transport Department of the Moscow City Council. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on April 29, 1939 under Art. 58-10 for 8 years ITL.

Executive, capable engineer, participated in the development and layout of the aircraft propeller group 102. He took an active part in the flight tests of the aircraft. He performs all assigned work quickly and proactively. 25. KVITKO Ivan Nikitich, born in 1901, former head of the land aircraft department of

the Scientific Testing Institute of the Air Force. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on September 9, 1938 under Art. 58-10 for 8 years ITL.

Qualified engineer, well acquainted with the operation of aircraft. He did a lot of work on flight tests of aircraft 102. He is accurate, precise and diligent in his work.

26. KOROTKOV Georgy Kirillovich, born in 1908, former head of department at Plant No. 22. Condemned by a special meeting at the NKVD of the USSR on April 23, 1939 under Art. 58-8-10-11 of the Criminal Code for 8 years ITL.

Technological engineer. He took part in the development of technology for Tu-2 and 102 aircraft. Disciplined and executive engineer. 27. KOSTKIN Ivan Mikhailovich, born in 1886,

former chief engineer of plant No. 301. Sentenced by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on April 7, 1941 for participation in an anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization for 8 years in labor camp.

Highly qualified process engineer with good knowledge of production. He did a lot of work to improve aircraft production technology.

28. MARKUSOV Abraham Solomonovich, born in 1905, former head. machine shop of plant No. 33. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-1a, 58-7-9-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years.

Experienced Mechanical Engineer. The head of the engine crew of the aircraft 102. An energetic, capable worker, a good organizer. 29. MAROL Ruvim Solomonovich, born in 1896, former head. design bureau brigade and leading engineer of plant No. 135. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 of the Criminal Code for 10 years.

Highly qualified design engineer. As the head of the brigade, he carried out a number of designs for Pe-2 and 102 aircraft. He independently developed the designs of the aileron and landing flaps, which showed good results.

30. MEERSON Zalman Movshevich, born in 1903, former head. armaments department of TsAGI. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-7-11 of

the Criminal Code for 10 years. A highly qualified engineer, a specialist in the field of aircraft weapons. He carried out all the main work on the installation of bomber and small arms on the 102 aircraft, which received an excellent rating from the state commission. tests.

31. NIMRNITSKY Matvey Alexandrovich, born in 1897, former head. shop of plant No. 22. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-6 h. 1 of the Criminal Code for 10 years. Skilled

design engineer with a good theoretical and practical training, has good organizational skills. He did a lot of work on the design of the Pe-2 and 102 aircraft. He provided great practical assistance to the plant for the construction of the 102 aircraft. He is disciplined and proactive.

32. NUROV Nikolay Georgievich, born in 1895, former deputy. ch. designer of plant No. 81. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art. 58-6 for 10 years. Highly qualified,

experienced design engineer. As deputy chief designer of aircraft 102, he did a lot of work on the design and construction of aircraft 102 and contributed to the successful passage of the state. tests.

33. NEVDACHIN Vyacheslav Pavlovich, born in 1887, former chief engineer of Mashtekhpromsoyuz. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 31, 1940 under Art. 58-6 hours 1, 58-10 hours 1 of the Criminal Code for 10 years.

Qualified design engineer with extensive experience in practical work in the field of aviation. Participated in the design and manufacture of Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He treats work conscientiously and accurately. 34. POLISCHUK Konstantin

Efimovich, born in 1897, former head. Military electrical engineering. KA Academy. Condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on July 2, 1939 under Art. 58-7-10-11 for 8 years ITL.

Highly qualified, experienced electrical engineer, head of the 102 aircraft electrical and radio equipment team. Successfully solved a number of complex design problems related to the aircraft electrical and radio equipment. Initiative, energetic and persistent. 35. PROTSENKO Ivan

Kuzmich, born in 1899, former deputy. early TsAGI for the scientific part. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art. 58-1a,

58-7 of the Criminal Code for 10 years. Highly qualified engineer with great theoretical knowledge. He participated in the design and manufacture of Pe-2, TU-2 and 102 aircraft. He supervised the development of the design of a new three-wheeled chassis. In his work he showed great creative initiative and ability. Responsible for assigned duties in good

faith. 36. TRUNOV Konstantin Ivanovich, born in 1896, ex. teacher of tactics at the Air Force Academy. Zhukovsky. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 29, 1940 under Art. 58-6 for 10 years ITL. A major specialist in the field of aviation tactics. During his work in the 4th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR, he developed a number of questions on the tactical use of aircraft designed in the 4th Special Department. The assigned work is carried out accurately and

conscientiously, while showing initiative and perseverance. 37. SHATALOV Yury Trofimovich, born in 1902, ex. early design department of plant No. 21. Convicted by the

Supreme Court of the USSR on May 28, 1940 under Art. 58-9-11 for 10 years ITL. Deputy ch. aircraft

designer 102. Experienced, qualified. an engineer with good knowledge of aircraft manufacturing. He supervised all dynamic and static tests of the 102 aircraft and actively participated in the introduction of the protot

38. SHEKUNOV Evgraf Porfiryevich, born in 1894, ex. chief engineer of plant No. 1. Convicted by the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 14, 1939 under Art. 58-7, 17-58-8-9-11 for 20 years of ITL. Highly qualified

process engineer with extensive experience in practical management work. Proactive, energetic professional. He did a lot of work on the production technology of Pe-2 and 102 aircraft. as a technologist in assembly shops and his work, in many respects contributed to the fastest implementation

experienced aircraft.

Beginning 4 special departments of the NKVD of the USSR V.

KRAVCHENKO AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 114-121. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "To Comrade Beria. Agree. I. Stalin.

No.

**246 Special message by V.N.
Merkulova I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P.
Beria about undercover data obtained from
London and New York**

11/01/1943

Sov. secret

STATE to comrade STALIN,

COMMITTEE

DEFENSE

comrade MOLOTOV,

comrade BERIA, the NKGB of the USSR informs

the following intelligence data received from London and New York about the preparation of the Anglo-American armed forces for the invasion of the territory of France. The invasion operations are supposed to start in March 1944.

The ratio of the Anglo-American armed forces destined for military operations on the territory of Europe is defined as 70% American and 30% British, except for Norway, for which 90% British and 10% American troops are determined.

First, it is planned to capture Normandy and Brittany with the direction of the attack on Caen (Normandy). For this operation, it is planned to allocate 100 divisions (70 American and 30 British). The initial landing is supposed to be carried out with the forces of 20 divisions, from which a strike group of 8-9 divisions will be allocated. Simultaneously with the main invasion operation from the West, it is planned to carry out a

distraction operation with the help of 6 divisions at the mouth of the Rhone River. In addition, the allied command has planned another ground operation, for which it is planned to allocate 26 American divisions. At present, the troops necessary for these operations are being concentrated on the territory of England, in particular

significant contingents of American troops are being transferred from North Africa.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.
MERKULOV

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: In 6 vols. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 613.

No.

247 Special message by V.S.

Abakumova I.V. Stalin on the reaction of military personnel to the new national anthem of the

12/23/1943

No.

343 / a Sov.

secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO
COMRADE STALIN

The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the National Anthem of the Soviet Union" published in the press caused a wide response among the Red Army servicemen.

The generals and officers of the Red Army approve of replacing the "Internationale" with a new national anthem, the text of which glorifies our great Soviet Motherland, the indestructible union of free republics, and "corresponds in its content to the cause and essence of the Soviet system."

YAKOVLEV, Colonel General

- Head of the Main

Artillery Directorate of the Red Army:

"Abroad, this will be regarded as a step back, as a concession to the allies, but in reality this is not so. After all, how many such steps we took during the war: we liquidated the commissars - nothing happened, they even began to fight better, they introduced general officer ranks, put on epaulettes for everyone - discipline was strengthened.

The Holy Synod was created, a patriarch was elected, the Comintern was dissolved and, finally, the International was abolished, and all this is for the

benefit of the Motherland. How can there be an "Internationale" with a German beast that exterminated hundreds of thousands of Soviet people and turned our

country into a desert. The extermination of fascist evil spirits - these are the tasks that should now be, and therefore everything that can hasten the death of fascists

should be used for this. NOVIKOV, Air

Marshal - Commander of the Red Army Air Force: "The content of the anthem

is strong. Apparently, the music will sound just as strong. This event is quite timely, since the old anthem has already outlived itself and its content does not correspond to the spirit of the times."

SEVOSTYANOV - colonel, head of the engineering department of the 5th Army of the Western

Front: "The new anthem of the Soviet Union corresponds to the present Time, reflects the role of Comrade STALIN, Commander-in-Chief." NIKITIN, Colonel General of Aviation - Supreme

Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force: "A wonderful anthem. Its content is very, very durable. This is

the anthem we need. In every word of the new anthem one can feel the great strength of our people." DMITRIENKO, colonel, head of the department of the rear headquarters of the Red Army:

"The new anthem very correctly mentions Lenin and Stalin, which says that Stalin raised

us to be loyal to the people. This reflects the era of great people, the creation of the Soviet Union and

education of the heroic people living in it.

TEKMAZOV, major general - head of intelligence

Department of the headquarters of the Belorussian Front:

"The new text of the anthem teaches to love the motherland, the fatherland specifically, and not in general. He sums up the meaning of the concept of the fatherland and, most importantly, that the Soviet Union was rallied by Great Rus'. The anthem speaks of the fatherland, and with these words, everyone is born with pride in their people and the union of all the peoples

of the Soviet country. RAKHMANOV, major general of the medical service - member Central Military Medical Commission of the Red Army:

"The new anthem fully reflects the political situation of our state. Its content is based on the speeches of Comrade STALIN and his historical indications.

ZHURAVLEV, Lieutenant General of Aviation - Head of the Operational Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Headquarters:

"The new anthem of the Soviet Union is in tune with our era. The text was corrected personally by Comrade STALIN. It

is very important now that good music be written to these words. MAKAROV, colonel - head of the

financial service of the headquarters of the Separate Moscow Air Defense Army:

"The text is very good and covers everything: the first verse is Rus', the second verse is LENIN and STALIN, and the third is the Red Army. The refrain is about the friendship

of peoples. SMOLENSKY, major - senior assistant of the intelligence department Artillery Directorate of the Headquarters of the 33rd Army of the Western Front:

"This wonderful anthem about LENIN and STALIN should be sung all peoples, and not in any song, but in the national anthem."

KONDRATOV, Colonel - Chief of Staff of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army of the Western Front: "The words of

the new anthem reflect the strength of the Soviet republics, rallied around Soviet Russia. They talk about the fatherland and the friendship of peoples, about the great leaders LENIN and STALIN, who showed the way to the Russian people and inspired them to exploits and fight against presumptuous fascists. BOGDANOV, lieutenant colonel - assistant

commander of the 2nd division barrage balloons of the Special Moscow Air Defense Army:

"Once the Comintern was dissolved, as having played its role in the organization of the working class, it means that the anthem of the International has outlived its functions. Our Government did the right thing by introducing a new text of the national anthem, which reflects the entire path of Soviet power over the 26 years of existence and clearly reflects the role of the founders of our state - Lenin and Stalin. MOTAEV, engineer-colonel - head of the department of the Main

Directorate of the Aviation Engineering Service of the Red Army Air Force:

"Finally, they remembered the great Rus', otherwise they had completely forgotten it. This word was deleted from the Russian lexicon. This was a big mistake.

The basis of our state, from which the Soviet Union arose, was Russia. It is on this basis that we must educate. This word creates the great traditions that we so much need."

SOROKIN, colonel - student of the Higher Military Academy. Voroshilova:
“The words of the

new anthem are exceptionally deep and meaningful. The whole anthem reflects our current state of the country and our strength.” KISLOV, lieutenant colonel - chief of staff of the 56th anti-aircraft

artillery division of the Special Moscow Air Defense Army:

“Changing the anthem is a necessary event. The International played its role back in the years of the civil war, but now it does not reflect Soviet reality. The new anthem fully reflects the essence of our reality. The leaders and organizers of building a happy life are sung in the new anthem, and our valiant army is also sung in it.

KURILOV, Major General of Aviation - Head of the Central Frunze airfield:

“The content of the International is outdated and does not correspond to the current situation. The new anthem fully reflects the reality and life of the multinational Soviet Union.”

ALESHIN, Major General - Deputy. head of the group at the Main NGO Human Resources Department:

“The anthem is very good. The words are cheerful, with great inner meaning and content. I would like to hear the anthem's melody sooner. Probably, the clock on the Spasskaya Tower will also beat out the melodies of the anthem.”

KRASNOSCHEKOV, Colonel - Head of the Academy of the Red Army Air Force Headquarters:

“The International, of course, is outdated. The old hymn was about the destruction of the old world. How long will we say that we will destroy the old world, when we have already come to a socialist society. OSTROUMOV, lieutenant colonel - chief of staff of the 56th division

Special Moscow Air Defense Army:

“This is what I understand, a really modern text of the anthem. It will be pleasant to pronounce such words, which expresses all the work of the Russian people and our leaders in creating the Russian-Soviet state. Now our allies will become thoughtful and will reckon with us even more. For the first time in history, the Russian people will be glorified like this.”

ERNEST, Major General - Head of the Department of Armored Forces of the Frunze Military Academy: "The anthem is very good, beautiful

and strong. It tells about the past, and about the present, and about the future of our country, and about the tasks of the Soviet Union. Of course, the text is quite different from the International. The International no longer corresponds to the conditions of life in our country, to the changes that have taken place in it in connection with the victories of socialism.

It is clear that when changing the anthem, the moment of our relationship with allies.

IVASHCHENKO, Art. lieutenant of the artillery regiment of the air defense headquarters of the

Western Front: "The International does not reflect the socialist essence of Soviet power, i.e. does not reflect the radical change in our country in 26 years. We have built a new socialist fatherland,

the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, and the peoples of the Soviet Union live in fraternal community. In the sacred struggle against the German fascist invaders, we are fighting for our free

independence.

The new anthem will sing the passed heavy, but glorious the path of our generation and our struggle against foreign invaders".

KONDRATIEV, lieutenant general - head of the Main Road Directorate of the Red Army: "The action of our Government on the introduction of a new national anthem is timely and reflects the entire course of the Patriotic War at present."

SUKHOVOY, lieutenant colonel - senior assistant to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Belorussian Front: "In the context of the Great Patriotic War, the introduction of the anthem is a call to all freedom-loving peoples to defeat fascism."

GNILOBOKOV, major - senior assistant to the head of the operational department of the armored and mechanized troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front: "Indeed, the International is already outdated. His

words to the call "Get up branded with a curse, the whole world of hungry and slaves," is not

correspond to reality. What kind of slaves we are, we are people of the Great Soviet country.”

Ezhov, colonel - head of the cipher department of the headquarters of the

Belorussian Front: “The content of the “International” has now become obsolete. The hegemony of the proletariat was emphasized in the old anthem, but the whole people is reflected in the new anthem.”

BENSKY, major general - head of the Red Army Troops Formation Department: “The anthem is of great importance. The text contains huge achievement of socialist construction and heroic struggle.

GALTSEV, Colonel - Assistant Chief of the 1st Department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: “The content of the new anthem meets all the requirements of our time. It reflects the reality of the Soviet Union, its features and achievements.”
IVANCHENKO, major - pom.

head of the intelligence department of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front: “The right decision to introduce this anthem. The anthem is very skillfully composed, short and clear and shorter than the International, it will make it easier its execution.”

FEDYUNIN, Lieutenant Technician, Barrage Balloon Division 2
Special Moscow Air Defense Army:

“When singing the old hymn, many words and expressions - it was felt that they were deprived, and not only deprived, but simply in our time did not have the meaning that is inherent in them. In fact, we have long outlived ourselves in the “world of slaves,” we have created a new, our own fatherland. The new anthem is concise, beautiful in content, it reflects all the feelings of the Soviet people. KISELEV, colonel - head of the chemical service 13 Air

Army of the Leningrad Front:

“The new anthem is good because it will reflect the reality today and mobilize for the defense of their state.

ZHIRNOBLEEV, lieutenant colonel - chief of staff of the armored and motorized troops of the headquarters of the 33rd Army of the Western

Front: “It is absolutely correct that they replaced the text of the anthem. The new anthem fully reflects what has happened over the 26 years of the existence of the Soviet

power change in our country and in the present period of the Patriotic War against the fascist enslavers. Expressing

positive opinions about the replacement of the national anthem of the USSR with a new text, some generals and officers of the Red Army believe that this was done under the influence of our cooperation with the allies - England and America. VOLSKY, lieutenant general - deputy commander

armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army:

"Since we have established friendly relations with the British and Americans, and at every meeting they are forced to play the International, and this, of course, is not to their liking, it was necessary to introduce a new anthem that corresponds to the spirit of the times and does not detract from the dignity of the Soviet Union. The new anthem is good, let's hear how it will sound in performance.

GRENDALE, lieutenant general of aviation - chief Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Headquarters:

"It's good that they finally remembered Rus' in the anthem, but still it seems to me that there is some concession to ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL."

SYCHEV, lieutenant colonel engineer - head of the accounting and planning department of the Red Army anti-aircraft artillery armament

department: "Get up branded with a curse - now it is unacceptable in our friendly relations with England and America. This is a concession to the allies. Now, if they demanded a change in the existing system and the choice of a king, we certainly would not agree to this. VOROBYOV, lieutenant colonel -

teacher of the Higher Political Courses named after Lenin: "All this is being done under the great influence of the

allies. They dictate their will, the more they succeed now, when our country is seriously weakened in the war and their will has to be reckoned with. Therefore, we have to abandon the anthem, which was won with the blood of the workers of Russia. RZHEVSKY, major - senior assistant to the head of the

department of the Directorate of Armored and Motorized Mechanics of the Headquarters of the 49th Army of the Western Front:

"The replacement of the International with a new anthem was carried out, like other events, under pressure from our allies. Our Government goes to great lengths to quickly open a second front." KORZUN, colonel - head of the personnel department of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Red Army: "The introduction of the new anthem was one of the big events, since the International cannot exist in the present era. We have made an alliance with the capitalist countries, and the International speaks of the abolition of slavery, while our allies have exploitation

person."

BELIKOV, major - chief of staff of the 53rd officer regiment of the officer brigade of the Moscow Military District: "The new anthem of the Soviet Union was issued because the International affected the inner life of our allies - England and America." KHOZHAINOV, engineer-lieutenant colonel - head of department of the 5th

Directorates of the GAU of the Red Army:

"The publication of a new anthem is connected with international relations. This was the question at the meeting of the allied powers, where, presumably, they agreed to replace the International.

KOPOLEB, Major - Assistant Chief of the Operational Department of the Headquarters of the 33rd Army of the Western Front: "The text of the anthem was changed after the demand of British and American diplomats, who did not like the previous International anthem." DONICHEV, major - teacher of tactics of

reconnaissance courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army:

"The replacement of the text of the anthem was not made because the old anthem does not correspond to the new setting in our socialist country, as indicated in the government decree. The new text has been introduced because we want to please our allies, who do not like the International."

FROLOV, Colonel of the Quartermaster Service - Head of the 6th Department of the Department of Carriage and Economic Supply of the State Inspectorate of the Red Army:

"Before, we were isolated and lonely, so we could sing and talk without listening to what others would say about us. Now we have to listen to the opinions of other states and adapt our anthems for our allies. Therefore, following the change in attitude towards the church and the international movement, the text of the anthem had to be changed to a more harmless one. SVELYEV, captain of the

communications department of the headquarters of the Separate Moscow Air Defense

Army: "The replacement of the anthem is associated with a meeting of statesmen in Tehran, this is due to a new direction in the policy of our state, as well as the dissolution of the Comintern."

KRYLOV, colonel - head of the department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: "We are gradually

moving towards the fact that the anthem of God save the Tsar will appear. We are slowly changing our basic mindset and moving towards being nice to our allies." VORKOV, major - senior

assistant to the head of the combat training department of the headquarters of the Belorussian Front:

"It was not without pressure from ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL, who forced Comrade STALIN to change our anthem, since it said "we will destroy the whole world of violence to the ground", which they didn't like it."

PASSOVA - teacher of the German language of the Chemical Academy of the Red Army:

"This is the business of the British, this is their influence, it is they who have come to the point that we now have a ridiculously high position of the church. It was they who forced the best ideals to be abandoned and the Comintern to be liquidated. It is they who have now forced the cancellation of the Internationale. Whatever the new anthem, it will never be for me what the Internationale was. I am an old man, but whenever I hear the Internationale, I get goosebumps with excitement. No, I am against. It's all the influence of England."

KOSHITSKY, a student of the Higher Academic Courses of the Red Army: "The

adoption of the new anthem is also in direct connection with the Tehran conference, where the allies proposed to a comrade

STALIN to renounce everything that is connected with our idea of world revolution. Probably soon the allies will open a second front.

BELOV, colonel of the commissariat service - deputy head of the Financial Directorate of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army: "The anthem of the International was

incompatible with the dissolution of the Comintern, since we call in it to destroy the old world and build a new one. If we did not do this, then there would be some kind of distrust on the part of England and America. Some Red Army officers express negative

opinions about replacing the "Internationale" with the new text of the national anthem of the USSR, and some believe that the new anthem will exist only during the Patriotic War, after which it will be replaced by another text of the anthem or even return to the "Internationale". KOPYLOV, major engineer - head of the 3rd department of the Import

Red Army Air Force Directorates:

"The anthem does not reflect the greatness and pathos of peaceful construction, about which we talked all the time before the war."

GOLTSEV, major - special correspondent of the Red Sokol Long-Range Aviation newspaper: "Of the anthems of

a number of states known to me, this will be the most unsuccessful anthem in terms of its artistic and internal content - this is a collection of roughly rhymed slogans that does not have the strength and beauty, as in monarchical anthem God save the Tsar.

PETROV, engineer-lieutenant colonel - head of department operation of the Directorate of Armored Forces of the Volkhov Front:

"It is a pity to part with the former anthem of the Soviet Union. The International reflected impulse, heroism, the desire to fight, and in general it was a favorite anthem that ennobled a person, and the new anthem, although we did not listen to it, however, judging by the content, is not interesting. Not the words you are used to. It is a pity to part with what reflects the struggle for Soviet power.

YUNASH, captain - head of the 3rd department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army: "There is nothing

sublime and inviting in the text of the anthem. Text bad

remembered and sluggish.

GOLOVAN, colonel - deputy. Chief of the 2nd Baltic Direction of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army: "The new anthem of the

Soviet Union, obviously, is introduced only during the war, since we do not refuse to influence the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world."

VASILEVSKY, engineer-captain - pom. head of department 3
Import Directorate of the Red Army Air Force:

"In two or three years, the anthem will be obsolete, and in general it reflects not the peaceful goals of the Soviet Union, but glorifies the war again.

FILATOV, engineer of the Central Design Bureau of the Main Directorate of the Hydrometeorological Service of the Red Army: "The old anthem was majestic

and strong in words and with
deep content, and the new one - so, some kind of song.

TOROKHOV, lieutenant colonel - head of the intelligence department of the 28th Army of the 4th

Ukrainian Front: "I don't like the words of the new anthem, there is no live fire in them. It would not be worth changing

the anthem at all now. NORDKIN, captain of the quartermaster service - senior assistant. head of the department of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the

Red Army: "The content of the new anthem is not guiding and not even ascertaining. In the anthem slips the exaltation of the Russian nation while hushing up other nations. This can be used by dark elements as great-power Russian chauvinism. The consistent protrusion of the Russian people is noticeable." YASTREBOV, lieutenant colonel - head of

the communications department of Long-Range Aviation: "The new anthem of the Soviet Union consists of

a simple set of words, but in relation to music to the anthem, nothing good can be expected from ALEKSANDROV, all his music is monotonous and based on continuous noise" . BOGATYREV, major - assistant to the head of the department

Operations Department of the Logistics of the 48th Army of the Belorussian Front:

"We have already experienced many different "songs", and this will change after the war. Such an anthem is a product of war and essentially

reflects the tasks of today only. KONICHEV,

major - deputy. head of the military faculty of the 2nd Medical Institute of the Moscow Military District for the educational part:

"The new anthem is not as solemn as the International. Words and thoughts are simpler. The introduction of the new anthem is indisputably connected with the dissolution of the Comintern and is a measure that continues our policy of retreat. It's all a road to something new."

MUSHNIKOV, Major of the Veterinary Service - Senior Assistant to the Head of the Veterinary Directorate of Logistics of the 49th Army of the Western

Front: "The new anthem does not reflect today. It says nothing about the Communist Party and about communism, despite the fact that this was our main goal.

LOMTEV, lieutenant of administrative service - deputy head of the naval mail department of the 5th Directorate of the Main Directorate of Communications of the Red Army:

"If you think, "be glorified," this was still sung under Paul the first. Why is the International rejected, because it is a militant revolutionary anthem, and one for all peoples.

TRIFONOV, lieutenant colonel - senior assistant chief operational department of the 16th Air Army of the Belorussian Front:

"The new anthem is introduced temporarily for the period of the war to maintain good relations with England and America. The war with the Germans will end, this anthem will immediately be canceled and there will again be the International.

BALYCHEV, engineer-captain - senior assistant to the head of the 1st department of the Airfield Construction Directorate of the Red Army Air Force: "I don't

like the text of the new anthem. There is no solemnity in it, and in the words it is more like a song than a national anthem. STRIZHIN, lieutenant of the administrative service - draftsman of the Communications Department of the Volkhov Front: "We need to write

such an anthem so that it will be forever. But the words of the new anthem reflect only what is happening now. After the war, they will not reflect the situation that will develop.

SOKOLOV, colonel - senior assistant to the head of the 1st department Operational Directorate of the Red Army Air Force:

"The new anthem is temporary. He embraces only the given epoch—the epoch of the Patriotic War. The line about the army was introduced in it, also in accordance with this era, but it will become obsolete after the war.

SPOMPOR, major - senior assistant to the head of the Department personnel of Long-Range Aviation:

"The anthem is built out of rhythm and in rude words. How, for example, to link the words "Rus" and "Union". The text of the anthem was written by some hitherto unknown poets. This is the third anthem in my life. The first anthem was "God save the Tsar", the second - "The Internationale" and the third - now published in the newspapers. The words of the first hymn are exceptionally well chosen in style and elasticity in contrast to the last hymn. And the music of the first anthem was so good that now I remember how they used to play the anthem, then my heart breaks from the melody. MOROZOV, Captain - Assistant Chief of the Operations

Department
48 armies of the Belorussian Front:

"Well, there will be something like "along Pitserskaya". In my opinion, every anthem should be inherently conservative. Any change of the national anthem means some kind of radical break in the policy of the state.

"God the king" has not yet been introduced. By God, it would be a good hymn, but instead of the word "king" they would

leave "people". Along with negative reactions about the introduction of a new text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union, hostile statements were recorded from individual Red Army servicemen. * LEDNEV * - engineer of the Central Design

Bureau of the Main Directorate of the Hydrometeorological Service of the Red Army: "The new anthem is weak, it was introduced in vain, and they made a big

mistake,
that introduced there the words about individuals.

PILYUGIN, major engineer - assistant head of department
Directorates of armored trains and armored vehicles of the GABTU of the Red Army:

"Have we been branded with a curse for 26 years. Although yes, branded. "The whole world is hungry and slaves." That's right - the slaves are still almost half-starved. Of course, it's a shame to sing such things already. Let them write new ones and rake in money."

* LEVACHEV *, captain - student of the Higher Officer Cavalry School of the Moscow Military District: "Today they will sing one thing, tomorrow another. All the same, listen to the Mother of God, that this anthem. It is necessary to pick up a motive for this hymn like a funeral march. We don't care about him." SPERANSKY, engineer-captain - head of the 3rd department of the Main

Office of the hydrometeorological service of the Red Army:

** "I don't understand why the personalities of Lenin and Stalin are included in the text of the anthem, since the anthem will exist for many centuries, while the leaders come and go" **. *BARANOV*, Art. lieutenant - assistant Head of Department

searchlight service of the headquarters of the Separate Moscow Air Defense Army:

"The essence of our state has changed so much that we are no longer faced with the task of building a communist society and we are slipping into the bourgeois system. In this regard, Marxism is no longer suitable for us, and it needs to be revised.

* MOISEYENKO *, captain - student of the improvement of the battalion commanders of the rifle and machine gun courses of the Leningrad Front: "Soon we will sing a hymn to the tune

of" God save the Tsar. Everything goes to the old. * SHARAPOV * - head of the administrative

and economic department of the Central House of the Red Army: "It remains only to change and dissolve the Bolshevik Party. In

1918-1919. there was something to agitate, then there was the slogan "land for the peasants, factories for the workers" and freedom of speech, and then they pressed it so that millions of people laid their heads." ABAKUMOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 98-114. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "Important. Someone needs to be touched. St.". *—* Surnames

are circled in pencil and crossed out in the margins with two lines. **—** Crossed out in the margins with two lines.

No. 248

**L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the arrest of persons
who collaborated with the German occupation
authorities**

12/28/1943

No. 1188/

b Top secret Copy

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO COMRADE

STALIN The so-called

"Volksdeutsche" belong to the number of persons who enjoyed significant privileges from the German occupation authorities in the temporarily occupied Soviet territory and who were widely used by the German invaders as their support in Ukraine. The Volksdeutsche category primarily includes German

colonists, as well as persons of non-German nationality, in whose family, however, there are Germans. In some cases, people who had nothing to do with German nationality, but who had earned the special trust of the German authorities, were included in the Volksdeutsche category in some cases.

Under the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, there was a special body that was engaged in determining the attitude and belonging to the Volksdeutsche and taking

them into account. Persons classified as "Volksdeutsche" had significant privileges in organizing their own trade and manufacturing enterprises, were completely exempt from paying income tax, being in the service of the Germans, received a salary 50% higher than the usual salary and a number of other benefits. "Volksdeutsche"

were widely used by the Nazi invaders as police officers, punishers and employees

German institutions.

During the retreat of the German troops, persons belonging to the Volksdeutsche category were evacuated by the Germans in an organized manner with the provision of transport and so on.

The NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR is currently conducting a secret count of the "Volksdeutsche" throughout the territory of Ukraine, liberated from the enemy.

In the city of Kyiv, 184 people from among the Volksdeutsche have already been registered. The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest all "Volksdeutsche" found on the territory liberated from the enemy. With regard to those on which there will be enough grounds to bring to court a military tribunal, to judge, all the rest of the Volksdeutsche, together with their families, should be evicted to the Altai Territory. Also expel the families of those "Volksdeutsche" who will be convicted in court. I

ask for your instructions. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 178. L. 73-76.

Script. Typescript. On the first page there is a resolution: "Arrest everyone, keep them in a special concentration camp under special supervision and us

No.

**249 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the
operation of overpopulation of
persons of Kalmyk nationality**

01/03/1944

No. 1/

b Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade

I.V. STALIN Comrade

V.M. MOLOTOV In

accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 28, 1943, the NKVD of the USSR carried out an operation to resettle persons of

Kalmyk nationality in the eastern regions. To ensure the conduct of the operation and prevent cases of resistance or escape, the NKVD took the necessary operational and military measures in advance, organized the protection of settlements, the gathering of the resettled, and escorting them to the places

of loading into echelons. At the beginning of the operation, 750 Kalmyk people who were members of gangs, gang accomplices, active accomplices of the German occupiers and other anti-Soviet elements were arrested.

In total, 26,359 families, or 93,139 displaced persons, were loaded into 46 echelons, who were sent to places of resettlement in the Altai and Krasnoyarsk Territories, Omsk and Novosibirsk

Regions. There were no incidents or excesses during the operation.

Echelons with resettled people are accompanied by NKVD workers. The NKVD of the USSR, together with local organizations, took the necessary measures to accept, provide housing and employment for migrants in places of resettlement.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.
BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**250 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov about the
"cleansing" of territories
liberated from the enemy**

01/08/1944

No. 28/

b Top secret Copy

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE Comrade I.V.

STALIN Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV In 1943, the

troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear of the Red Army in the process of clearing the territory liberated from the enemy, and while serving to protect the rear of the fronts, detained 931,549 people for verification, of which:

Military personnel - 582,515

Civilians - 349,034

Among the detained military personnel :

Disorganized retreat from the battlefield - 42,807

Those who strayed from their units -

158,585 Those who were captured by the

enemy - 88,221 Those who left the

encirclement - 18,086 With incorrectly executed

documents - 254,922 Violators of the order of

NPO No. 0860 - 19,894 Among the

detained civilians: Escaped from

defense work - 3560 Escaped from

places of detention - 114 Draft evaded to the Red Army

- 65 259 Escaped from resettlement from the front line - 11 110

Violators of the frontline regime - 113 790 Those

who did not have identification documents - 87 665

Suspicious element - 67,536 Of the total number of NKVD troops detained by the intelligence agencies for the protection of the rear of the fronts, 80,296 were exposed and arrested people, of which:

Enemy agents - 4822 Traitors
and traitors - 14,626 Police officers
and punishers - 5663 German
henchmen and accomplices - 21,022 Deserters
from the Red Army - 23,418 Marauders -
929 Other criminal
elements - 9816 In addition, 95
paratrooper agents were detained German

intelligence, which were transferred to the bodies of "Smersh".

The largest number of enemy agents was detained in the rear of the Western, Belorussian and 30th Ukrainian fronts. Over

the past year, the troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear of the fronts liquidated 114 bandit groups with a total of 636 members and arrested 160 lone bandits. The bandit element

consisted mainly of proteges and accomplices of the German invaders and former Red Army servicemen who deserted from units and took the path of banditry.

The rear of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Ukrainian and former North Caucasian fronts were the most affected by the bandit element, where 604 bandits were liquidated and arrested. Seized

from enemy agents and bandits: light
machine guns - 4 rifles
- 391 pistols

and revolvers - 89 grenades -
109 explosives

- 75 kg of radio stations - 10

Enemy agents,

traitors to the Motherland, traitors, bandits, deserters, henchmen and accomplices of the German invaders and other criminal the element was transferred to the bodies of the NKVD, the NKGB and counterintelligence "Smersh" by territoriality.

Detained military personnel - disorganized retreat from the battlefield, lagged behind their units and did not have established

documents - after verification they were sent to their units and to the points of formation of fronts and armies.

Those who evaded service in the Red Army, those who escaped from defense work and places of detention, and malicious violators of the front-line regime were transferred to the territorial bodies of the NKVD to bring them to justice.

The troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear of the Karelian Front in 1943 had 29 combat clashes with reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the enemy, who penetrated or tried to penetrate into the rear of the front. At the same time, 269 were killed and 40 enemy soldiers and officers were

captured. In the rear of the advancing units of the Red Army, 8686 enemy soldiers and officers were detained and handed over to the reception centers for prisoners of war. During the clearing of the front line, service detachments of the NKVD troops collected on the battlefields and confiscated from the local population trophy and domestic weapons and ammunition:

aircraft - 85

tanks - 757 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers - 31 guns of various calibers -

230 mortars - 539 anti-tank guns

- 290 easel and manual machine guns - 1,712 machine

guns - 2,488 rifles -

34,783 revolvers and pistols - 1,341

artillery shells of various calibers - 302,827

mines - 78,774

hand grenades - 47,176

cartridges of various types -

5,478,536 In addition, 150 warehouses with domestic weapons and ammunition were found in the rear of the fronts, left unguarded, and 19 warehouses abandoned by the enemy during the

withdrawal. The warehouses were transferred to the command of units and

formations of the Red Army. Along with the fulfillment of their main tasks of protecting the rear of the fronts, on the orders of the Military Councils of the fronts and

three non-separate battalions of the NKVD troops during 1943 participated in battles with regular enemy units. They destroyed 379 and captured 217 soldiers and officers. Trophies were captured: 50 cars, 100

tractors, 2100 artillery shells, over 10 million rounds of ammunition, more than 200 kilometers of telephone cable, 200 tons of gasoline, 11 wagons with ammunition and military equipment. combat operations and service had losses: killed and died from wounds - 480, wounded -

1203 and missing - 12 people. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA Top secret REFERENCE In 1943, in combat operations with regular units

enemy involved:

KARELIAN FRONT Since

the beginning of the war, the 82nd border regiment has been defending the Restikent direction, with up to two Finnish battalions numbering over 2000 people in front of it.

The divisions of the regiment did not conduct major battles with the White Finns; actions on both sides were limited to searching for scouts and capturing control prisoners - "tongues". The 80th border

regiment, having fire contact with the enemy, covers the eastern coast of the Povenets and Zaonezhsky bays and Lake Onega. Former SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT The 143rd Rifle

Regiment of the NKVD from March 1

to March 11, 1943, by order of the Military Council of the front, fought defensive battles on the southern approaches to the city of Izyum. Ex. NORTH

CAUCASIAN FRONT From 14 to 31/1-43, the

2nd Battalion of the 23rd Border Regiment by order Commander 46 A led offensive battles and captured the city of Maykop.

From March to June 1943, two combined detachments of the 26th and 95th border regiments took part in the battles to break through the German Blue Line on the Taman Peninsula, as part of the OSD of the NKVD.

Chief of the Operations Department Colonel YEFREMOV ""

January 1944

GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 9-13. Copy. Typescript.

No.

251 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the formation of the 1st Romanian Infantry Division

02/07/1944

No. 140/

b Copy

Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade STALIN The decision of the State

Defense Committee on the formation of the 1st Romanian Infantry Division of the NKVD of the USSR from among the prisoners of war was fulfilled.

The division was formed according to the states of the rifle division of the Red Army with a total number of 9562 people, of which: officers - 856, sergeants - 4393 and soldiers - 4313.

Division Commander - Lieutenant Colonel KAMBRYA, Chief of Staff divisions - Lieutenant Colonel TEKLU.

500 lieutenants of infantry, artillery and communications were trained from among the sergeants of Romanian prisoners of war to staff officers at the Ryazan Military School. The division is fully

provided with weapons, equipment and various types of property, with the exception of the horse staff, which will be completed by the end of February.

The division finishes combat training on February 10 of this year. According to the preliminary assessment of the command of the Moscow Military District, the division is well prepared.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA
RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 91. Copy. Typescript

No.

252 Special message by V.S.

Abakumova I.V. Stalin about the regional army

02/01/1944

No. 371/

A

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade

STALIN In addition

to No. 370/A of January 30 this year, the SMERSH Main Directorate reports that during further interrogations, the arrested Polish officers V.A. PELKA, Milashevsky K.A., Lototsky E.G., Kohutnitsky Z.B. and BOBROVNITSKY I.A. showed that the Polish underground military organization, called the "Army of the Krai" (army within the country) organizes its battalions in the voivodships for armed action against the Red Army when it approaches the borders of Poland or in the rear of the Soviet troops during the offensive against the Germans on the territory of Poland. As the arrested people

testified, according to the words of the underground Polish commandant for the Stolbtsovsky district of the Baranovichi region "Svir" - VOROKOMSKY, who through the inspector of the "Krayov army" lieutenant colonel nicknamed "Borik" maintained contact with the commander of this army, General "Grot", and then his successor, General "Bur" and the representative of the Polish government in exile in London KRAJEVSKI, they know that the underground Polish battalions being formed should be the core of the future Polish army, into which the manpower reserves that are already being prepared in the regions of Poland will join. So, the arrested former adjutant of the 331st Polish battalion Lieutenant MILASHEVSKY showed:

"From the words of Svir, I know that our 331st Polish battalion should be, as it were, the core of the Polish army, into which the reserves already prepared by him, located in the area, should join,

numbering over 500 people. At the same time, Svir stressed that similar battalions and reserves exist in other areas.

“Svir” also stated that the signal for action would be given from Warsaw for all of Poland, which would rise in order to prevent the Red Army from entering Poland. “Svir” has

always emphasized that we are now obliged to prepare for this, accumulate strength, save weapons and ammunition, try not to quarrel with the Soviet partisan detachments for the time being and maintain the appearance of good relations with them, and expel them from our territory at the right time.

This “Svirem” was most clearly expressed in a speech at the national holiday on November 11 (November 11), 1943 in the town of Derevnoe, where, speaking about the significance of the holiday for the Polish people, he stated: “We, a small group of Polish people, are on the eastern border Poland, which indicates that we live and will live and will not give up our land to anyone.”

Another arrested, former deputy. company commander of the 331st Polish battalion, lieutenant BOBROVNITSKY, in this unit gave such indications:

“From the orders of the leadership of the “Krayov Army”, as well as from the underground press of this organization, I know that at present the “Krayov Army” is working on training personnel, putting together detachments, stockpiling weapons and ammunition for armed action at the time of the approach of the Red Army to borders of Poland.

At present, the “Krayov army” is not conducting any active struggle against the Germans, allowing only the commission of individual sabotage and terrorist acts against the Germans.

Similar testimonies were given by the arrested lieutenant KOKHUTNITSKY and second lieutenant

LOTOTSKY. The arrested former commander of the 331st Polish battalion, major PELKA gave somewhat different testimony on this issue.

According to PELKA, the performance of the “Krayov Army” was supposed to take place after the Red Army went deep into Poland, pursuing the Germans. PELKA

testified: “This performance, according to “Svir”, should take place in the rear of the Red Army, when it passes, pursuing the Germans, into the depths of Pol

The speech is timed to coincide with the end of the war in such a way that by the time the peace treaty is concluded, the Polish army will be on the Polish-Soviet border (meaning the border before 1939).

In addition, "Svir" said that the formed battalions with Soviet partisan detachments needed to maintain friendly relations for the sake of appearance, but in the future they, like the Red Army, would be expelled by the Poles from the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.

Concerning the anti-Soviet documents seized during the disarmament of the 331st Polish battalion, the arrested Major PELKA and Lieutenant KOHUTNICKI testified that these documents belonged to the "Krayow Army" and representatives of the Polish government located in Warsaw and the voivodships, they were kept at the battalion headquarters and served as guidelines in practical activities .

KOKHUTNITSKY testified:

"The documents presented to me belong to the headquarters of the 331st Polish battalion.

The documents were kept in a closet at the headquarters, and only Svir and PELKA

had access to them. Some of the documents belonged personally to "Svir", they were stored in a special folder with the inscription "Documents of Svir". I myself saw them in the

closet, being in the headquarters room. The confiscated documents in their content reflect the activities of the "Krayov army", our battalion was guided by them in everyday practical work."

This was also confirmed by the arrested commander of the PELKA battalion, who

testified: "The anti-Soviet documents stored at the headquarters of the Polish battalion No. 331 belong to the "Krayov Army" and served as a guide for the practical activities of the battalion."

In addition to carrying out anti-Soviet propaganda and indoctrination of the battalion soldiers in a hostile attitude towards the USSR, as the arrested MILASHEVSKY testified, the command of the 331st Polish battalion took the path of open attacks on Soviet partisans. The most striking manifestation of this is the execution of 10 partisans by a mounted group of cornet NURKEVICH. The

arrested MILASHEVSKY testified about this:

"I am forced to admit that the attack on the Soviet partisans was carried out in accordance with the order of the Svir, and this was, as it were, the beginning of activities directed against the Soviet partisans. I must add

that if in the first period of the existence of the Polish detachment organized by me, relations with the Soviet partisan detachments were normal and we coordinated all actions with them, then after it was reorganized into the 331st Polish battalion and came to the leadership of Svir, PELKA and others relations with the Soviet partisans deteriorated sharply, the clashes between the soldiers of the Polish battalion with them became more frequent, although personally PELKA and I tried to show the appearance of our good relations with them. The Polish underground press, as stated by BOBROVNITSKY, conducting propaganda for the establishment

of Polish borders within the limits before 1939, CHURCHILL's speech in the death of SIKORSKY, stating that allegedly CHURCHILL promised guarantees of used Poland's eastern borders. The arrested connections BOBROVNITSKY testified about this: "CHURCHILL's speech, delivered by him in connection with the death of SIKORSKY,

was used in the underground press of the 'Army of the Territory' for anti-Soviet purposes. I personally read in one of the newspapers that allegedly CHURCHILL assured the Polish people that England was faithful to all the obligations it had undertaken, including the obligations to guarantee the eastern borders of Poland until 1939. Along with drill and tactical training in the detachments of the "Krayov Army", special training is also carried out for demolition personnel who are intended to be used to

commit sabotage during the period of the "Krayov Army" attacking units of the Red Army. Concerning the training of these personnel, the arrested lieutenant KOKHUTNITSKY testified:

"In Warsaw, I completed a one and a half month course on the study sabotage methods led by SETKOVICH.

Commanding a company in the Polish battalion No. 331, I received the task from "Svir" to prepare not separate groups, but the entire 2nd company for sabotage activities, and at the time of the speech

against the Red Army to blow up the railway bridge on the Stobtsy-Kaidanovo line. At the same time, I

present the following Russian translations from Polish documents seized during the disarmament of the 331st Polish battalion.

1. The magazine "Svit Polski" No. 13 dated 16.IX.1943, which is the official organ of the leadership of the underground struggle of the Novogradok Voivodeship, which contains: "Appeal to the Peasants" and "Appeal to the Workers", signed by the representative of the Polish government in London in Novogradok voivodeship, as well as the article "Warning", signed by the leader of the underground struggle.

2. Order of the commander of the "Krayov Army". 3. Guiding instruction of the underground commandant of the Stolbtsovsky district "Svir", written by him with his own hand. 4. Order "to the commandant of the SLUP

district." In addition, during the disarmament of the Polish battalion, several documents of an anti-Soviet nature in Russian, which were stored along with all other documents, were also seized, among them "Peasants of the Border Strip", signed by the Polish Commissar for Security of the Vilna Land - SOKOL, "Announcement" on behalf of the underground struggle and appeal "to the Poles", dated June 1943. I also provide copies of these documents. ABAKUMOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 269. L.

32-41. Script. Typescript.

No.

253 Telegram L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the preparation of an operation to evict Chechens and Ingush

02/17/1944

No.

7 Sov. secret

TELEGRAM No. 5351, 5352

February

17-44 To Comrade

STALIN The preparations for the operation to evict the Chechens and Ingush are being completed. After clarification, 459,486 people subject to resettlement were registered, including those living in the regions of Dagestan bordering Checheno-Ingushetia and in the city of Vladikavkaz. On the spot, I check the state of affairs on the preparation of the resettlement and take the necessary measures.

Taking into account the scale of the operation and the peculiarity of the mountainous regions, it was decided to carry out the eviction (including the boarding of people in echelons) within 8 days, within which the operation will be completed in the first 3 days in all lowland and foothill areas and partially in some settlements in mountainous regions, covering more than 300 thousand people. In the remaining 4 days, evictions will be carried out in all mountainous regions, covering the remaining 150,000 people.

During the operation in low-lying areas, i.e. in the first 3 days, all the settlements of the mountainous regions, where the eviction will begin 3 days later, will be blocked by military teams already in advance brought there under the command of the Chekists.

There are many statements among the Chechens and Ingush, especially those related to the appearance of troops. Part of the population reacts to the appearance of troops in accordance with the official version, according to which training maneuvers of the Red Army units are allegedly being carried out in mountainous conditions. The rest of the population speculates

about the eviction of Chechens and Ingush. Some believe that they will evict bandits, German accomplices and other anti-Soviet element.

There was a large number of statements about the need to resist the eviction. We have taken all this into account in the planned operational Chekist measures. All necessary measures have been taken to ensure that the

eviction is carried out in an organized manner, within the above time limits and without serious incidents. In particular, 6-7 thousand Dagestanis and 3 thousand Ossetians from the collective farm and rural areas of Dagestan and North Ossetia adjacent to Checheno-Ingushetia, as well as rural activists from among Russians in those areas where there is a Russian population, will be involved in the eviction. Russians, Dagestanis and Ossetians will also be partially used to protect the livestock, housing and households of the deportees. In the coming days, preparations for the operation will be fully completed, and the eviction is scheduled to begin on February 22 or 23.

Considering the seriousness of the operation, I ask you to allow me to remain in place until the operation is completed, at least in the main, i.e. until February 26-27. NKVD USSR
BERIA GA

RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D.

64. L. 167-167v. Copy.

Typescript.

No.

**254 From a letter from leading
medical scientists I.V. Stalin with a
request to release Professor L.A. Zilber**

03/01/1944

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Joseph Vissarionovich
Comrade Stalin.

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! We, the
undersigned, appeal to you with a request to release Doctor of Medical
Sciences Professor L.A. Zilber. We ask this because Professor Zilber's work is
especially needed at the present moment for the Red Army, and because we
are
convinced of his innocence. His current health

is in a very critical condition.

Professor Zilber's outstanding research on immunity and methods of
preparing vaccines at the present moment is especially necessary to be
continued at the most energetic pace for the anti-epidemiological defense of
the front and rear.

Honorary Academician, Stalin Prize Laureate, Honored
Scientist GAMALEIA Honored Scientist,
Order Bearer, Professor MOROZOV Honored Scientist, Professor
YERMOLYEVA Stalin Prize Laureate, Order Bearer,
Professor SOLOVIEV Stalin Prize Laureate, Doctor of Biological Sciences
YAKOBSON Stalin Prize Laureate, Doctor of Medical Sciences
SHUBLADZE

Laureate of the Stalin Prize, Candidate of Medical Sciences
CHUMAKOV

Stalin Prize Laureate, Professor ENGELHARDT Academician,
Stalin Prize Laureate, Lieutenant General of the Medical Service,
Vice President of the Academy of Sciences L. ORBELI Hero of Socialist
Labor, Academician, Stalin Prize Laureate,
Lieutenant General of the Medical Service, Chief Surgeon of the Red Army

N.

BURDENKO AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 255. L. 187-191.

Script.

Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "T-schu Beria. Need to
Release immediately" and "Completed. L. Beria. 22.III. 44".

No.

**255 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov about the
detention of German paratrooper
agents with a summary**

03/17/1944

No. 188/

b Sov. secret
copy

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE Comrade I.V.

STALIN Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV From January 1

to March 10 of this year. bodies and troops of the NKVD detained 10
enemy reconnaissance paratroopers. All the detained
paratroopers were recruited by German intelligence from among the
former soldiers of the Red Army who were in captivity. The following items
were

confiscated from the paratroopers: 7 pistols and revolvers, 2 walkie-
talkies, money 113,400 rubles. Picked up 6 parachutes.

A summary of the arrests of enemy paratroopers is attached.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA Sov.

top secret

SUMMARY of detentions of enemy
paratroopers from January 1 to

March 10, 1944 On January 1, 1944, in the village of Gorislavtsy,
Globinsky district, Poltava region, an enemy paratrooper MATYUSHENKO
Ivan Ivanovich was detained, born in 1918, a native of the village.
Semenovka, Rechitsa district of the BSSR, specializing in land surveying technician.

The detainee testified that he was drafted into the Red Army in 1941,
served in a construction battalion, and in April 1943, with the rank of junior
sergeant, was sent to the Active Army as part of

80th Guards Rifle Division as commander of a machine gun crew. In the Opishnya region of the Poltava region, he was captured by the Germans. While in the Kirovograd POW camp, he was recruited and on January 1 of this year. thrown into our rear with the task of reconnoitering the deployment of garrison units, the state of industrial and railway facilities in the Kremenchug region. During the search, the

detainee was seized: a TT pistol, a compass, 1564 rubles of money and fictitious documents. January 11

this year in the village of Kovchin, Kumekovsky district, Chernihiv region, a German paratrooper, reconnaissance EGOROV Yuriy Dmitrievich, aka Vladimir Dmitrievich BARKOV, born in 1915, came to the local police officer with a confession. Moscow.

Before the war, he worked as an inspector of the special sector of the Moscow City Financial Department. In July 1941, he voluntarily joined the Militia Division. Frunze and during the battle near the city of Spas-Demyansk was

surrounded and surrendered. In April 1943, while in a prisoner-of-war camp in the town of Przemyśl, Egorov was recruited and sent to an intelligence school.

After graduating from school, he was thrown on a plane to our rear with the task of reconnoitering the location and numbers of Red Army units in the mountains. Nizhyn; establish types of weapons, especially artillery and firearms; observe the movement of echelons on the railways; find out the amount of assistance provided by the allies to the Soviet Union, and the proposed directions of the upcoming offensive of the Red Army. Having turned himself in, Egorov indicated the

place of his landing, where they were found and seized: 2 parachutes, one of them was a cargo one, a walkie-talkie, a Nagant revolver, a topographic map of the Nezhinsky district, various documents, including several blank forms with fake seals and stamps 143 and 487 rifle divisions of the 60th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and 37,000 rubles. Egorov was transferred to the Smersh

Counterintelligence Department of the Kyiv Military District. January 12 this year near

the village of Popot, Sverlovsky district, Gomel region, an authorized RO of the NKVD detained an enemy

parachutist GONOSHVILIN Alexander Ivanovich, born in 1915, a native of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist

Republic. During interrogation, GONOSHVILIN testified that, being a prisoner of the Germans, he was recruited, graduated from a special school for military intelligence agents in the suburbs of Warsaw, and on January 12 of this year. was thrown on a plane to the rear of the Red Army with the task: to establish the movement of the Red Army troops, their numbers and weapons. To transmit information, GONOSHVILIN was equipped with a walkie-talkie.

The following were confiscated from the detainee: a Nagant revolver, a radio station, various documents and blank forms with stamps and seals, 40,000 rubles.

GONOSHVILIN was handed over to the NKGB authorities. February 6 this year on the territory of the Gorodyansky district of the Chernihiv region, a German reconnaissance paratrooper YAKUNIN Ivan Petrovich, born in 1922, a native of the Ryazan region, was detained.

Yakunin testified that from January 1941 to July 1942 he was at the front, in one of the battles near the mountains. Rossosh was wounded and captured by the Germans. While in a prisoner of war camp in the city of Przemyśl, he was recruited by a German officer, graduated from the Warsaw Intelligence School and on February 4, 1944, was thrown on a plane near the village of Gorsk, Gorodyansky district, with the task of observing the movement of military echelons on the Gomel-Bakhmach railway section.

During a personal search, documents in the name of A.G. KOZLOV, a Nagant revolver, two parachutes (one of them was a cargo one), various fictitious documents and blank forms, 28,000 rubles were confiscated from YAKUNIN.

February 22 this year on the territory of the Vorobyevsky district of the Voronezh region, an enemy paratrooper SOTNIKOV Ivan Platonovich, born in 1903, a native of the village of Semenovka, Alekseevsky district, Kharkov region, a former Red Army soldier of the 95th cavalry regiment, was detained. In December 1941,

SOTNIKOV was captured by the Germans, was recruited by German intelligence, the Warsaw Intelligence School, and in August 1943 was thrown by plane to our rear with the task of establishing the deployment and movement in

side of the front of military units on the line Boguchar - Kantemirovka, Rossosh - Urazovo - Kupyansk - Kharkov. After landing,

SOTNIKOV hid with a relative of his wife in the village of Nikolskoye, having as a document a fictitious Red Army book addressed to foreman V.K. VELICHKO.

The detainee was transferred to the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the Oryol Military District. February

25 and 26 this year service detachment of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the village. Balyashuv (32 km southwest of Rivne) two paratrooper agents of German intelligence were detained:

SOLOVIEV Alexander Sergeevich, nickname "Sokolovsky", born in 1922, a native of the village. Guchkovo, Istra district, Moscow region, was a member of the Komsomol, a former lieutenant technician of the 3rd airborne brigade; NIKIFOROV Ivan Nikolaevich, nickname

"Volkov", born in 1916, a native of the village of Kalikino, Dubrovsky district, Ryazan region, former sergeant of the 225th Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Infantry divisions.

They were kept in a POW camp in Uman. During interrogation, they showed that in October 1943 they were recruited by a German officer and for three months they studied at the intelligence school in Barshovice (15 km east of Lvov). February

21 this year were thrown by plane from the Lvov airfield to the area of the Zdolbunov railway junction with the task of reconnoitring the concentration of tanks and artillery on the Rovno-Dubno, Rovno-Ostrog routes, establishing the area and the readiness of the second line of defense. They were supplied with fictitious documents

of the 1816 hospital. Seized: a revolver "Nagant" with ammunition, forged documents and 6900 rubles. Picked up two parachutes. The detainees were handed over to the Smersh

Counterintelligence Department of the 1st Ukrainian Front. March 3 this year the service detachment

of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the 1st Baltic Front in the village of Poluchie (50 km southwest of Nevel) detained two German intelligence paratrooper agents:

AKSENOV Dmitry Pavlovich, nickname "Anodin", born in 1911, a native of the city of Sterlitamak, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a resident of Taldy-

Kurgan of the Alma-Ata region, was a candidate member of the CPSU (b), a former platoon commander, Art. Sergeant of the 56th Rifle Regiment of the 19th Guards Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army. KALASHNIKOV Nikifor Karpovich, nickname

"Afonin", born in 1911, a native of the village. Svishchevka, Penza region, resident of the city of Kuibyshev, former company commander, lieutenant of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment of the 327th Infantry Division of the 2nd Shock Army. During interrogation, they showed that the first in September, and the second in June 1942, were

captured by the Germans, recruited for espionage in the rear of the Red Army, and studied for four months at an intelligence school in Valga (Estonia). February 26 this year thrown by plane to the Sheshurino area (37 kilometers north of Toropets) with the task of reconnoitering the deployment

and movement of Red Army units along the route Toropets - Velikiye Luki - Nevel, establishing the movement of echelons along the Toropets - Nevel railway, reconnoitring the forces of the 7th Shock Army, especially 119 and 357 rifle divisions. Having completed the task, they returned to the Germans.

Seized: Nagant revolver, pistol, forged documents, including a certificate for the right to check documents.

The detainees were handed over to the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 4th Shock Army. March

6 this year on the territory of the Shatsky district of the Poltava region, an enemy parachutist KOSENKO Konstantin Efimovich, born in 1921, a native of the Krasnodar Territory, thrown out from a German plane, was detained. During the interrogation, KOSENKO testified that in January of this year. from mountains.

Belaya Tserkov with him on an enemy plane were transferred to our rear by 3 German agents, who disappeared after landing. Investigation measures have been taken. GA RF. F. 9402 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 179-184. Copy. Typescript.

No.

256 Special message by V.N.

Merkulova I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P.

Beria on the attitude of the

governments of England and

the United States to the issue of civil administration

04/12/1944

Top secret To

Comrade I.V. STALIN To

Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

Comrade BERIA L.P.

The NKGB of the USSR reports the following data characterizing the attitude of leading Anglo-American government circles to the question of civil administration in France.

According to our source close to British Foreign Office circles, ROOSEVELT prepared a secret directive for Eisenhower on the question of civil administration in France. According to this directive, Eisenhower is given the right to maintain

contact in France not only with the French National Liberation Committee, but also with other local authorities, but it is forbidden to carry out any activities that could be regarded as recognition of the French Committee or other administration by the French government. On this issue, the State Department requested the opinion of the Ministry

British Foreign Office, but has not yet received a reply.

This directive will be subject to discussion at the headquarters of joint operations in Washington, and if approved, the State Department intends to begin negotiations with J. MONNE -

representative of the French National Liberation Committee in Washington.

In addition, we received in London, undercover, copies
the texts of the following two secret documents on the subject:

a) Telegram No. 337 dated 24.III. 1944 by the Resident Minister in
Algeria, MACMILLAN, addressed to the British Foreign Office. "To your
telegram No. 296.

Taking advantage of your
offer to give my opinion on the question you have raised, I must
state that, in my opinion, the secret directive of ROOSEVELT to General
EISENHAUER is deliberately intended to insult the French Committee of
National Liberation, which he recognized and to which he accredited his
representative with the rank of ambassador. I am not surprised that the
American representative refused to return to Algiers.

In addition, it should be noted that the French Committee has some
advantages over all other allied governments, which have received full
recognition. The French Committee is located on French
territory, controls a large empire, directs the army, navy and air fleet,
participating in the struggle on the side of the united nations. The French
Committee also has the support of the majority of the French people
represented in the Consultative Assembly, which has recently been
working on measures to create a truly democratic system for the future
of France.

Despite all this, the French National Liberation Committee is treated
with less respect than the so-called governments of Poland, Greece and
Yugoslavia.

If the content of Roosevelt's directive becomes known to the French,
then the prestige of the Americans, already undermined in North Africa
and France, will finally fall. Since the views of His Majesty's Government
are usually assumed to be those of the President, there is a danger that
the prestige of Great Britain will also be undermined by this. If the Soviet
government takes

advantage of the situation and fully recognizes the French
Committee, the result will be very unpleasant.

b) Telegram No. 75 dated April 1, 1944, from the British Ambassador in Washington, HALIFAX, addressed to the British Foreign Office: "I informed DUNN

(HELL's assistant) and McCloy
(Assistant Secretary of War STIMSON).

DUNN agreed with our reply to the Soviet Ambassador and stated that the directive on the civil administration in France should not be communicated to EISENHAUER until the matter had been clarified with the Soviet Government in the European Consultative commissions.

DUNN said the State Department understood the Russians' reluctance to take up any other issues in the European Advisory Commission until the final terms of Germany's surrender were agreed. However, he suggested that the Russians would not strictly adhere to this

positions.

DANN attaches great importance to the nature of the information to be conveyed to the French Committee and to the psychological approach to it in the most friendly manner. He considers it necessary to negotiate with the French Committee through its representative in Washington, J. MONNAY, who can be used to advantage for the best interpreter in Algeria through his connections in London (obviously through the representative of the French Committee of VIENNAURE), where negotiations with EISENHAUER will take place. Whichever option is adopted, relations with the French Committee should be based on our proposal for a mission of the Committee to EISENHAUER and our declaration of

desire to maintain close and friendly cooperation with the Committee, with which we intend to resolve the question of civil administration in France in an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation. We could openly state that although we

cannot at the moment bind ourselves to keep no contact with any other French (other than the Vichy government), we do not intend to do so and in any case we will be consulted on such matters. with the French Committee.

DUNN added that, according to his assumption, the French in London received a copy of ROOSEVELT's directive, which he very much regrets.

DUNN's remarks I did not intend to record, but it must be taken into account that on the basis of his words it can be assumed that the United States intends to send a warm letter to the French Committee as to the recognized government.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV
Published:

Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6
vol. 4 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 613-615.

No.

257 L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulova

I.V. Stalin on radio

interception and decryption of

correspondence on German

communication lines Sofia - Budapest, Sofia - V

04/18/1944

No. 327/

b Top secret Copy to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Since

the autumn of 1941, the decryption and intelligence service of the NKVD - the NKGB of the USSR has been irregularly, and since the spring of 1942, systematically recorded encrypted radio traffic on the German communication lines Sofia - Budapest, Sofia - Vienna, etc.

By direction finding of the radio transmitter, it was established that it was located on the outskirts of the mountains. Sofia in Bulgaria.

According to the meaning of the intercepted and decrypted correspondence of an organizational nature, it was established that it comes from the German air force attaché in Bulgaria, whose employees signed the telegrams with the nickname "Klatt", later - "Vigo". Many telegrams also passed without a signature. The content of the telegrams concerned mainly the movement of the Red Army

troops. A special study of these materials was undertaken in order to establish, firstly, their correspondence

to reality and, secondly, the channels through which this information could penetrate into Sofia.

By checking a significant part of the telegrams of this category through the General Staff of the Red Army, it was established that the vast majority of the data given in the telegrams about the units of the Red Army and their

movements is not at all true and is fiction.

Some telegrams are a repetition of disinformation transmitted with the approval of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army by our radio stations participating in the radio game with the Germans.

Some, a very small part of radiograms of a general nature about the movements of troops without indicating unit numbers and exact directions, when checked, turned out to be similar to the truth. It

should be assumed that these plausible data could be established by aerial reconnaissance, interception of radiotelegraph and radiotelephone lines of the grassroots army communications and interrogation of prisoners of war. At present,

the exchange of cipher correspondence over the indicated lines continues, although it has significantly decreased compared to the past. The

correspondence of the content of the telegram to reality is checked every time by the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of NPO Smersh. Specifically, with regard to the

radiotelegrams placed in the collection of the 5th Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR for April 14, 1944, No. 5/1/2532, by checking the General Staff of the Red Army through Comrade. ANTONOV found: 1. of the telegram: 12.4.1944.

Radiogram No. 41.

From SOFIA to BUDAPEST. "The troops of the 2nd Baltic

Front received an order to prepare and conduct an offensive in the direction of RIGA, as well as on OSTROV and PSKOV." Check results: The

troops of the 2nd

Baltic Front did receive an order to advance, but not 12.4, but 1.4. The depth of the offensive to Riga was not planned. The task was set to start the offensive on April 5-6, in fact it was launched on April 7th.

Thus, radiogram No. 41 was sent 5 days later after the start of the attack.

2. Telegram text:

12.4.1944. Radiogram No. 40. From
SOFIA to BUDAPEST.

"According to reports for 12.3 from KALININ to the NEVEL-VELIKIE LUKI front, the following flew: the 191st division of night bombers, the 64th separate fighter brigade, 28 transport and 8 ambulance aircraft." Check results: Neither the 191st division of night bombers nor the

64th separate fighter

brigade are part of the Red Army Air Force. 12.3 Our aviation was not relocated from Kalinin anywhere. 3. Text of the telegram: 12.4.1944. Radiogram No. 35. From SOFIA to BUDAPEST. The 271st Night Bomber Division, "Units located in

RECHITSA, received

an order to prepare for a flight to the
BOBRUYSK front sector

and 20 together with one squadron of night fighters, 27 attack aircraft long-range reconnaissance aircraft." Check results: The air force of the Belorussian Front has the 271st air division of night bombers, but it is not deployed in Rechitsa and has not received an order to prepare for the flight.

4. Text of the telegram:

12.4.1944. Radiogram No. 42. From
SOFIA to BUDAPEST. "From

KREMENETS (northeast of Lviv) to ZALozHTSY are sent: one motorized brigade, the 18th anti-tank brigade, one motorized anti-aircraft regiment, two infantry brigades, one regiment of miners and two assault engineer battalions."

The results of the check: there is no 18th anti-tank brigade as
part of the troops of the

1st Ukrainian Front. Of the units located in Kremenets, not a single one moved anywhere during the specified period. It is possible that the passage of tank and motorized rifle units of RYBALKO through Kremenets was noted, which coincides in time. Interception of these telegrams of the NKGB of the USSR and their verification through

The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of NPO "Smersh" continues.

BERIA

MERKULOV

GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 265-268. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**258 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.
Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, A.I.
Mikoyan about the food
situation in
Sverdlovsk region [58] —**

04/21/1944

"GOKO - Comrade Stalin I.V. GOKO -
Comrade Molotov V.M.

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks - Comrade

Malenkov G.M. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR -
Comrade Mikoyan A.I. The NKVD Department of the Sverdlovsk Region
reports the

following data on the food situation in the region, received from local
authorities: From the beginning of 1944, food difficulties in the region
increased slightly due to the fact that the planned receipt of food products
from centralized funds was

not fully satisfied. In the first quarter of The region received from
centralized funds of meat and its substitutes 67% of the planned need,
animal oil - 51.3%, fish products - 37.8%, confectionery products - 13.7%.
In this regard, for

the main industrial work, the sale of food cards for meat and fish
products ranged from 45 to 70%, for fats from 36 to 60%, for cereals and
pasta from 50 to 80%. The situation with the delivery of products to the
city markets and with

their prices has significantly worsened. In the markets of Sverdlovsk,
the delivery of potatoes in the IV quarter. 1943 was 60 thousand
centners, in the first quarter of 1944 - only 7 thousand centners, the
supply of animal oil, respectively, 85 and 242 centners, milk - 6400 and
3500 liters.

Prices for potatoes rose from 50 to 75 rubles, for meat from 200 to 350 rubles, for butter from 900 to 1000 rubles per kilogram.

Approximately the same situation is with the delivery of agricultural products to the markets and with their prices in Nizhny Tagil, Irbit, Kamensk-Uralsk and other main cities of the region.

According to incomplete data obtained from 20 NKVD city apparatuses, as of April 1, 1944, 22,400 patients with dystrophy were registered among those who applied to city and district medical institutions. This is the vast majority of the urban population and, mainly, the workers of enterprises. Only in March 1944 died of dystrophy:

in Sverdlovsk - 451
people, in N. Tagil - 428 people, in Serov - 112 people.

95% of the murders were committed in order to take possession of ration cards, a small amount of food and things. 84% of the killers were low-skilled workers, as well as employees, collective farmers and individual farmers who had no previous convictions and had no connection with the criminal environment. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch.

Op. 2. D. 64. L. 293-294. Copy. Typescript.

No. 259

Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.

**Molotov, G.M. Malenkov on the work of
operational Chekist groups to "cleanse" the
Crimean ASSR from "anti-Soviet"**

element

05/01/1944

No. 387/

b

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade I.V.

STALIN Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV Central Committee

of the CPSU (b) comrade.

MALENKOV G.M. In addition to our message of April 25 this year.

The NKVD of the USSR reports on the work of the operational-Chekist groups to clear the Crimean ASSR from the

anti-Soviet element. Bodies of the NKVD - NKGB and "Smersh" NPO arrested 420 a person of an anti-Soviet element, of which 430 spies were exposed.

In addition, from April 10 to April 27, the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 5115 people, including 55 agents of German intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, 266 traitors to the Motherland and traitors, 363 accomplices and henchmen of the enemy, as well as members of punitive detachments.

49 members of Muslim committees were arrested, including IZMAILOV Apas - chairman of the Karasubazar district Muslim committee, Batalov Batal - chairman of the Muslim committee of the Balaklava district, ABLEIZOV Beliai -

Chairman of the Muslim Committee of the Simeiz region, Aliyev Musa -
Chairman of the Muslim Committee of the Zui region.

Muslim committees, on the instructions of the German intelligence agencies, recruited Tatar youth into volunteer detachments to fight the partisans and the Red Army, selected the appropriate personnel to send them to the rear of the Red Army, and conducted active pro-fascist propaganda among the Tatar population in the Crimea. Members of the Muslim committees were

subsidized by the Germans and, in addition, had an extensive network of "commercial" and "cultural and educational" institutions, used at the same time for espionage work. After the defeat of the 6th German army of Paulus near Stalingrad, the

Feodosia Muslim Committee collected one million rubles from the Tatars to help the German army.

work, members of the Muslim committees v his In their were guided by the slogan "Crimea only for the Tatars" and spread rumors about the annexation of Crimea to Turkey.

In 1943, the Turkish emissary Amil Pasha came to Feodosia, who called on the Tatar population to support the activities of the German command.

In Berlin, the Germans created a Tatar national center, whose representatives came to the Crimea in June 1943 to get acquainted with the work of Muslim committees. A significant number of

persons from the enemy agents, henchmen and accomplices of the Nazi invaders were identified and arrested. Arrested on April 20 of this year. fighter of the

partisan detachment SPANOV V.I. during interrogation, he testified that in March 1943 he was recruited by the SD in Kerch for espionage work and was given the task of recruiting agents and creating residencies.

SPANOV created a residency consisting of 10 agents, after which he was appointed as a bailiff of the gendarmerie.

In October 1943, SPANOV was introduced into the partisan detachment by the German counterintelligence agencies for subversive work. The agents named

SPANOV are wanted.

In the city of Sudak, a resident of the German intelligence VP PETROV was arrested, who created a spy residency in Sudak, consisting of 7 people, left for subversive work in our rear. The agents named by PETROV were arrested and confessed to belonging to the intelligence agencies of the enemy.

In the Alupka region, a group of German spies consisting of 9 people was seized, who received the task from the German command to remain in our rear and carry out bacteriological sabotage by poisoning and contaminating the sources from which the sanatoriums in the Alupka-Simeiz region are supplied with water. In the city of Simferopol, an

investigator and an agent of the "SD" LUKIN A.P. were arrested. and translator of the Simferopol "SD" German colonist GILDENBERG, according to whose testimony 34 German spy.

Five people have been arrested in the case. Search and arrest of other spies continues.

In the city of Sudak, the chairman of the district Muslim committee UMEROV Bekir was arrested, who admitted that, on the instructions of the Germans, he organized a volunteer detachment from a kulak-criminal element and waged an active struggle against the

partisans. In 1942, during the landing of our troops in the area of the city of Feodosia, the Umerov detachment detained 12 Red Army paratroopers and burned them alive.

30 people have been arrested in the case. In the city of Bakhchisaray, the traitor ABIBULAEV Jafar, who voluntarily joined the punitive battalion created by the Germans in 1942, was arrested. For active struggle against the Soviet patriots, ABIBULAEV was appointed commander of a punitive platoon and carried out the execution of civilians suspected of their connection with the partisans.

The military field court sentenced ABIBULAEV to death by hanging. In the city of Sudak,

the punisher IA KOSTIUK, a member of the Old Crimean police troika, was arrested, which was engaged in the seizure and destruction of Soviet paratroopers. Kostyuk personally sought out and shot the head of the Special Department of the Soviet landing and three people of local residents who helped the paratroopers.

In the Dzhankoy region, a group was arrested, including three Tatars - MAMBETA, ABILAEV and SELIMOV, who, on the instructions of German intelligence in March 1942, poisoned 200 Gypsy.

According to reports, in order to recruit agents among the Red Army soldiers who were captured by the Germans, German intelligence agencies in the Crimea created branches of the National Labor Union of the New Generation (NTSNP), the Party of Truly Russian People and the Ukrainian National Committee. According to our agent, the NTSNP organization, created in

1943 in Simferopol by German intelligence, was engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda among the Russian population of Crimea, recruiting anti-Soviet intelligentsia for these purposes, as well as recruiting spy personnel for reconnaissance of the enemy among the Soviet

prisoners of war.

Our agent provided a number of noteworthy data about work of this organization, the correctness of which is checked.

Created by the German command in the Crimea, the Russian-fascist organization "Party of True Russian People" was headed by Count KELLER, the head of the Romanian counterintelligence in Crimea, who lived in Sevastopol before the occupation of Crimea. Members of the Crimean Center of this organization were FEDOV, aka GAVRILIDI A.P. - an employee of the military department of the Gestapo, who arrived in the Crimea from Bulgaria, and BULDEEV - an active traitor, editor of the fascist newspaper "Voice of Crimea".

Based on the captured personal records of one of the German intelligence officers, 10 active members of this organization were identified, including: POLSKY, LARSKY and BEREZOV - former Red Army soldiers.

According to available data, in addition to the above-mentioned fascist organization, German intelligence agencies created an illegal organization to carry out subversive work in our rear in the event of the retreat of German units from the Crimea. The organization was also

involved in engaging young people aged 15 to 19 in subversive work against the USSR through

appropriate education of them under the guise of various sports teams, dramatic, musical and other societies.

Measures have been taken to identify the members of this organization. In the winter of 1942, German intelligence created the "Ukrainian National Committee" in the Crimea, headed by a certain SHOPAR. The headquarters of the "Ukrainian National Committee" was the trade enterprise "Konsum", all the service personnel of which were members of the committee.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 64. L. 385-389. Copy. Typescript.

**No.
260 Cipher telegram of
Protopopov I.V. Stalin, G.M.
Malenkov about the
"bourgeois-nationalist group" in Tajikista**

05/17/1944

No. 1920/

sh of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Stalin I.V., G.M. Malenkov In addition to No.

1488sh, we inform you that after a thorough check of the materials by the NKGB authorities and the head of the Tajik district of the border troops, the guilt of Artykov, the nationalist district executive V chairman of the Murgab bourgeois-committee, was established by the emigration group. Artykov Kutmamat was one of the leaders of the organization and emigration of the inhabitants of the Murghab region to Afghanistan and China. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Tajikistan issued a sanction for the arrest of the chairman of the Murgab district executive committee, Artykov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 191. Original. Typescript.

No.

261 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the attitude of Romanian generals prisoners of war to the former Romanian king

05/24/1944

Top secret No. 503/b

To

Comrade I.V. STALIN May

22 this year a conversation was held with the prisoners of war of the Romanian generals MAZARINI, LASKAR, DIMITRIU, NEDEL and BRATESCU about their attitude towards the former Romanian king Karol, who was in exile, and about the attitude of various political and military circles of Romania towards him. The

Romanian generals who took part in the conversation had a generally positive attitude towards the former King Karol and expressed their intention to cooperate with Karol, albeit with some reservations.

Generals MAZARIN and DIMITRIU specifically emphasized that they would cooperate with King Carol only if he was supported by the Government of the USSR, and that they refused to act with him if Carol was supported only by the United States and England.

Most of the old officers, according to the Romanian generals, will support King Karol if the latter opposes the Germans.

Opposition political parties in Romania can support King Carol. Being monarchically

minded, the POW generals believe that the best form of government for Romania even in the post-war period will be a constitutional monarchy. King Michael, in the general opinion of the

generals, does not enjoy the support of the army, the people and political parties, but the general

LASCAR stated that consideration should be given to the possibility of acting in favor of King Michael's mother.

The generals attach great importance to the fact that King Karol is compromised in the eyes of Romanian society by the "ignoble" origin of his second wife. Here are excerpts from the recording of conversations and handwritten statements of the Romanian generals:

DIMITRIU Romelus Savva, born in 1892, brigadier general, from the family of a general, has a higher military education, career officer of the Romanian army, awarded six orders, commander of the 20th infantry division, captured in January 1943 near Stalingrad. In a handwritten statement, DIMITRIU writes: "I have known King Carol since

1912, when I served in the army with him. King Carol has always trusted me. If King Carol takes the throne of Romania again, then I will be by his side and serve him with the same loyalty, but only if King Carol is supported and recognized by the government of the USSR and its allies - the USA and England. In 1940, many in Romania regretted the abdication and departure of King Carol from Romania. I believe that the accusations of King Carol for all the misfortunes that have now befallen Romania are not entirely fair. The people loved King Carol very much.

At the present time, I cannot say whether these sympathies have been preserved in the face of such a misfortune for Rumania, the likes of which have never been seen in the history of Rumania, a misfortune for which King Carol also responsible

The Romanian army kept good memories of King Carol, which still exist today. I believe that the majority of Romanian officers are behind Karol. The young officers are influenced by the "legionary spirit", the old officers retain their former sympathies towards King Karol. King Carol can have the full support of the liberal party, especially the TATARESCU faction, and partial support from the BRATIANO faction. The Peasant Party, especially the MANIU-MIHALAKI faction, was against him throughout the reign of King Carol and until his departure from Romania. The faction of this party, the National Renaissance Front, headed by CALINESCU, united

most members of the peasant party, always stood for King Carol. The extreme left and right parties will apparently be against King Karol, especially those in the bloc with the "legionnaires".

On his return to Romania, King Carol will also be able to rely on the People's Party, whose members belong to the Liberal Party or are in solidarity with it, and can also receive the support of the remnants of the old conservative party led by ADGETUIANU, a personal friend of the King. In the army, King Carol can count on the support of his former generals Mikhail - the former marshal of the court and the Minister of War, THEODORESK Paul - the former secretary and minister of war (King Carol's best friend) and TATARAN - the former military attache in Paris, as well as most of the officers of the naval and air fleet, created in due time by King Karol. If King Carol had returned to Romania with the intention

of saving her, he would have been treated very well. Of great importance is the support that could be given to Karol by the governments of the USSR, the USA and England. If King Carol gets this support, the question of sentiment will not be a problem. I personally will stay with King Karol as long as he cooperates with Russia and as long as the Soviet government supports him.

King Michael in Romania does not matter, he is, in my opinion, a child without any power. Mikhail will have to leave the country, as all political parties, the people and the army will not support him."

LASKAR Mikhail Konstantinovich, born in 1889, division general, comes from an old noble family, career officer of the Romanian army, graduated from the military academy, commanded the 6th infantry division, was awarded the highest Romanian and German orders, surrendered in November 1942 near Stalingrad. LASKAR is loyal to King Carol and

believes that the return to power of King Carol would bring Romania a desirable way out of the war. According to LASCAR, the Liberal Party of Georg BRATIANU and the Peasants' Party of MANIU MIHALAKI will support King Carol. LASKAR admits that King Carol, being a democrat at heart, will make concessions

democratic parties and will actively fight against the German-backed Iron Guards.

According to LASCAR, the army, especially the old officers, can be completely on the side of King Carol, since the leadership of ANTONESCU has been discredited. The Romanian people will welcome the return to power of King Carol positively. The Romanian bourgeoisie, oriented towards the British and French, will also support King Carol.

If the issue of returning King Carol to power arises, some misunderstandings may be caused by the fact that Carol's wife is treated implacably in Romania, and his harsh restrictions on democracy in the past have angered opposition parties. According to LASCAR, King Michael's mother can organize a fight against King Carol. Personally, LASKAR considers it possible to take part in the movement on the side of King Carol.

In a handwritten statement, LASKAR writes that "the return King Carol must take place with the consent of the Romanian people."

MAZARINI Nikolai Ivanovich, born in 1894, divisional general, comes from a family of a poor landowner, a career officer in the Romanian army, graduated from the military academy, was a military attache in Bulgaria, was deputy chief of the General Staff of the Romanian army. As commander of the 5th Infantry Division, in November 1942 he surrendered in the Stalingrad region. In the government and military circles of Romania, MAZARINI has extensive connections. In a handwritten statement, MAZARINI writes: "The return of King

Carol to Romania is possible only with condition of official support of his USSR, USA and England.

Only in this position could the former King Karol gain an advantageous position in the eyes of the people and the army. It must

be borne in mind that this issue can create conflict between father and son. In order to avoid this, King Michael must immediately leave the throne and join his father, since, in my opinion, it is impossible for a father to agree to fight against his son.

If King Carol is not supported by the great democracies of the world, it is impossible that changes in the social and political life of the country will take place in his favor. Personally, I think the

return of King Carol is very unlikely. I loved the former King Karol very much, but his behavior in his private life and his tendencies towards dictatorship did not give me the opportunity to maintain my former sincere feelings towards him. The return of King Carol to Romania as the savior of the country can again attract all democratic parties to him, and one can hope that the majority of the Romanian people will follow him. In an oral conversation, in addition to the above, General MAZARIN stated that he

could take part in the activities of King Karol against the Germans only if Karol was fully supported by the governments of the Soviet Union, the USA and England, and that he would not cooperate with Karol, unless the Soviet Government participates in its support. WEEK Savva Frolovich, born in 1890, brigadier general, comes from a family of a landowner, career officer of the Romanian army, former commander of

the 11th Infantry Division, captured in the Millerovo region in December 1942.

In a handwritten statement, General NEDELJA says: "The army regretted the departure of King Karol. Despite the fact that I left the country a long time ago, I still think that the Romanian people and the army would react positively to the arrival of His Majesty King Carol to the leadership of the

country. The Romanian people sympathized with King Carol and had great faith in his patriotism and ability to lead the country. The army was even more sympathetic to King Karol. I think that

the majority of politicians would also be happy with the return of King Karol. Of course, it is first necessary that the people know how the allied powers (the Soviet Union, the USA and England) feel about the accession to the throne of King Karol and on what conditions they will support him.

I believe that, apart from the Germanophiles, legionnaires and the current government, everyone else would have supported the coming of King Carol. In the event that His Majesty King Carol comes to the leadership of the country in order to act for the good of the fatherland, then I am ready to help him

help. I believe that the question of King Michael will be resolved without difficulty, since he must share the fate of the ANTONESCU government.”

BRATESCU Konstantin Ivanovich, born in 1892, brigadier general, comes from a family of a large landowner, career officer, awarded Romanian and German orders. He was taken prisoner in January 1943 near Stalingrad, being the commander of a cavalry division.

BRATESCU said in a conversation that in the event of Karol's attempts to restore himself to the throne, the Romanian people would support him, with the exception of those closely associated with the Germans.

BRATESCU says that Karol is unlikely to receive support from the Romanian parties, since at one time all these parties were disbanded by Karol. BRATESCU went on to say that he

thought the question of who would be the king of Romania was of little importance.

The conversation was conducted with each general separately.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 115-121. Script.

Typescript.

No.

262 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the progress of the resettlement of residents from the 25-kilometer front line

05/24/1944

No. 509/

b Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE - to comrade STALIN The chiefs of the NKVD

troops for the protection of the rear of the fronts report the following data on the progress of the resettlement of residents from the 25-kilometer front line, in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the High Command of May 4 of this year.

As of May 21, resettled: Leningrad

Front - 14,622 people. - 98.5% 3rd Baltic Front -

44,630 people. - 99.5% 2nd Baltic Front - 64,137

people. - 92.8% 1st Baltic Front - 51,340 people. -

96.6% 3rd Belorussian Front - 50,615 people. - 100%

2nd Belorussian Front - 56,547 people. - 67.1%

1st Belorussian Front - 180,578 people. - 54.2% 3rd

Ukrainian Front - 127,111 people. - 96.9% 2nd

Ukrainian Front - 374,553 people. - 100% 1st

Ukrainian Front - 214,950 people. - 94.0% People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 150. Copy. Typescript.

No.

263 Special message L.P. Berii

**I.V. Stalin on the expediency of evicting
Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians from
the territory of Crimea**

05/29/1944

No. 541/

b Copy

Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade I.V. STALIN After
the eviction of the Crimean

Tatars in the Crimea, work continues to identify and seize the anti-Soviet element by the NKVD-NKGB, check and search settlements and forest areas in order to detain Crimean Tatars who may have taken refuge from eviction, as well as deserters and a bandit element. Currently living on the territory of Crimea are counted

Bulgarians - 12,075 people, Greeks - 14,300 and Armenians - 9919 people.

The Bulgarian population lives mostly in the settlements of the region between Simferopol and Feodosia, as well as in the Dzhankoy region. There are up to 10 village councils with a population of 80 to 100 Bulgarians in each. In addition, Bulgarians live in small groups in Russian and Ukrainian villages.

During the period of German occupation, a significant part of the Bulgarian population actively participated in the activities carried out by the Germans to procure bread and food for the German army, assisted the German military authorities in identifying and detaining the Red Army and Soviet partisans. For the help rendered to the German occupiers, the Bulgarians

received from the German command the so-called "security certificates", which indicated that the person and property

such and such a Bulgarian are protected by the German authorities, and for an encroachment on them, they are threatened

with execution. The Germans organized police detachments from the Bulgarians, and also recruited among the Bulgarian population to be sent to work in Germany and to serve in the German army. The

Greek population lives in most regions of Crimea. A significant part of the Greeks, especially in coastal cities, with the advent of the invaders, took up trade and small-scale industry. The German authorities assisted the Greeks in trade, transportation of goods, etc.

The Armenian population lives in most regions of Crimea. There are no large settlements with Armenian population.

The "Armenian Committee" organized by the Germans actively assisted the Germans and carried out a lot of anti-Soviet work.

In the mountains In Simferopol, there was a German intelligence organization "Dromedar", headed by a former Dashnak general DRO, who led intelligence work against the Red Army and for this purpose created several Armenian committees for espionage and subversive work in the rear of the Red Army and to facilitate the organization of volunteer Armenian legions.

The Armenian national committees, with the active participation of emigrants who arrived from Berlin and Istanbul, carried out work on the propaganda of "Independent Armenia".

There were so-called "Armenian religious communities", which, in addition to religious and political issues, were engaged in organizing trade and small industry among Armenians. These organizations provided assistance to the Germans, especially by raising funds "for the military needs of Germany."

The Armenian organizations formed the so-called "Armenian Legion", which was maintained at the expense of the Armenian communities. The NKVD of the

USSR considers it expedient to carry out an eviction from the territory of Crimea of all Bulgarians, Greeks and

Armenians. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 161-163. Copy. Typescript.

No.

264 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.

**Molotov, A.I. Antonov about the detention
of German agents of paratroopers
in the Kazakh SSR**

06/01/1944

No. 559/

b Copy

Top secret THE STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO COMRADE STALIN OF THE SNK OF THE
USSR TO COMRADE MOLOTOV

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY TO

COMRADE ANTONOV about the detention of a group of enemy paratroopers
in the territory of the Guryev region of the Kazakh SSR, the NKVD of the USSR
reports: Two paratroopers who escaped during

a skirmish were detained on May 26. Thus, the ejected group of 14 people
was completely detained. All members of the group are Kazakhs by nationality,
former soldiers of the Red Army, who at various times were captured by the
Germans.

In addition to those mentioned in the previous message BOLZHIBAEV and
ZHANIEV, who voluntarily surrendered on May 16, the group included:

AGAYEV Alikhan, nickname "Iranov Agay", head of the group, former Art.
lieutenant of the Red Army, the Germans awarded him the rank of chief lieutenant
(killed during a shootout). Head of the radio station

DASHCHANOV Zulkhair, nickname "Zakirov
Zulkhair, sergeant major of the German army (killed).

Radio operator BESENALIEV Bakki, nickname "Bom", born in 1914, a native
of the Astrakhan region, non-commissioned officer of the German army (killed).

Group doctor nicknamed "Batashev Balkhash", also known as "Batashov
Kamkor", last name not established, non-commissioned officer of the German
army (killed).

Radio operator MUHAMMEDIYEV Akhmet, nicknames "Algirov Akhmet" and "Algirov Mir", born in 1918, a native of the West Kazakhstan region, non-commissioned officer of the German army.

"DNISHEV" Mukhambet, surname not established, chief corporal of the German army (killed).

URAZOV Sartmagambet, nickname "Mukhammedov", born in 1912, a native of the Guryev region of the Kazakh SSR. OMAROV

Matai, nickname "Dzhunusov Ibrai", born in 1920, a native of the Novosibirsk region, a former member of the Komsomol, worked as an elementary school teacher, served in the Red Army since 1939 with the rank of sergeant.

BAVASHEV

Kenispek, nickname "Tulegenov Kolzhan", born in 1920, a native of the South Kazakhstan region, a former member of the Komsomol. KERIMBERDIEV Rakhim,

nickname "Karim Khodjimbetov", 1921 birth, a native of the Tashkent region, a former member of the Komsomol.

KISHEBAYEV Kenispay, nickname "Amanzholov Kizhibay", born in 1913, a native of the Akmola region, a former tractor driver and mechanic of the Ishim MTS.

ALZHANOV Abdukadyr, nickname "Kadyrov Kaydan", born in 1917, a native of the South Kazakhstan region, a former student of the Zoovetstekhnikum in the city. Dzhambul.

The paratroopers showed that the AGAEVA group was created by the Germans in the summer of 1942. She graduated from the Brandenburg intelligence school, and then studied sabotage in Lukenwald. The paratroopers had the task of creating sabotage groups on our territory, focusing on the mullahs, former bays and deserters from the Red Army. Specific objects of sabotage were allegedly not indicated. During the operation, two bases were discovered with

property and weapons buried by paratroopers in the ground. At the bases, as well as from the killed and detained paratroopers, the following were confiscated: two machine guns and a box with spare parts for them, 8 machine guns, 9 rifles, 10 pistols, 26 grenades, more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition, about 50 kg. tola, electric fuses, 140 fuses and incendiary bombs, 3 radio stations, more than 3,000 anti-Soviet leaflets in the Kazakh language, a printing press,

font, 51 parachutes, 658,000 rubles, as well as military uniforms, food and documents. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR GA

RF. F. 9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 168-169. Copy. Typescript.

No. 265 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the eviction of special settlers from Crimea

07/04/1944

No. 693/b

Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade I.V. STALIN The

NKVD of the USSR reports that

the eviction from the Crimea

special settlers - Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians finished. In total,

225,009 people were evicted, including: Tatars - 183,155

people. Bulgarians - 12,422

Greeks - 15,040

Armenians - 9,621

Germans - 1,119

As well as foreign

nationals - 3,652 All Tatars arrived and

settled in places of resettlement: In the regions of the Uzbek SSR -

151,604 people. In the regions of the RSFSR, according

to the resolution of the GOKO of May 21, 1944 - 31,551 people. Bulgarians, Greeks,

Armenians and Germans

in the amount of 38,202 people. are on the way to the Bashkir ASSR, the Mari ASSR, the Kemerovo, Molotov, Sverdlovsk, Kirov regions of the RSFSR and the Guryev region of the Kazakh SSR. 3652 people foreign nationals were sent for resettlement to the Fergana region of the Uzbek SSR. arrivals All

special settlers

placed

V

satisfactory living conditions. able-bodied A significant

are included in the work on agriculture - in

number of special settlers of the Tatars

collective farms and state farms, logging, enterprises and construction.
During the

eviction operation, there were no incidents on the spot or en route.

People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA One copy was made
for a special file on the Crimea. GA RF. F.

9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 275. Copy. Typescript.

No.
266 Special message by V.N.
Merkulova, Shatalina, Fedoseeva I.V.
Stalin and V.M. Molotov on
the situation in Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk

07/04/1944

No. 2497/

m Top secret From
ARKHANGELSK To

Comrade I.V. STALIN To
Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

Having become acquainted with the situation in Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk,
we report:

1. Provocative rumors that the cities of Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk would be concessioned to the British appeared for the first time back in October 1941, in connection with the arrival of the British military mission in Arkhangelsk. These rumors were noted

periodically in 1942, 1943 and early 1944 in various versions. The primary sources of these rumors were

people who had close ties with the British during the period of intervention, who cherished the hope that the Arkhangelsk region would be occupied by the British.

So, for example: the inhabitants of the mountains arrested at different times. Arkhangelsk, who had ties with the British in the past - KRYUKOV M.V., a former large ship owner, KATINOVA A.F., the former owner of a cinema in Arkhangelsk, and a doctor SEVASTYANOVA E.M., during interrogation admitted to spreading rumors about an allegedly forthcoming surrender Arkhangelsk region in concession to the British. The wife of a former major Arkhangelsk merchant, convicted in 1938 to VMN, N. D. VIDYAKINA, who lived from 1919 to 1923 in England, stated back in March 1942:

The Department of the NKGB of the Arkhangelsk region has materials on 138 people who spread these rumors in one form or another. Of these 138 people, the majority are employees (59 people) and persons without specific occupations (33 people). Rumors had some circulation also among

military personnel of the Arkhangelsk military district and the White Sea military flotilla (19 people).

According to the available materials, 70 people were summoned and interrogated in an appropriately cautious manner, of which 15 people admitted that they believed these rumors and spread them, and 42 people testified that they learned about the rumors from other people in the market, in queues, tram cars, but did not attach importance to them; b) On our

instructions, the secretaries of the district committees of the party of the mountains. Arkhangelsk talked with the secretaries of the primary party organizations. At the same time, out of 192 secretaries, 20 reported that some workers and employees turned to them for clarification about rumors about the transfer of Arkhangelsk to the British, and 24 secretaries reported that they learned about these rumors by chance from persons who were not members of these collectives. The remaining 148 people said they did not know anything about these rumors.

Thus, it should be considered that the provocative rumors mentioned above were quite widespread among the population of the city. There is no reason to believe that these rumors had any noticeable effect on the moral and political state and behavior of the broad masses of the population, since the majority of the inhabitants who heard these rumors did not believe in them. However, politically backward, philistine-minded elements took this anti-Soviet provocation seriously, made inquiries about the reliability of these rumors, and talked among themselves about the possible conditions of life under

the English.

3. It is noteworthy that in Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk political work among the population is carried out poorly. Reports and lectures are rarely read at factories and factories, newspapers are not delivered to readers in a timely manner, the use of library book stocks is not organized, and there are very few newspapers and books, especially in the mountains. Molotovsk. Insufficient awareness of the population about political events undoubtedly contributes to the spread of all kinds of rumors and rumors.

4. In view of the fact that the people who spread the rumors were mainly talking about the fact that the British, in the event that the Soviet north was handed over to them as a concession, would improve material and living conditions, open shops, bring in goods, etc., we got acquainted with the situation dealing with

supply of the population of Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk. It should be noted that the stocks of foodstuffs and industrial goods, which in themselves are insufficient for the north, are, as a rule, not fully merchandised.

The British take advantage of difficulties in supply and through small handouts easily make connections with the local population.

5. The British military mission currently has 61 people, and the US mission - 4 people. With the exception of a few individuals, they all arrived in the Soviet Union after October 1943. The British tried to let as many people as possible through their mission and often updated its composition. Foreign vessels arriving in Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk

usually stay idle in ports from 2 weeks to a month and a half. Total visited Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk for the period 1941-1944. 222 foreign ships with 15,540 crews

Human.

As a rule, the British, in comparison with the Americans, behave more arrogantly and impudently, allowing hooligan antics towards Soviet citizens.

So, for example: in May of this year, the British launched an electric current into the wire stretched over the fence of the British mission. A certain teenager LOBANOV, who was trying to steal canned food stacked in the mission yard, touched the wire and, under the influence of an electric current, could not free himself from it. Policeman KULESHOV, who intended to drag the boy away from the wire, got into the same situation. The British, who came out to shout, laughed at them and only after 15-20 minutes they took measures to free them from the action of the current. Material about this case is in the NKID. Foreigners, primarily the British, establish extensive ties with

local residents, mostly with women, with many of whom they cohabit, bribing them with various gifts, mainly food. State security agencies recorded more than 1,150 connections between foreigners and residents of the city, of which 150 were more or less permanent.

citizens.

State security agencies for the period 1941-1944. 41 British and 2 American spies were arrested and exposed from among Soviet citizens, including 29 people in 1943 and 11 people in the first half of 1944. The British widely used the Poles living in the

Arkhangelsk region for espionage purposes. Thus, out of 43 spies arrested, 25 are Poles. Persons from the British mission who were engaged in intelligence

activities (MOND, COTTON, SOTTON, DAN, BERG, etc.) left the Soviet Union at different times. Other established scouts from the British mission in the amount of 5 people (RIIS, HENDERSON, BERD, VAYBOARD, POWELL) were expelled from the Soviet Union.

7. From the beginning of the Patriotic War to July 1, 1944, state security agencies in the Arkhangelsk region arrested 2,716 people in the process of combating espionage, anti-Soviet and other hostile elements.

For spreading provocative rumors in the first half 1944, 23 people were arrested.

In order to limit the number of ties between the British and Americans with Soviet citizens and to remove from Arkhangelsk the most suspicious persons who could serve as a base for hostile activities of foreigners, 266 people were evicted from Arkhangelsk to remote areas during the Patriotic War, including in the first half of 1944 year - 61 people.

8. We have carried out the following activities:

a) Of the malicious spreaders of rumors, 9 people were arrested and held accountable; b) Prepared and

reviewed materials on persons with suspicious connections with foreigners, keepers of brothels and persons involved in the dissemination of provocative rumors, a total of 142 people with a view to deporting them from Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk;

c) As a result of a survey of the work of the UNKGB of the Arkhangelsk region, the operational brigade of the NKGB of the USSR outlined and is implementing measures to improve the work of the UNKGB in the area of combating espionage: a number of briefing meetings were held,

specific instructions on undercover affairs and developments, on the use of interclubs for this purpose, on the organization of certain special events; d) Together with the members of the bureau of the regional committee and the city

committee of the CPSU(b), the secretaries of the district committees of the party developed measures to strengthen and improve agitation and propaganda work;

e) At a meeting of the secretaries of the major primary party organizations in the cities. Arkhangelsk, together with the workers of the regional committee and the city committee, conducted an instructive report by comrade. FEDOSEEVA about the current moment.

The same instructive report was held at a meeting of propagandists and agitators of the regional committee, city committee and district committees, allocated to deliver reports on this topic at enterprises and institutions. 9. We would consider it expedient: a) to deport to remote areas of the Arkhangelsk

region from the cities of Arkhangelsk and

Molotovsk 142 people in respect of whom the UNKVD and UNKGB have materials about their suspicious ties with foreigners, about the spread of provocative rumors by them, etc.; b) Send a propaganda group of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Arkhangelsk for a long time to carry out appropriate work; strengthen the

supply Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk political and fiction; c) Taking into account the peculiarities of Arkhangelsk and Molotovsk as port cities visited by foreigners, to oblige the People's Commissariat of Trade to fully purchase the food and manufactured goods funds allocated for the Arkhangelsk Region. Open one grocery store and one department store in Arkhangelsk.

MERKULOV

SHATALIN FEDOSEEV Appointment of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 207. L. 195-202. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's note: "Important."

No.

267 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the "anti-Soviet" sectarian organization

07/07/1944

No. 707 /

b GOKO to a comrade - STALIN I.V. The

NKGB of the USSR revealed the anti-Soviet sectarian organization "True Orthodox Christians", consisting mainly of former kulaks and those previously convicted of anti-Soviet activities. There are groups of this organization in some districts of the Ryazan, Voronezh and Oryol regions. Active members of the organization are in an illegal position, and ordinary members

live in houses with bricked-up windows, men let their hair grow, women reject marriage, but in their midst lead a dissolute lifestyle. The sectarians lead a parasitic way of life and carry out anti-Soviet work: they do not pay taxes, they evade the fulfillment of state obligations and service in the Red Army, they

do not come to summons to the Soviet authorities, they do not accept Soviet documents.

Because of the fear of Soviet influence on children, the members of the organization do not let them go to school and bring them up in a spirit of hostility to the Soviet Union. authorities.

Arrests of active participants do not have the proper impact on the members of the organization due to their belief: "Whoever is arrested and sits in prison, he is chosen by God, is on the cross and he is provided with the kingdom of heaven."

Taking into account the corrupting influence of this organization on the collective farms of a number of districts of the Ryazan, Voronezh and Oryol regions, the NKVD of the USSR decided to relocate the members of the organization "True Orthodox Christians" together with their families to Omsk,

Novosibirsk region, Altai and Krasnoyarsk regions, dispersing them there in several special settlements, where they will be under the supervision of the NKVD. The following are

subject to resettlement:

Out of 62 settlements in ten districts of the Ryazan region - 416 households - 1323 people; out of 18 settlements in five districts of the Voronezh region - 99 households - 274 people; out of 7 settlements in two districts of the Oryol region - 22 farms - 76 people. In total - 1673 people.

The resettlement will be carried out on July 15, 1944 according to personal lists compiled by the UNKGB of the Ryazan, Voronezh and Oryol regions, on the basis of verified data confirming the belonging of the resettled to the organization. I ask for your

consent. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA

RF. F. 9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 305-306. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**268 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.
Molotov, A.I. Antonov on the activities
of the troops of the NKVD of the USSR
for the protection of the rear**

07/11/1944

No.

730/

b Copy of

Sov. secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

to comrade I.V. STALIN

Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

The GENERAL STAFF of the spacecraft

to Comrade ANTONOV In the period from April to June of this year. The troops of the NKVD for guarding the rear of the fronts of the Red Army in the process of clearing the territory liberated from enemy troops and while serving in guarding the rear of the

fronts detained 267,141

people for verification,

of which: military personnel - 115,973

civilians - 151,168 Among the detained military personnel:

Disorganized retreat from the

battlefield- 615

people. Those who strayed from their units

- 25,364 Those who left the encirclement

- 243 Those who were captured by the enemy -

5288 Violators of the order of the

NPO No. 0860 - 2466 With incorrectly executed

documents - 81,997 Among the

detained civilians: works - 509 Illegally returned to the

resettlement zone -

61,157 Without documents - 30,779 Violators of the front-line regime - 21,77

Suspicious element - 13,987 In addition, in the rear of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, 4835 soldiers and officers of the German army and 182 Vlasovites were detained while trying to get behind the front line.

When filtering the NKVD troops detained by intelligence agencies to protect the rear of the fronts, it was exposed:

Enemy agents - 1592 Traitors
and traitors - 1838 Policemen and
punishers - 762 German henchmen
and accomplices - 1267 Participants in gang
manifestations - 2604 Deserters of the
Red Army - 7573 Marauders - 251
Other criminal
element - 2250 Among the exposed
enemy agents - 26 agents
paratroopers.

Those detained and exposed were
transferred to: To the assembly points of the
Red Army - 22,492 To their units and military
commandants - 70,829
To the camps of the NKVD - 6526 To the bodies of the
NKVD and the NKGB by territoriality - 13,455
To the bodies of
counterintelligence "SMERSH"
- 9926 To the prosecutor's office - 391 To the police -
40,722 The rest were released after identification. The troops of the
NKVD for the protection of the rear of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian
fronts in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR had 142 combat clashes
with the bandit groups of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists". At the
same

time, 2564 bandits were killed and 2247 bandits
were captured alive. In addition, 1939 lone bandits were detained.
During combat clashes with bandit groups, the NKVD troops for protecting
the rear of the fronts lost: 124 killed, 53 wounded and 18 people missing from among the
In the rear of the Karelian Front, service detachments of the NKVD
troops had combat clashes with four reconnaissance and sabotage groups
of Finns, each numbering from 40 to 200 people.

At the same time, 44 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and wounded and 4 were captured.

Service outfits lost: 9 killed, 11 wounded and one missing. Four outposts of the 92nd border regiment

of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front, together with units of the Red Army, on April 27-44, fought with German units in the Zabloty region (20 km southeast of Kolomyia). The enemy was thrown back across the Prut River, while losing 30 people killed.

The outposts lost 4 killed and one wounded. During the cleaning of the front line by service detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the fronts, as well as in a collision with bandits, trophy and domestic weapons and ammunition were collected on the battlefields and confiscated from the local population: guns - 32

mortars - 49

anti-tank rifles - 19

machine guns - 371 machine guns

- 632 rifles - 3667

pistols - 259 artillery

shells - 2724 mines

- 3672 hand grenades

- 4009 cartridges over

- 4 million 300

thousand pieces of radio

stations - 8 cars - 26 motorcycles - 7 bicycles

- 50 Collected and

seized weapons

and ammunition

handed over to

captured

commands and warehouses of units and formations of the Red Army.

Over the past period, snipers trained in the troops of the NKVD to protect the rear of the fronts and undergoing training in the combat formations of the Red Army units, put out of action killed and wounded - 8025 enemy soldiers and officers. The sniper teams lost 12 killed and 11 wounded.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.
BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 p. Op. 2. D. 65. L. 325-327. Copy. Typescript.

No.

269 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the liquidation of groups of German paratroopers and landing

07/15/1944

No. 753/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to

comrade I.V. STALIN The

organs of the NKVD-NKGB and "Smersh" NPO during May-July of this year. liquidated 13 groups of German paratroopers and 2 landings with a total number of 162 people, of which: 103 were arrested, 29 were killed during detention, and 10 people turned themselves in. Among the killed and arrested paratroopers were 18 Germans.

Paratroopers were thrown out in the Guryev region of the Kazakh SSR, the Kabardian ASSR, the Georgian SSR, the Astrakhan, Oryol regions, the Tarnopol, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Stanislav regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Gomel region of the BSSR.

The German intelligence agents, abandoned by agents, were given the task of committing sabotage in industry and transport, killing Soviet and party workers, organizing bandit groups of deserters and anti-Soviet people in the rear of the Red Army, reconnoitering the number and armament of Red Army units. Walkie-talkies were confiscated from

paratroopers and paratroopers, significant

quantity of weapons and explosive materials.

The NKVD of the USSR petitions for awarding orders and medals of the USSR to operatives of the NKVD, the NKGB, officers, sergeants and soldiers of the NKVD troops, as well as civilians who particularly distinguished themselves during operations to eliminate paratroopers and paratroopers thrown out by the enemy.

Attaching at the same time the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council
USSR, I ask for your decision. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 p.

Op. 2. D. 65. L. 351-352. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**270 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, A.I. Antonov
about maordering and robbery of
the local population by military personnel**

07/20/1944

No. 777/b

Copy

Top secret GOKO to comrade

STALIN SNK of the USSR to comrade

MOLOTOV GENERAL STAFF of the KA to

comrade ANTONOV The NKVD of the Moldavian SSR

arrested 15 servicemen of a separate repair and restoration battalion of the tank troops of the Red Army, who were engaged in looting and robbery of the local population.

June 15 this year a group of servicemen led by tank commander KHASANOV, having arrived in a tank in the village of Shestach, Kotyuzhansky district for food, began to exchange their uniforms for wine. Having drunk drunk, the servicemen raised a brawl, opened fire from machine guns, rifles and dispersed the workers of the village council.

On June 18, the head of the field army workshop, Art. lieutenant LUZHANSKY before the formation of tankers announced the absence in the unit food and offered to get food and wine in neighboring villages.

Fulfilling this instruction, 18 tankers arrived on a tank in the village of Kushmirka. Having exchanged uniforms for wine and food, the tankers got drunk drunk. Two of them, driving up to the house of Count MARTIN, fired two cannon shots, took away the uniforms exchanged for wine, took away the wine belonging to Count MARTIN, destroyed part of the outbuildings with a tank and disappeared from the village.

On the way, drunk tankers, under the threat of being shot, took away 12 sheep from a shepherd, and in the village of Shestach they took a calf and household items from a citizen of NONKO. In the same village, Zinaida, a 55-year-old citizen of NAKU, was raped and robbed, and a resident of the village of MARTOLOG was also robbed.

Arrested in the case: head of the field army workshop st. Lieutenant LUZHANSKY, Art. foreman of the mechrota, Art. lieutenant OKOLZIN, tank commanders, ml. lieutenants KRESTELEV, KHASANOV, lieutenant ABROSIMOV and others.

The investigation completed the case and sent it to the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401
sch. Op. 2. Op. 66. D. 9-10. Copy. Typescript.

No.

271 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.

Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, A.I.

**Antonov about the arrest of deserters
and those who evaded service in the
Red Army**

07/27/1944

No. 812 /

b Copy

Top secret GOKO - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade

MALENKOV G.M. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SC TO COMPARISON

ANTONOV In May of this year. NKVD authorities detained 24,898 deserters and 26,300 who evaded service in the Red Army; of which 285 officers, 1065 non-

commissioned officers and 49,850 enlisted men. Of the detainees, 9128 people were arrested and handed over to the bodies of the NKGB, Smersh and the Prosecutor's Office. 35,543 people were

transferred to the heads of garrisons and to the district military registration and enlistment offices. 187 criminal groups, consisting of deserters and evaders, were liquidated. 43 killed person.

Arrested 220 accomplices and harborers of deserters element.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA

RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 60. Copy. Typescript.

No. 272 Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, A.I. Antonov about the detention of German paratroopers

08/02/1944

No. 838 /

b Copy

Top secret GOKO - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV The GENERAL STAFF of the

spacecraft to comrade ANTONOV on July 15 and 21 of this year. on the territory of the Leningrad
enemy paratroopers were detained:

BEREZIN E.A., born in 1923, resident of the mountains. Pskov, former member
of the Komsomol. Remaining in the territory occupied by the Germans, he served in the
gendarmerie;

ULYANOV F.P., born in 1920, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks, former commander of a Red Army battalion. He was taken prisoner by the Germans
in March of this year;

VEDMEDEV P.M., born in 1920, a native of Kirovograd
region, was captured by the Germans, and

VEDERNIKOV PD, born in 1913, a native of Leningrad, was captured by the
Germans. The detainees

testified that they were thrown out on July 14 and 15 with reconnaissance and
sabotage missions, as well as to find out the possibility of landing in the Tsapelka-
Novoselye-Katezhna area.

The detainees were seized weapons, fictitious documents and
explosives.

July 21 this year on the territory of the Karelian-Finnish SSR, 55 km southeast of
the mountains. Vyborg, Finnish paratrooper HEINANNEN detained

Yakko Johannovich, born in 1922, soldier of the 2nd company, 1st battalion, 31st infantry regiment of the Finnish army.

HEINANNEN testified that on the night of July 21 he was thrown out to communicate with five Finnish paratroopers, thrown earlier in the area of the village of Myakryalya, 50 km southeast of the city of Vyborg.

120 kg found at HEINANNEN landing site
products and food for the radio.

The group mentioned by HEINANNEN is equipped with a walkie-talkie and operates in the rear of the Leningrad Front. On July 20, when trying to detain her, she put up armed resistance, wounding two Red Army soldiers. The operation to eliminate this

group continues. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of
the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 117-118.
Copy. Typescript.

No.

**273 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M.
Malenkov, A.I. Antonov on the results
of the operation to disarm the
soldiers and officers of the Polish Home Army**

08/03/1944

No. 841 /

b Copy

Top secret GOKO - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade

MALENKOV G.M. The GENERAL STAFF of the spacecraft to Comrade

ANTONOV of the NKVD of the USSR reports on the results of the operation to disarm the soldiers and officers of the "Polish Home Army" and

on the operational-Chekist measures being carried out in the Lithuanian SSR.

According to the regiments and formations of the 3rd Belorussian Front that took part in the

operation, a total of 7924 soldiers and officers were disarmed. Of this number, 4,400 soldiers and officers were escorted to assembly points, 2,800 soldiers were sent home by convoy.

In addition, 400 Polish soldiers were disarmed for the participation of the 4th Baltic Front. During the

disarmament of the Poles, the following were seized: rifles - 5500, machine guns - 370, light and heavy machine guns - 370, light guns - 12, as well as - 27 motor vehicles, 7 radio stations, horses - 720.

Within a few days, a representative of the BERLING army recruited 440 soldiers at the assembly point. Officers

refuses to go to the army of BERLING, stating that there is no order from the high command for this.

There was an attempt to drop leaflets published by an underground Polish organization into the camp. The leaflets pointed out that the Poles had been disarmed by treacherous and fraudulent means, that one should not join the BERLING army, that they would be held accountable before London for the disarmament of the Poles, and so on. Leaflets have been removed.

Before the war, Vilna had 320,000 inhabitants. During the occupation, about 80,000 dispersed to the villages and were taken by the Germans to Germany. In addition, according to local residents, over 40,000 Jews and other citizens were arrested and shot by the Germans.

Currently, up to 200,000 people live in the city of Vilna and its suburbs. The vast majority of the inhabitants are Poles. It has been established that the Lithuanians left with the Germans during the retreat, fearing reprisals from the Soviet authorities and the Poles for actively helping the Germans during the occupation. Hostile relations exist between Poles

and Lithuanians. This is explained by the fact that during the period of the occupation of Lithuania by the Germans, the Lithuanians occupied all the responsible administrative posts both in the city and in the countryside and had a bad attitude towards the Poles.

In addition, on the instructions of the Germans, the Lithuanian General Plekhovichus organized a division from the Lithuanians to carry out punitive measures against the Poles and partisans. This division brutally cracked down on the population. The population of

Vilna reacts positively to the liberation of the city from the German invaders and expresses satisfaction with the fact that the service in the churches will be conducted not in Lithuanian, but in Polish, and also expresses the hope that Vilna will be part of Western Ukraine or Belarus, but only not Lithuania.

According to unverified intelligence data, signatures are being collected from the population in the Trakai district in order to send a letter to Comrade STALIN with a request to annex the Vilna region to Western Belarus. The working and laboring intelligentsia

of the city of Vilna speaks favorably about the creation of the Polish National Liberation Committee, believing that as a result of this event, Poland will become an independent state.

Part of the population, especially the clergy, Polish nationalists and the reactionary intelligentsia consider the National Committee illegal and rely on the London government.

In all the liberated counties, the local administration, which consisted exclusively of Lithuanians, fled. The Germans left the police and punitive organs in place, organized self-defense units from them and offered them to defend their city. For example, the cities of Trakai and Panevezys were defended by self-defense units. After the Red Army entered the city, these people hid in the forests. Operational measures were

organized to capture members of self-defense units. In all counties, a large number of

Russian people remained, driven away by the Germans in February of this year. So, for example, in the Panevezys district there were more than 3,000 people who were driven away by the Germans from the Leningrad region along with livestock and agricultural implements.

In other counties there are residents of Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk and other regions.

From July 14 to July 20, the NKVD-NKGB of the Lithuanian SSR arrested 516 people, including: spies - 52, active accomplices of the German invaders - 91, senior officials of the administrative bodies of the German occupation authorities - 302, members of underground anti-Soviet nationalist organizations - 36 and a criminal element - 35.

In addition, the organs and troops of the NKVD caught and captured 570 German soldiers and officers who were trying to get to the West. During

combat clashes with separate groups of Germans, 785 soldiers were killed.

Weapons were confiscated from those arrested and the population: rifles - 984, machine guns - 405, mortars - 132, grenades - 137, cartridges -

450,000. The Poles were arrested - DEMBINSKY, GUTOVICH, FOLYAK and PETRUKANETS.

In the process of conducting investigative work with officers of the so-called "Polish Regional Army", the presence in the city of

Vilno and the surrounding counties of a conspiratorial Polish military insurgent organization. According to the

testimony of General KULCHYTSKY and Colonel KSHESHOVSKY, arrested, this organization is headed by a representative of the Warsaw Center and a Vilna district delegate, an illegal immigrant "YUZEK". There are county delegates for all the former

voivodships of Poland, who in turn have county commissioners. KSHESHOVSKII and KULCHITSKII showed that one of the active participants in the

Vilna Underground Committee was the former rector of the Vilna State University, Professor Stefan Ehrenkreuz; the latter is being sought. On the basis of undercover materials, it was established that the Polish

nationalists deploy active anti-Soviet activities.

The NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR is taking measures to arrest the underground leadership of the nationalists, led by "YUZEK".

From July 27 of this year. By order of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front, mobilization into the Red Army is carried out on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR.

Military registration and enlistment offices carry out conscription without announcing orders and sending summons, but send messengers with a list, inviting those called to come to the assembly point.

Provocative rumors appeared among the draft contingent, that there is no mobilization, and those called up will be exiled to Siberia.

In this regard, the mobilization is unsatisfactory, especially among Lithuanians.

So, in the Vilna district from July 26 to July 31, 5,000 people were subject to mobilization, 1,700 people came to the recruiting stations, and only 950 people came to the station for loading.

In some counties, the Lithuanian fascists "tautinniki" took advantage of this circumstance and began to organize gangs from among the Lithuanians who had evaded the draft. So, in the Panevezys district, two bandit groups appeared, armed with rifles and machine guns, each numbering up to 50 people.

There are facts of shelling of military columns by "tautinniks", moving along the highway.

Measures have been taken to eliminate the group of "tautinniks". According to reports from local bodies of the NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR, army workers take food, warehouses and clothing allowances left by the enemy without accounting. On

the part of the military, there were cases of robbery and excesses. The population complains that the Red Army soldiers are taking away food, livestock, things from the inhabitants, slaughtering livestock for meat. In the Trakai district, the Red Army

soldiers robbed the church. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 124-129. Copy. Ty

No.

**274 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.
Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, A.I.
Antonov about the capture of
German paratroopers in
the Kabardian ASSR**

08/04/1944

No. 844/

b Copy

Top secret GOKO - to

comrade STALIN SNK of the USSR -

to comrade MOLOTOV of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks - to comrade MALENKOV OF THE

GENERAL STAFF OF THE KA - to comrade ANTONOV July 31 and August 3 of

this year. in the Baksan and Chegem regions of the Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, two groups of paratroopers totaling 43 people were thrown from German aircraft.

Of those thrown out, 3 were captured and 5 people were killed.

According to the testimony of the detained paratroopers, both groups consist of Kabardians, mostly active German accomplices, who voluntarily left with the Germans during the retreat of the German army from the North Caucasus. Trained in Germany in reconnaissance and sabotage schools.

The paratroopers have the task of establishing contact with gangs operating on the territory of the Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, organizing rebel groups among the Kabardians, committing sabotage on railway transport and in industry, and also collecting and transmitting military-political information to German intelligence by radio. Three walkie-talkies, code and ciphers were confiscated from the paratroopers.

Found in the drop areas and confiscated from paratroopers: 38 parachutes, 4 machine guns, 4 pistols, fictitious documents, a large amount of explosives, ammunition for machine guns and pistols, military and civilian uniforms and about 4 million rubles. According to the testimony of the detainees, for throwing into the territory

The Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic has trained two more groups of paratroopers. Measures have been taken to catch the escaped paratroopers. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 123. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**275 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M.
Malenkov on conducting Chekist
military operations to eliminate the
armed formations of the OUN**

08/05/1944

Copy

Top secret GOKO to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of

People's Commissars of the USSR to Comrade

V.M. MOLOTOV Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade MALENKOV G.M.

According to the NKVD-NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, recently, in connection with the advancement of the Red Army to the West and the withdrawal of certain units of the NKVD troops stationed in the regions of the Rivne region, the OUN underground and UPA bandit formations have

stepped up their activities. The transfer of OUN gangs from Poland and Lviv region is now to the regions of Volyn, Tarnopol and Rivne regions.

Across the Western Bug River, several gangs with a total number of up to 1000 people crossed into the regions of the Volyn region.

Over the past two weeks, cases of murders of Soviet and party activists, family members of Red Army soldiers and former bandits who turned themselves in to the NKVD bodies have increased. There are cases of forcible capture by OUN gangs of conscripts at recruiting stations and along the way. On July 28-30, UPA gangs operating in the regions

of the Volyn region captured and drove into the forest several teams of recruits with a total number of 1,130 people.

To take measures to suppress the actions of the OUN gangs, a deputy was sent to the place. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

comrade

KRUGLOV. Units of the NKVD troops are being transferred to the affected

areas. To prevent the infiltration of OUN bands from Polish territory into the regions of Lvov, Volyn and Rovno regions, measures are being taken to establish border detachments along the border line between the USSR and Poland.

During the KGB-military operations to eliminate the OUN gangs (February-July), 17,550 bandits were killed and 17,480 bandits were captured alive. 3,795 people came

to the NKVD with a confession. Active members of the OUN and UPA were arrested 4743. Weapons and ammunition were seized: 14 guns, 85 mortars, 600 heavy, heavy and light machine guns, 436 revolvers, 6567 grenades, 600,000 cartridges, 6,060 mines, 6,110 shells, 20 radio stations were confiscated. Captured 158 food

warehouses.

As a result of the work carried out to detain persons who evade conscription and mobilization to the Red Army, 270,600 people were sent to the district military registration and enlistment

offices. During operations, 700 were killed and 562 were wounded workers, officers and soldiers of the NKVD and the Red Army.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 130-131. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**276 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on
the resettlement of families
of traitors to the motherland**

08/18/1944

No. 898/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to

comrade I.V. STALIN In the

resort towns of the Caucasian Mining Group (Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Zheleznovodsk, Essentuki, Minvody) families of active German accomplices, traitors and traitors to the Motherland, who were convicted or voluntarily left with the Nazi occupiers, live in a total of 850 people. In order to clean up these cities, the NKVD of the

USSR decided

to relocate the families mentioned above to the Novosibirsk

region. The resettlement will be carried out until

September 1, 1944. I ask

for your consent. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of

the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 232. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**277 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on
measures to eliminate the
armed formations of the
OUN on the territory of the Ukrainian
SSR**

08/19/1944

No. 900/

b

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade I.V.

STALIN In connection with

the telegrams received in your name, etc. KONEV and MEHLIS about the actions of gangs of Ukrainian nationalists in the regions of the Lvov region, the NKVD of the USSR reports that at present the organs and troops of the NKVD in the newly liberated regions of the Lvov, Volyn and Tarnopol regions are taking the necessary measures to capture and eliminate the bandits. The first deputy is on site.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. KRUGLOV; areas affected by banditry are reinforced by NKVD troops and Chekists. To eliminate gangs, border guards are also used, who have begun to guard the border with Poland.

At the same time, I present information about the situation in the Lviv region.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 233. Copy. Typescript.

No. 278

Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks on the Convocation of a Council of the Armenian Gregorian Church

09/04/1944

Strictly secret 14

- On permission to convene a council of the Armenian Gregorian Church

To accept the proposal of the NKGB of the USSR on permission to convene in early 1945 in Etchmiadzin (Armenian SSR) the Council of the Armenian Gregorian Church, with the participation of representatives of foreign dioceses, for the

election of the Catholicos. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 135.

Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 44.

No.

**279 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M.
Malenkov about the detention of
German paratroopers-saboteurs from
among teenagers**

09/27/1944

No. 1030 /

b Top secret GOKO - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M.

MOLOTOV Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade MALENKOV G.M. From August 25 to September 4 this year. groups of German paratroopers-saboteurs, consisting of teenagers aged 8 to 15, were thrown into the regions of Minsk, Borisov, Orsha, Baranovichi and Nevel and into the territory of

the Smolensk region. Of those thrown out, 22 people were detained. According to the detainees, in 1943 in the mountains. Konino (Poland) and in the mountains. In Hamburg, the Germans organized sabotage schools for teenagers taken from orphanages in the years. Orsha, Minsk, Yartsevo and Orel.

The school taught topography, subversion and tactics of crossing the front line. After graduating from school, teenagers were thrown into our rear with task of blowing up locomotives.

The detainees were seized explosive briquettes, shaped and the color of coal given to them for tossing into tenders. The search for the remaining paratroopers continues. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 66. L. 352. Copy. Typescript.

No. 280

Special message by V.S. Abakumova I.V.

Stalin about A.P. Timoshenko with

an appendix of the protocol of interrogation [60]

05.10.1944

No. 551/

A

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade

STALIN Herewith I

present the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested
TIMOSHENKO Afanasy Prokofievich, who is the nephew of Marshal of
the Soviet Union S.K. TYMOSHENKO.

TYMOSHENKO Athanasius confessed that, while living in the
territory of the Odessa region occupied by the enemy, he was for some
time the chief of the district police, and then was recruited by the chief of
the Romanian gendarmerie, STEFANESCU, on whose instructions he
identified partisans, communists and persons hostile to the invaders.

Shortly before the liberation of the Odessa region from the Romanian
invaders, Timoshenko A.P. the Siguran officer DRAGULESCU, who
came from Bucharest, met twice. As A.P.

TYMOSHENKO testified, he told the German and Romanian
intelligence officers the information he knew about Marshal TIMOSHENKO.

In addition, Timoshenko A.P. said that along with him in the territory
occupied by the enemy was the sister of Marshal TIMOSHENKO -
KUZUYMA A.K., who was interrogated by the Germans and Romanians
about S.K. TYMOSHENKO and just like him (Tymoshenko A.P.), was
not repressed by the occupation authorities. Based on this, Timoshenko
A.P., taking into account the attitude towards him

on the part of the Romanians, suggested that, perhaps, KUZUYMA A.K. also collaborated with Romanian intelligence.

It is characteristic that in May of this year, after the liberation of the Odessa region, KUZUYMA A.K. came to Moscow to S.K. TYMOSHENKO and stayed at his dacha. During his stay at the dacha of S.K. TYMOSHENKO and KUZUYMA had lengthy conversations with each other, specially leaving the premises for this, as a result of which it was not possible to record their conversations with operational equipment. You were informed about this on July 5 of this year. No. 033/A.

For KUZUYMA A.K. establish surveillance. In order to more thoroughly clarify the espionage assignments received from the Romanians TIMOSHENKO A.P., and possibly KUZUYMA A.K., the SMERSH bodies located in Romania were instructed to identify DRAGULESCU and SHTEFANESCU and secretly seize them.

Interrogation of Timoshenko A.P. continues.
ABAKUMOV

PROTOCOL OF THE
INTERROGATION OF Afanasy Prokofyevich
TIMOSHENKO,

arrested on October 4, 1944 TIMOSHENKO (CHABAN) A.P., born in 1908, a native of the village of Furmanka, Kiliya district, Izmail region, since 1940 a citizen of the USSR, non-party, from

peasants. QUESTION: The investigation has data on your criminal activity during your stay in the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy.

Give evidence about it.

ANSWER: Living in the territory of the Odessa region occupied by the Romanian troops, from December 1942 until February 1943 I was in the service of the Romanians as the chief of police in the regional center of Savran and at the same time was used by the gendarmerie as an interpreter of the Romanian language.

QUESTION: Under what circumstances did you find yourself in the territory occupied by the enemy? ANSWER:

Before the war, I lived at the place of my birth in the village of Furmanka, Izmail region, where I arrived from Romania in early July 1940, during the liberation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union.

With the beginning of the Patriotic War, I, along with my other abundant relatives evacuated the Ordzhonikidze ^V village region.

In August 1942, the area where I lived was occupied by the enemy, and I did not have time to leave. I remained on the

side of the enemy against my will, especially since, being a relative of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. TYMOSHENKO, I feared reprisals from the Germans and Romanians.

QUESTION: What are your kinship relations with Marshal TYMOSHENKO?

ANSWER: I am the nephew

of S.K. TIMOSHENKO, and my aunt KUZUYMA Anastasia Konstantinovna, who remained with me in the territory occupied by the enemy, is the sister of Marshal TIMOSHENKO. QUESTION: The Germans knew that you were a relative of S.K. TYMOSHENKO?

ANSWER: I hid from the German and Romanian authorities that I was a relative of S.K. TYMOSHENKO. Given that many residents of the village of Izobilnoe knew about my relationship with him, in September 1942 my relatives and I left for Bessarabia, where, as I believed, I would be able to avoid repressions. With a

pass obtained from the German commandant's office, we drove to mountains Tiraspol, where they were detained and imprisoned.

During interrogations in this camp, I was forced to confess that I was the nephew of Marshal TIMOSHENKO.

QUESTION: You are not telling the truth. You are on your own initiative declared in Tiraspol to the Romanians about their relationship with S.K.

TYMOSHENKO. Why did

you do it? ANSWER: I declare that I did not confess this until, during the interrogation in Tiraspol, they did not show me documents revealing that I was related to TYMOSHENKO.

QUESTION: You are lying. Your wife TYMOSHENKO M.A. testified that you agreed in advance between yourselves to declare to the Romanian authorities about your relationship with S.K. TYMOSHENKO.

Why are you hiding it now? ANSWER: I told

a lie. Indeed, in Tiraspol, my wife and I agreed not to hide our

relationship with S.K. TYMOSHENKO, because they feared that the Romanians would check me at the place of birth, they would establish that I was a relative of the Marshal, and then they could shoot us. Therefore, we decided that if during the interrogation they again seek a confession from me, then I will confess that I am his nephew.

So I did. When I was summoned to the camp for interrogation at the beginning of November 1942, I confessed to the Romanian officers and also told them that TYMOSHENKO's sister, A. K. KUZYUM, was with me. She was called in for questioning, and she confirmed my testimony.

QUESTION: The Romanians

demanding from you detailed information about S.K. TYMOSHENKO?

ANSWER: No,

this time I'm talking about S.K. TYMOSHENKO was not questioned, but at the next interrogation I was required to tell in detail about him.

QUESTION: What data did

you tell the Romanians about Marshal TIMOSHENKO? ANSWER:

Around November

20, I was again summoned for interrogation, at which, in addition to the Romanian officers, German officers were also present. During the interrogation, I was insistently required to know the information about S.K. TYMOSHENKO. They

were interested in where he lives, whether he has a family, where he is at the present time and whether I saw him, and also whether I had correspondence with Marshal

TYMOSHENKO. I replied that the place of residence of S.K.

Timoshenko is unknown to me, but he lives permanently in Moscow, in the Kremlin, he had no correspondence with him and had not seen him for a long time.

To this, the Romanian officer who interrogated me said that I was not telling the truth, since in 1940 S.K. TYMOSHENKO came to the village of Furmanka, where I undoubtedly saw him.

Confirming that the marshal had indeed come to Furmanka at the beginning of July 1940, I explained that I had not seen him, since I was not in the village at that time. The rest of the relatives who lived in Furmanka had meetings with the marshal during his stay at home. He said that he

had a wife and children, and when asked whether his wife was S.K. TIMOSHENKO, a native of Bessarabia, I

answered that she was not a Bessarabian, but I did not know where she came from.

Then they asked me if Tymoshenko's wife came or who any of his family in Furmanka, to which I gave a negative answer.

After that, they asked me which of the relatives of TYMOSHENKO, who lived in Bessarabia, went to Marshal in Moscow. At first I answered that

none of the relatives of S.K. TIMOSHENKO was not in Moscow, however, interrupting me, the officer began to shout that I was lying, since they knew about the trip to Moscow of Marshal's brother, Yefim TIMOSHENKO.

In this regard, I was forced to confirm that Yefim really went to S.K. in 1940. Timoshenko and stayed with him in Moscow for some time. The officer insistently demanded

from me data on the whereabouts of Yefim at the present time, but I did not know this and only reported that Yefim had been evacuated to the rear of the Soviet Union, but where exactly I do not know.

In addition, they sought evidence from me why I was evacuated from Bessarabia at the beginning of the war, and then remained in the occupied territory and now I am returning to Bessarabia again. At the same time, they called me a "Soviet agent", a "Bolshevik", they beat me and threatened to shoot me or send me to Germany.

After the interrogation, my aunt Kuzyuma A.K. was summoned, but what interrogated, I don't know.

QUESTION: What did they do to

you? ANSWER: No more repressions were applied to me, and the next day, under guard, they sent me from Tiraspol to Balta, along with other Bessarabians and Ukrainians.

From Balta, my wife and I were sent in a group of up to 30 people to the regional center of the Odessa region - the village of Savran, and my aunt - KUZUYMA A.K., among others, was sent to the district center of Peschany, where, as I later found out, she got a job as a worker in the canteen of the praetorship (district administration).

Those who came with me to Savran was sent to work on various collective farms, but I was left in Savran, where I first worked on a collective farm, and then I was hired by the police.

QUESTION: Who hired you to serve in the police?

ANSWER: When November 23, 1942 we arrived in the village. Savran, chief of the gendarmerie PETRESCU, hearing that I speak Romanian, told me: "Well, you will be a good policeman." To my objections that I would not be able to work in the police, as I suffer from diseases, PETRESCU replied: "Well, then you will be my translator." He immediately gave the order to leave me in Savran and provide me with an apartment. He ordered me to come to his gendarmerie every three days for registration.

Fulfilling PETRESCU's order, I visited him several times.
to the gendarmerie for registration.

In mid-December, PETRESCU called me to his office and announced that I was appointed as a police officer. I tried to refuse, but PETRESCU categorically insisted and threatened to deal with me if I did not agree. I was frightened by his threats and agreed to serve in the police, and soon began my duties. Thus, from December 23, 1942 until February 1943, I

served as a police officer in the village of Savran.

QUESTION: Were you an ordinary policeman?

ANSWER: No, I was appointed chief of police in the village of Savran, and I had 7 policemen under my command.

QUESTION: Did PETRESCU know that you are a relative of Marshal TYMOSHENKO?

ANSWER: Yes, he knew about it from the documents that were delivered to Savran by the gendarme who accompanied us from Balta.

QUESTION: Why were you appointed Chief of Police?

ANSWER: I cannot explain it. PETRESCU immediately, as soon as he saw me for the first time, told me that I would serve in
police.

A few days later, perhaps after PETRESCU got acquainted with the documents that were sent from Balta, he asked me in a conversation why I had not told him that I was S.K.'s nephew. TYMOSHENKO. However, after that PETRESCU did not change his mind and appointed me chief of police.

QUESTION: You are giving false explanations. The Romanian authorities, despite the fact that they knew about your relationship with Marshal TYMOSHENKO, not only did not repress you, but appointed you as chief of police.

We invite you to tell the truth.

ANSWER: I do not hide anything from the investigation, but I cannot explain why I was not repressed by the Romanian authorities, but was appointed chief of police. QUESTION:

Under what surname did you serve as chief of police in Savran? ANSWER: At first I

served as chief of police under my real name TYMOSHENKO, but around January 14, 1943, PETRESCU summoned me to his office and suggested that I change my surname.

From that moment on, I was listed under the name CHABAN. Subsequently, in the summer of 1943, when the documents were being re-registered, I was given a new passport with the surname CHABAN.

QUESTION: Why did PETRESCU suggest you change your surname?

ANSWER: As PETRESCU explained to me, I had to change my surname TYMOSHENKO to another one in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and troubles on the part of the Romanians or Germans who came to Savran.

QUESTION: What duties did you perform as chief of police? ANSWER: As the chief

of police, I assigned police officers on duty to the praetor's office and on night rounds around the village every day, appointed people to guard collective farm warehouses, collected taxes, carried out the praetor's orders to mobilize local residents and transport for work, sent to the collective farms the praetor's orders to surrender meat and chickens. In addition, by order of PETRESCU, I

simultaneously, as

knowing the Romanian language, was an interpreter at the praetorship.

QUESTION: Did you participate in the searches and arrests carried out by the gendarmerie?

ANSWER: Yes, I am as Chief of Police on the instructions of PETRESCU was involved in the searches carried out by the gendarmes.

So, in January 1943, together with the gendarmes, I searched the house of a local resident GUMENNY, who received information that several rifles, a revolver and cartridges were hidden in his house.

During a search at HUMENNOY's, we found a revolver and cartridges, after which he was arrested by the gendarmerie. I must

say that throughout the entire period of my service in the police, I was weary of the work I did and repeatedly

asked PETRESKA to release me from the police service.

PETRESCU at first did not agree to satisfy my request, but on February 1, 1943, when I again turned to him, he, angry, tore off my police bandage, took away my certificate, and from that time I no longer served in the police.

QUESTION: What did you do after leaving the police service? ANSWER:

After leaving the police service, I was ill for a long time and did nothing, and from April 1943 I was appointed as a salesman in a grocery store in Savran.

I worked in this store until March 1944, when Romanians were expelled from Savran.

QUESTION: Who appointed you as a salesperson in the

store? ANSWER: The praetor appointed me as a salesman in a grocery store NICULESKU Dimitri, to whom I directly reported.

I must say that I essentially acted as the head of the store, as I was personally responsible for the operation of the store myself and signed all the documents.

QUESTION: Did you keep in touch with the gendarmerie? ANSWER: After

I was removed from the post of chief of police, I had nothing to do with the gendarmerie and did not maintain contact with it.

QUESTION: Were you used as an interpreter by the gendarmerie? ANSWER:

Yes, once at the

beginning of December 1943 I was actually present in the gendarmerie as an interpreter at the interrogation of Petr SOPIN, who lived in the village of Savran.

QUESTION: So, you continued to maintain contact with the gendarmerie even after leaving the police service? ANSWER: No, I did

not maintain contact with the gendarmerie, and participation mine in the SOPIN interrogation took place under the following circumstances:

SOPIN came to my apartment, although I knew him very well before that. little, and said that I must beware, because they want to kill me.

To my question about who wants to kill me and why, SOPIN replied that there are bandits in Savran who call themselves partisans. They intend, according to him, to kill me, believing that I am connected with the gendarmerie and that, according to my denunciation, the gendarmes allegedly killed the prisoner of war CHUBA. I knew that ChUB served in

police, then was arrested for something by the gendarmerie, but after a while he was released. I knew nothing about the murder of CHUBA and did not report him to the gendarmerie.

Therefore, I was surprised at SOPIN's statement and tried to find out from him exactly who was threatening to kill me. However, SOPIN did not say anything definite to me, but began to speak with malice about the inhabitants of Savran POSTUPALSKY, MATSYPUR and ROMANIUK, calling them bandits who must be destroyed, since innocent people should not be allowed to suffer because of them. According to him, the partisans will kill 2-3 Romanians, and for this the gendarmes will kill innocent people. At the same time, SOPIN told me that he should have a talk with the chief of the

gendarmerie, and asked me to arrange a meeting with him in my apartment. Not wanting to get involved with the gendarmerie, I refused to comply with SOPIN's request. That same night,

after SOPIN left, the gendarmes unexpectedly came to my apartment and arrested me. QUESTION: Here

again you are trying to mislead the investigation. No one arrested you, but you yourself appeared at the gendarmerie and declared what was reported by SOPIN. Tell about it.

ANSWER: I admit, I tried to hide from the investigation that after SOPIN left, I immediately went to the chief of the gendarmerie SHTEFANESC (appointed after PETRESCU left) and told him about my conversation with SOPIN.

After my statement, ȘTEFANESCU ordered me and two gendarmes to find and bring SOPIN to him. Being taken to the gendarmerie, SOPIN,

during interrogation, told SHTEFANESK about the existence of an underground Soviet group in the Savran region, which had weapons, and betrayed more than 20 of its members.

ȘTEFANESCU offered me to translate SOPIN's testimony into Romanian, and thus I was present at this interrogation as an interpreter.

After the interrogation, I went home, SOPIN was also released, and the other day the gendarmerie began making arrests in Savran.

QUESTION: So you, together with SOPIN, betrayed the underground Soviet group that existed in Savran?

ANSWER: Yes, it is. I became an accomplice in SOPIN's betrayal, but he did so because he feared for his life.

QUESTION: Isn't it because you were carrying out the task of the Romanian gendarmerie?

ANSWER: I did not receive any assignments from the Romanian gendarmerie.

QUESTION: Stop lying. Speak when you've set criminal connection with the gendarmerie?

ANSWER: I stubbornly concealed from the investigation the fact of my recruitment Romanian gendarmerie, but now decided to tell the truth.

Indeed, from December 1943 I was an agent of the Romanian gendarmerie, I had the task of identifying communists, partisans and persons opposed to the Romanian authorities in Savran.

QUESTION: By whom were you recruited as an agent of the gendarmerie?

ANSWER: Long

before the recruitment, it was clear to me that the gendarmerie wanted to use me, and for this reason, not only was I not repressed after I confessed my relationship with Marshal TYMOSHENKO, but, on the contrary, I was released from the camp and appointed to a position police chief. In January 1943, the former chief of the gendarmerie PETRESCU told me that I owe a lot to the

Romanians and must atone for my guilt before them. Although I was not recruited by PETRESCU at that time, the gendarmerie considered me a trusted person, since several times

the gendarmes came to me and were interested in information about local residents opposed to the Romanians. At the beginning of December 1943, after I had informed the gendarmerie on SOPIN and participated in his interrogation, the chief of the gendarmerie, ȘTEFANESCU,

suggested that I identify partisans, communists and other persons among the local residents of Savran who were doing any kind of work against the Romanians. I tried to refuse, saying that I would not be able to identify such persons, since I am not a local resident and do not know anyone in Savran. However, ȘTEFANESCU insisted on his own, told me that I was

already connected with the gendarmerie, because I had informed on SOPIN, and threatened that if I

I will not give him consent to carry out the tasks of the gendarmerie, then I will be arrested and destroyed.

Taking advantage of this circumstance, ȘTEFANESCU forced me to give him my consent to carry out the tasks of the gendarmerie as its secret agent. QUESTION: Did you give a

signature to ȘTEFANESCU about this? ANSWER: No,

ȘTEFANESCU did not demand such a signature from me, but after SOPIN's interrogation, I gave a signature that, under threat of death, I undertake not to tell anyone about what happened during SOPIN's interrogation and what testimony he gave.

QUESTION: What treacherous work did you do on the orders of the gendarmerie? ANSWER: After

the recruitment, ȘTEFANESCU warned me that the gendarme ALBU, who was present during our conversation, would keep in touch with me.

Three days later, ALBU came to my shop and, naming the names of a number of local residents who were interested in the gendarmerie, offered to carefully monitor them, identify their moods and establish whether they were connected with the partisans. I promised ALBU to complete this task.

Subsequently, when meeting with ALBU, I informed him of the data I had discovered about the moods of these individuals, but I failed to establish their connection with the partisans, which ALBU was dissatisfied with.

At the end of January 1944, I was summoned to the praetor office with reporting documents on the store. As it turned out, this was just a pretext for calling me to the Romanian officer DRAGULESCU who arrived in Savran. The praetor introduced me to him and said that

DRAGULESCU wanted to speak to me alone. The latter suggested that I go unnoticed to the premises of the forestry, where he intended to talk to me.

When I arrived at the forestry, DRAGULESCU told me that he had come from Bucharest and was a representative of the Siguranza, and became interested in my work as an agent of the gendarmerie. I must say that

DRAGULESCU was fully aware of my work, since in the conversation he mentioned the SOPIN case and the members of the underground Soviet group in Savran associated with it.

After I told him in detail about my work in the gendarmerie, DRAGULESCU let me go. QUESTION: And what tasks did you receive from DRAGULESCU? ANSWER: This time I did not receive any assignments from DRAGULESCU, but a month later, at the end of February, when DRAGULESCU again arrived in Savran, during a meeting with me, he instructed me to identify what conversations were being held among local residents in connection with the successful offensive of the Red Army units. Army, which of the inhabitants of Savran wants to avoid evacuation and is waiting for the arrival of Soviet troops. After that, I never saw DRAGULESKU again, as the evacuation of the Romanians from Savran soon began.

QUESTION: Did you also evacuate from Savran with the Romanians? ANSWER: I was forced to leave Savran because I

forced to do it by the gendarmes.

Back in Savran, I tried to avoid evacuation by saying that I could not leave because of the lack of transport. Then, by order of the chief of the gendarmerie, I was given a wagon and 3 horses, after which I could not refuse the trip.

However, on the way, I deliberately lagged behind the gendarmes, made my way to the place of residence of my aunt Kuzyum A.K. to the village of Peschany, where he remained to wait for the arrival of the Red Army.

QUESTION: Not true. You were specially left to DRAGULESK in the territory liberated by the Red Army.

What tasks did you receive from him?

ANSWER: I stayed in the village of Peschany to await the arrival of the Red Army on my own initiative and did not receive any assignments from DRAGULESCU.

QUESTION: Earlier you

testified that your aunt KUZUYMA A.K. was interrogated in Tiraspol by German and Romanian officers, but you hide her criminal connections. Talk about it. ANSWER: As I have already shown, while in the camp

in Tiraspol, in November 1942, during interrogation, I confessed that I was a relative of S.K. TYMOSHENKO, and testified that his sister A.K. Kuzyuma was in the camp with me. After that, KUZUYMA was interrogated twice by German and Romanian officers.

From the words of KUZUYUM, I knew that during interrogations she was asked in detail about Marshal TYMOSHENKO, but she did not tell me what evidence she gave about

him. The fact that my aunt KUZUYUMA A.K., just like me, was released from the camp, sent to work in the praetorship and subsequently not repressed by the Romanian authorities, gives reason to believe that she may also have been recruited by the Romanians, but I don't know about this. QUESTION: You are trying

to shield KUZUMA and are silent about the tasks that DRAGULESKU gave you. You will be questioned about this in more detail. The testimony from my words was

recorded correctly, I read the protocol. TYMOSHENKO

INTERROGATED:

Deputy. early

Department of the Main Directorate "SMERSH"

Lieutenant Colonel

BELOUSOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 256. L. 77-93. Script. Typescript.

No. 281 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov on strengthening Poland's counterintelligence agencies [6

10/17/1944

No. 1100/

b

Copy Top secret

GOKO - Comrade STALIN SNK

USSR - Comrade V. M. MOLOTOV At the

same time, I present the message of Comrade. SEROVA from

Lublin. To strengthen the counterintelligence organs of the Polish army

comrade Abakumov will send 100 Smersh employees.

Through the NKVD-NKGB, we are sending 15 comrades to assist the Polish state security agencies. Tov.

ABAKUMOV - along the line of "Smersh" and comrade. SEROV - the necessary assistance will be provided on the spot to the Office of Counterintelligence of the Polish Army and its chief Comrade.

KOZHUSHKO. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

From LU B L I N A Moscow, NKVD of the

USSR to Comrade BERIA In order to organize operational and military measures, in accordance with your instructions, we have organized: undercover, investigative, installation and search groups and operational-military group for work in the districts. A qualified operative was also allocated to contact in the work and assist the Security Department of the PKNO (Polish Committee of National Liberation).

Familiarization on the spot with the organization of the struggle of the counterintelligence agencies of the Polish army and the Security Department of the PKNO with the insurgent formations of the Home Army reveals the following:

1. The counterintelligence agencies of the Polish army are very small (504 to the required staff), and the operational staff is not sufficiently qualified. In most regiments, instead of the 4 operatives required by the state, there is at best 1 operative, who, moreover, does not speak Polish, which makes it difficult to carry out undercover work. As a result of this situation, units and formations of the Polish army are operationally poorly served, therefore they do not know about all the intentions of the enemy element that has penetrated the ranks of the Polish army.

The work of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Polish Army also has a negative effect on the fact (according to the statement of the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate comrade KOZHUSHKO) that no one directs them from Moscow and does not help in their work. Tov. KOZHUSHKO, in his KGB training, is not able to cope with the duties assigned to him. In

order to prevent further mass desertion from Polish army, it is necessary to strengthen the counterintelligence agencies.

2. After the disarmament of the "Home Army", the soldiers of the latter went to staff the Polish army without sufficient verification, as a result of which the leadership of the "Home Army" through its infiltrated soldiers and sub-officers conducts hostile agitation, calling for a speech against the existing order in the army, and organizes mass transfer of soldiers of the Polish army to the camp of the Home Army. As it turned out here,

over the past two months, 40-50 soldiers and officers deserted daily from the Polish army with weapons. During the 15 days of October, about 2,000 people

deserted, but no decisive measures were taken by the command to curb desertion. 3. The security agencies of the PKNO also work poorly, as a result of

this, the "Akovtsy" have recently stepped up their activities. According to our far from complete data, in Lublin there is an armed organization of the "Home Army", numbering more than 1,000 people, which is carrying out active insurgent activities.

Suffice it to point out that on Sunday, October 15 in Lublin, the "Akovtsy" wrote a number of slogans on the walls of houses: "Live the Kraev Army", "Long live the BUR General", etc. In the counties, the rebels are active with impunity, for example: the 3rd and 7th regiments of the Home Army are being formed. The rebels attacked the county jail and freed 5 detainees;

In the Kholmshy district, there are AK detachments, numbering more than 300 people. These detachments carried out more than 10 armed attacks in the counties. 15 people from among local workers were killed, including 4 employees of the Public Security Department, who escorted the arrested and released 4 arrested;

The 9th AK Regiment and the 8th AK Assault Group have been formed in Zamostiensky Uyezd. In the district, the rebels killed 11 people, including 5 soldiers of the Red Army, 12 arrested were released, including 6 active "Akovites";

Up to 300 AK detachment operates in Lublin County Human. Five soldiers of the Red Army were killed;

in the Vladava district, an AK detachment was formed, numbering 200 people. 6 murders of police officers were committed;

in the Bivdorai district, "AK" dancers are formed, numbering 30-40 people each; in the

Krasninsky district there are two detachments of "AK" numbering up to 100 people. The rebels committed 5 murders and released 10 arrested persons.

There are also bandit manifestations in other counties.

The security department of the PKNO conducts intelligence and operational work both in the city and in the village very poorly. The head of the department, RATKEVICH, complains about the insufficiency of the operational staff, their low qualifications.

In addition, I believe that in the apparatus of the Security Department of the PKNO there are also "AKOVs" who harm the common cause. The following fact can serve as an example of this: was arrested "Akovets" BINETSKY - head of counterintelligence of the Lublin military district "AK". As it turned out, BINETSKY was interrogated twice by the chief

counterintelligence department of the Security Department PKNO RAMKOVSKY and, in addition, was interrogated by an investigator for 24 hours. After that, BINETSKY was shot without a sentence. When I asked RATKEVICH and RAMKOVSKY what evidence BINETSKY gave (who could tell a lot about the insurrectionary activities of the "Akovites"), RATKEVICH stated that BINETSKY did not give any evidence, did not admit to anything, so they decided to shoot him.

As we have established, BINETSKY was known to the arrested commandant of the city of Lublin "AK" KMITS and a number of other detainees with whom it would be possible to confront and expose BINETSKY. This execution gives grounds to assume that one of the employees of the Security Department, fearing Binetsky's testimony, prepared his execution.

4. In view of the fact that, as of October 15, the existing arrested in the Smersh group have been in jail for 2-3 weeks, whose testimony is largely outdated, today we will arrest the identified commandant of the 5th district of Lublin "Akovets" ALYAM. In addition, 4 arrested persons from the Security Department were taken for more thorough interrogation and identification of their connections around the city. A

meeting is being held today with the operational workers of the counties to expand work in the counties. Instructions were also given to the heads of the counterintelligence department "Smersh" of the fronts on these

issues. 5. Yesterday, October 15, in the Rzeszow region, a Polish transceiver station was confiscated, which worked with London and Taranta (Italy). Arrested: radio operator MAKOVSKY and assistants PARIS and HODOR. An

investigation is underway. Intelligence information was received from a source who came to Lublin from the Warsaw Voivodeship that a Polish government headed by General PORTNOVSKY was organized in the Polish territory occupied by the Germans. In connection with this, the Germans liberated all the Poles from the camps. Polish flags hang in the c
Tonight, 18

sub-officers and 1 second lieutenant (senior lieutenant). The search and prosecution of a group of deserters was organized.

Of the 1,400 people of the 31st Polish regiment who deserted on the night of October 12, the NKVD troops yesterday detained and disarmed 31 soldiers while combing the forests, of which 22 were soldiers of the 33rd Polish regiment, whose desertion was not known at the headquarters of the Polish army. According to the testimony of the soldiers of the 33rd regiment, in total 40 people deserted with them. The search for the rest of us organized.

This afternoon, the Security Department arrested the inspector of the commandant of the Lublin Military District of the "Krayevoy Army" YASINSKY Edward, nicknamed "NURT". We are conducting an investigation to identify and arrest the leaders of the Lublin Military District of the Home Army. 6. In order to deliver a

decisive blow to the insurgent "AK" formations both in the Polish army and in the counties, I consider it appropriate to report the following: operational workers "Smersh";

b) disarm all former "Akovites" who are now in the Polish army and put them in special camps. Detained "Akovites" in the counties are also sent to camps;

c) to provide practical assistance in the work of the Security Department of the PKNO for combating insurgent elements, send here 15 qualified workers of the NKVD-NKGB. I ask for your instructions. Deputy People's

Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR - SEROV GA RF. F. 9401 sch.

Op. 2. D. 67. L. 1-6. Copy. Typescript.

No.

282 Special message by V.S.

Abakumova I.V. Stalin and V.M.

Molotov about the "agent" of British

intelligence P.M. Gusev with [62] the protocol of

10/18/1944

No. 566/

A Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE To Comrade STALIN

To Comrade

MOLOTOV In this case,

I present the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested British intelligence agent P.M. GUSEV, who was the secretary of the Soviet military attaché in Sweden, about which you were informed on October 1 . for No. 547/A.

Particularly noteworthy are the testimony of GUSEV about the presence among the employees of the Soviet embassy in Sweden of foreigners - Swedes, Norwegians and Germans, who for the most part form the close circle of Ambassador KOLLONTAI and use her patronage. GUSEV

also testified that among these persons he knew a Swedish police agent, and also that a number of other foreigners working in the embassy were apparently framed by the Swedish police or German intelligence for espionage purposes. ABAKUMOV

PROTOCOL

OF THE INTERROGATION

OF THE ARESTED Pyotr Mikhailovich

GUSEV dated October

18, 1944 P.M. GUSEV, born in 1907, a native of the mountains.

Leningrad, Russian, citizen of the USSR, former member of the CPSU

(b), with higher education, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1939, form

secretary of the Soviet military attache in Stockholm (Sweden), major of the Red Army.

QUESTION: At the interrogation on September 30 of this year. you showed that you were an agent of British intelligence, but did not tell about all your espionage connections. Talk about

it. ANSWER: At the previous interrogation, I confessed that when I was my secretary of the USSR military attache in Sweden, in July 1943 I was recruited by British intelligence for espionage activities against the Soviet Union and at the same time I passed information to the British intelligence officers HENNINGSEN and ROBERT about the agents who were on my communications, as well as those Soviet agents who were trained by the military mission to be transferred to Norway.

In March 1944, I handed over to British intelligence the characteristics of newly arrived employees in the apparatus of the Soviet

military attache.

About the crimes I committed and about the English spies with whom I was connected, I gave exhaustive evidence earlier, and I have nothing more to say, but I must state that an employee is working in the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, who is an agent of the Swedish police. QUESTION: What is the name of this

employee. ANSWER: VYSTREM is a Swedish subject, a Swede by nationality, who works as a personal driver for the Soviet Ambassador Kollontai Alexandra Mikhailovna.

QUESTION: How do you know that VYSTREM cooperates with the Swedish police?

ANSWER: In August 1943, the Swedish police in Stockholm arrested Soviet agents — local residents of KATs Mikhail and his son KATs Lenart, who maintained direct contact with the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army through their radio station. To find out the circumstances of their arrest, I met with Mikhail Katz's

wife. In a conversation, she said that after the trial she had a meeting with her husband, who gave me a book. Realizing that the book had been handed over to me with a purpose, I, returning to the

embassy, began to study it together with the military attaché, Colonel NIKITUSHEV, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel

PENYUGIN. Through a magnifying glass, we managed to notice that some letters are marked with dots.

After reading these letters in order, we learned that KAC was arrested by the Swedes after the Swedish radio stations of the state telegraph, the General Staff and the police tracked his work on the radio with Moscow. KATS also warned that at his trial, he

learned that a Swede working as a driver in the Soviet embassy was an agent of the Swedish police who had reported about his, KATS, visits to the embassy.

Although KAC did not indicate the name of the driver, it was clear that his message referred to SHOT, the only Swede among the drivers. All other drivers were Russians.

QUESTION: WYSTREM was fired from the embassy?

ANSWER: No, when on June 15, 1944 I left Stockholm for Moscow, VYSTREM continued to act as the ambassador's chauffeur.

It should be pointed out that VYSTREM enjoys the support of KOLLONTAI, has free access to the embassy building, and can often be seen at the doors of the offices of advisers, secretaries and other employees of the embassy and the military mission. After the message

from KAC, I realized that VYSTREM did not do this by accident, but on the instructions of the Swedish police, he was monitoring the workers of the Soviet embassy.

In addition to VYSTREM, other foreigners also worked in the embassy, who, apparently, were framed by the Swedish police or German intelligence for espionage purposes.

QUESTION: What foreigners are you talking

about? ANSWER: In the Soviet embassy in Stockholm until the last Several Swedes, Norwegians and even Germans worked at the time.

These foreigners make up the personal environment of KOLLONTAI, enjoy her patronage and, despite the fact that all these persons do not inspire confidence, work at the embassy for several years.

The embassy workers wondered why KOLLONTAI surrounded herself with foreigners, and in particular why the Germans enjoyed her confidence. For example, the

German DABBERT Emma, who enjoys the special patronage of KOLLONTAI, works as a nanny for the ambassador, has access to her

office and is almost inseparably with her. DABBERT traveled with KOLLONTAI to Solchebaden (near Stockholm), where in one of the hotels PAASIKIVI met with KOLLONTAI on the issue of an armistice between the USSR and Finland. The personal servant of KOLLONTAI is the Norwegian

RANTE Ravik, who has been living in the embassy for a long time, has the right to walk freely throughout the building and has the opportunity to observe everyone who visits the Soviet embassy and the military attache. Often it could be seen on the 2nd and 4th floors, where the military and naval attache, the encryption room, and the ambassador's apartment were located.

From my observations of the behavior of this servant, I had a definite opinion that RANTE Ravik, on someone's instructions, was following the embassy

workers. Until the end of 1943, a certain Swede (I don't remember her last name) worked as a cleaning lady at the embassy, who had to clean the premises before work began, but she could be met every day in the building

during the daytime. No less suspicious person is the Swedish BRANTING, who works at the embassy as a lawyer. QUESTION: What do you know

about BRANTING? ANSWER: All employees at the embassy knew that BRANTING was a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, which throughout the war took a hostile position towards the USSR and predicted Russia's defeat in the war with Germany.

BRANTING was an active member of this party and did not deal with any legal issues at the embassy, although he received a monthly salary of 500 crowns.

At the end of 1942, Kollontai personally gave him the only assignment - to settle the conflict that arose between one of the homeowners of Stockholm and his tenant - an embassy worker. BRANTING failed in the task entrusted to him, and the embassy worker was defiantly evicted from the apartment he occupied.

The embassy employee SHEKIN was surprised more than once by BRANTING's stay at the embassy and told me: "Why does the ambassador pay such a scoundrel a lot of money? If the embassy needs a lawyer, why doesn't she want to invite him from the Soviet Union.

I personally, seeing how foreigners grouped around KOLLONTAI, came to the conclusion that she trusted German and Swedish specialists more than Russian ones. Kollontai has been living in Sweden for 14 years and has largely cut herself off from Soviet reality. QUESTION: What grounds do

you have for making such a statement? ANSWER: I will give specific examples. In 1942, the head of the Intourist office in Stockholm, SIDORENKO, was visited by his wife from the Soviet Union, a doctor in childhood diseases by profession. Having learned about this, many wives of the

embassy staff began to seek advice from her and invite her to treat their children. Women said that it was more convenient to contact their local doctor. When Kollontai became aware of this, she called SIDORENKO and, as he later told me, reprimanded him for allowing his wife to practice medicine, saying that Swedish doctors are good and more experienced specialists than Russians, and therefore it is necessary use their services. When SIDORENKO objected that the mothers of the children themselves wanted this,

Kollontai forbade SIDORENKO's wife to receive patients.

Nothing else but the special trust that KOLLONTAI has in foreigners explains the fact that in the kindergarten, which existed in 1942 at the embassy, a German woman worked as a teacher, a German taught the embassy workers the German language and even in a singing circle for the wives of employees The leader was also a German.

On November 7, 1943, when the choir was giving a concert, the employees and members of their families present in the hall were outraged that during the war with Germany in the Soviet embassy in Stockholm a German was teaching Soviet citizens to sing. Besides, as far as I know, this German is an officer in the German army. QUESTION: What

is the name of this German?

ANSWER: His surname is

STEMPEL. QUESTION: How do you know that STEMPEL is an officer in the German army?

ANSWER: This was told to me by Assistant Military Attache PENYUGIN, who at the same time drew my attention to the fact that STEMPEL continues to remain in Stockholm despite the fact that the majority of Germans left Sweden for Germany in connection with mobilization into the army. It is necessary to indicate that he took

lessons from the same STAMP
German language military attaché Colonel NIKITUSHEV.

Another teacher of the German language, a German woman named Gerta, I don't remember her last name, gave lessons to the chargé d'affaires SEMENOV, the adviser VETROV and the driver TROITSKY. She, like STEMPEL, enjoyed the favor of the ambassador, who recommended her to anyone who intended to study German.

Herta, at the direction of KOLLONTAY, in 1942 was kindergarten teacher.

It is noteworthy that Hertha's husband - a German - was not mobilized into the German army, despite his draft age and general mobilization in Germany.

Only the patronage enjoyed by these Germans, Norwegians and Swedes at Kollontai makes it possible for them to remain in embassy, and some of them are forgiven even for their defiant behavior. So, the Swede

STORG works in the embassy, who is listed as an interpreter in the press bureau. Kollontai knows him well. On November 7, 1943, without permission, STORG brought two members of the Swedish National Socialist Party to a reception at the Soviet embassy. According to TASS employee PAVLOV, the guests brought by

STORG are known to him as ardent fascists. After the official reception was over and only Soviet citizens remained at the embassy,

STORG continued to stay with his fascist friends, and he had to be asked to leave. Considering this, I did not send him to the reception on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, sending out invitations to STORGU, but he

came to the reception uninvited and again accompanied by the same fascist friends who were with him for the first time. After sitting up until 10 pm, STORG began to act hooligans, and he had to be expelled from the embassy. KOLLONTAI did not react to these facts.

It must be said that at receptions held at the embassy, there are and other persons who behave no better than STORG.

Before the arrival of other guests, the Russian White émigré Countess POSSE usually appears at the embassy, an acquaintance of Kollontai and, except for her, unknown to anyone, who, taking advantage of good attitude towards her KOLLONTAI, keeps himself free.

Another embassy visitor, like POSSE, is a Swede NILSON, who calls herself a doctor, who visits KOLLONTAI only during breakfast and lunch. POSSE and NILSON play the role of hosts under KOLLONTAI,

and they are aware of all sorts of things going on in the embassy.

Kollontai's sympathies for foreigners are known in Stockholm, and it is not by chance that she enjoys prestige among the Swedes. However, KOLLONTAI gained this authority, in my opinion, not as an ambassador of the Soviet Union, but rather as a private person.

Indicative in this regard is the fact that the Swedish Foreign Minister GÜNTER, known for his hostility to the Soviet Union and who was the organizer of assistance to the Germans under the guise of "neutrality", repeatedly visited Kollontai privately during her illness.

In addition, a number of embassy employees also, in my opinion, do not deserve the trust placed in them, since they were detained by the Swedish police.

QUESTION: Which embassy staff was detained by the Swedish police?

ANSWER: At the beginning of 1944, there were two cases of detention of embassy employees by the Swedish police, while in both cases, persons who were related to ciphers were detained embassies.

One Sunday, the embassy cryptographer SUROGIN, after watching a movie in the embassy club and having dinner with the courier Afinogenov, went for a walk around the city. At 2 o'clock in the morning, SUROGIN returned to the embassy in a state of intoxication, accompanied by two policemen.

All the employees of the embassy with whom I had to talk about this expressed the opinion that SUROGIN should not be allowed to work with ciphers, nevertheless, by order

Kollontai, he remained at this job for a long time, and then was transferred to the Trade Representation.

Also at the beginning of 1944, shortly after the incident with SUROGIN, PETROV and PAVLOV, who worked at the embassy, were detained by the police during one of their walks in a car, and I do not know how they were released.

This case was reported to KOLLONTAI, but PAVLOV was left to work at TASS, and PETROV continued to be a cryptographer. I must also inform you

that in 1940, when I arrived to work in Sweden, Colonel NIKITUSHEV, introducing me to the work, told me to take into account the peculiarities of KOLLONTAI's character, which, according to him, is kind with all employees, but at the same time tend to gossip about them. She, said Nikitushev, treats well only certain employees who are considered her favorites.

For more than 4 years of work at the embassy, I have observed how some employees completely undeservedly used the special location of the ambassador. In

1940, a certain WOLFEN arrived at the post of security courier, sent abroad at the request of his wife, who works as an assistant at the embassy. WOLFEN won KOLLONTAI's

sympathy in an unusual way. When it became known that KOLLONTAI had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor in connection with her 70th birthday, WOLFEN collected all the flowers from vases at the embassy early in the morning and, when KOLLONTAI was still in bed, presented them to her, kissing her hand.

Since then, as Colonel NIKITUSHEV told me, KOLLONTAI considered the courier WOLFEN to be the most cultured and educated person in the embassy. Taking

advantage of the reputation of KOLLONTAI's favorite, WOLFEN began to allow himself to ridicule some of the responsible officials and, in particular, sneered at Councilor SEMENOV. Colonel NIKITUSHEV then made a remark to him, to which WOLFEN responded with rudeness. Being close to the ambassador,

WOLFEN at the same time had contact with suspicious persons.

QUESTION: With whom exactly?

ANSWER: In the house next to the embassy on the street. Villagaten in Stockholm lived a white émigré whose last name I do not know. We drew attention to her due to the fact that she spent all her time at the window, watching the exit from the embassy. From the windows on the second floor of the embassy, one could see that this woman, although she pretended to be busy knitting, however, periodically, when the door of the embassy opened, she put off her work, picked up a pencil and made some notes.

One evening, at the invitation of the security courier KUDRYAVTSEV, I looked through the window into the room where this white emigrant lived, and saw WOLFEN sitting at the table there. QUESTION: Where is WOLFEN located now? ANSWER: In August

1944, in Moscow, I met a senior assistant of the 2nd branch of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Major STAROSTIN, who had been in Sweden for some period and knew the employees of the embassy. STAROSTIN told me that WOLFEN got a job at the Institute of

Foreign Languages of the Red Army as a teacher of Scandinavian languages. Both of us were surprised by this, because we knew that WOLFEN was weak speaks Swedish.

Another confidant of KOLLONTAI was a certain KABANKOV, who worked as the head of the encryption department. Kabankov earned fame among the embassy workers as an unrestrained drunkard.

In a conversation with me, the secretary of the embassy GRAUR said that Kabankov cannot be removed from work - KOLLONTAI forbids this.

KOLLONTAI's confidant is Anna Ivanovna PETROVA, a resident of Stockholm, who caters for her receptions at the embassy.

Colonel NIKITUSHEV once told me that PETROVA is very suspicious and it is possible that she was recruited by the Swedish police. What facts did NIKITUSHEV have about PETROVA, I Don't know.

The protocol from my words was written down correctly and read by me. GUSEV

INTERROGATED:

early. separated. trace department Ch. ex. "SMERSH"
Major SOKOLOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 256. L. 97-108. Script. Typescript.

No.

283 Special message L.P. Berii

I.V. Stalin about the direction to Bialystok

V.S. Abakumova, L.F. Tsanova and Krivenko

10/29/1944

No. 1161/

b

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade I.V.

STALIN In accordance

with the instructions given by you in a telegram from Comrade PONOMARENKO in the mountains. Bialystok to carry out the necessary activities sent comrade. ABAKUMOV and People's Commissar for State Security of the BSSR comrade. TsANAVA with a group of senior officials "Smersh" of the NPO and the NKGB of the BSSR.

To ensure the events to be held t.t. Abakumov and Tsanova, 2 regiments of the NKVD troops are transferred to Bialystok. The troops will arrive in

place by the end of October 31, 1944. Thus, 3 regiments of the NKVD troops with a total number of 4,500 people will be concentrated in Bialystok. To lead the

NKVD troops in Bialystok, Major General Comrade Comrade was sent from the NKVD of the USSR. KRIVENKO.

All sent comrades have been briefed. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA

RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 67. L. 83a. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**284 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M.
Malenkov with a memorandum to V.S.
Abakumov and L.F. Tsanava about the
fight against the regional army**

11/09/1944

No.

1207 / b Top secret

To Comrade I.V. STALIN

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

To Comrade MALENKOV

G.M. At the same time, I present to you another information from those in Bialystok, t.t. Abakumov and

Tsanava. As of November 8, 1,200 active members of the Home Army and other underground organizations were arrested in the Białystok Voivodeship and Byala Podlasie County.

A number of active members of the Home Army were arrested, who made their way to various positions in the Polish government bodies. In the

Vysoko-Mazowiecki district, a radio-receiving station of the Bialystok headquarters of the AK, which maintained contact with London, was identified and liquidated. The entire staff of the radio station was arrested. Arrests are

being carried out of persons conducting subversive work against the resettlement of Ukrainians and Belarusians

in the USSR. From the 9th division of the 2nd Polish army, located in the mountains. Bialystok, on November 3, 31 people deserted with weapons. When pursuing the fled 19 people. killed, the rest are wanted.

An inspection was carried out of the personnel of the military personnel guarding the Red Army warehouses with ammunition and fuel

lubricant.

For inactivity in work and failure to provide commandant service in the city of Bialystok, the Military Council of the front removed the military commandant of the city of Bialystok, Major SAPELKO. Instead, Lieutenant Colonel RYADKOV was appointed commandant of the

city. From the arrested members of the Home Army and other underground organizations seized: 95 machine guns, 1232 rifles and machine guns, 24 walkie-talkies and radios, as well as grenades, mines, cartridges and explosives.

Tov. ABAKUMOV was instructed to carefully check the cases of purchase servicemen of the Red Army have weapons and report the results.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

BERIA We report that

as of November 8 this year. 1,200 active members of the Home Army and other members of

underground organizations were arrested in Białystok Voivodeship and Biało-Podlasie Uyezd, including: 1,030 people on the morning of November 8 of this year. sent by special train No. 84176 to the Ostashkovsky camp of the NKVD.

Among those arrested are active members of the "Home Army": Inspector of the "Home Army" for the Bialystok inspectorate LAVRISH, second lieutenant of the former Polish army nicknamed "Franko", he is also the commandant of the Bialystok district "PN" (Polish-non-legal), who

led the three contours of the "AK" ; Arrested while trying to buy weapons from

the Red Army; Referent for land affairs of the Bialystok magistrate, appointed by the London government in exile, the captain of the former Polish army - Kosinsky, nicknamed "Mercury". Bought weapons from the Red Army; Deputy

head of intelligence and counterintelligence of the Bialystok district of the "Krayeva Army" BASTACH, nicknamed "Vyrva", who had a group of agents in touch, some of them

were arrested by us; Commandant of the bypass of the city of Brest "Army" nicknamed "Pop", who was active in "AK";

Deputy commandant of the Bialystok district of the underground organization "POV" (People's Organization of the Troops) - MONTENEGRO, nicknamed "Let", a Pole; The head of

propaganda of the Zambrovsky bypass of the "Krayevoy Army" is ZARANSKY Y.V. nicknamed "Ogorodnik", Pole;

The head of the sabotage-terrorist team (the so-called "KEDIV" - command of the diversin) of the "Krayevoy Army" in the city of Bialystok - STETSKIY V.S. nicknamed "Black Eagle", a former member of the "POV"; The

commandant of the district of the underground organization "PN" (Polish non-legal), Lomzhinsky district in the city of Zambrovo - TARNOVSKI Stanislav,

nicknamed "Lynx"; The liaison officer of the Home Army, who arrived from Warsaw in the city of Zambrovo to organize underground work and establish communications, is SKZHEK Zenon.

During his arrest, 100 copies of the illegal newspaper Zromb, 105 AK leaflets, a revolver and 3 grenades were confiscated

from him; The commandant of the Bialystok bypass "VSK" (military service kobet) - RIBARCHIK Aneliya, nicknamed "Alexandra" and her successor KATINSKAYA, who led the communications service and the production of fictitious documents for members of the

"Krayeva Army". During the arrest, illegal newspapers were confiscated from both; An active member of the underground organization "Polish Zvenzek Insurgents" ROYAL, nicknamed "Kruk", who bought weapons from the Red

Army. During his arrest, a Nagant revolver, two hand grenades and 36 rounds of

ammunition were confiscated from him; Active recruiter of the Home Army in Byala-Podlyassky

district V.S. KONON, Pole. He created an organization of 200 people "PZP" (Polish

zvenzek insurgents); Commandant of the district in Byala-Podlyassky district, second Polish army HVEDCHUK B.P.;

Active members of the "Home Army" LITKOVSKIY and PSHELOMSKIY, according to whose testimony an arms depot was discovered, where 13 rifles, 6 grenades, one box of cartridges, one box of medicines and other military equipment were seized;

A group of 10 AK members, led by the leader of the group, KLOSOVSKY, was arrested in a safe house. During the search, illegal literature

(leaflets and newspapers) was confiscated; In the town of Suprasl, Bialystok district, a group of 6 members of the "Home Army" was arrested, the leader of which was the company commander PETROVSKY S.K., a Pole;

In the town of Vasilkovo, Bialystok Voivodship, members of the Home Army MATUSHEVSKY, TSILIK and KOTINSKY were arrested, who were distributing literature received from Warsaw and calling on members of the AK to active armed struggle against the National Liberation Committee. As a result of the intelligence and operational measures

taken, in the village of Franky-Piaski, Vysoko-Mazowiecki district, Bialystok voivodship, a receiving and transmitting radio station of the headquarters of the Bialystok district of the "Home Army" was identified, through which communication was maintained with the London emigrant Polish government.

November 7 this year at the time of the operation of the station, all its personnel were arrested and a radio transceiver and a diary of the station's

operation were seized. Among those arrested: radiotelegrapher Vitold KUCHER, aka MOYSA Stanislav, nicknamed "Resin", as well as station those who served FRANKOVSKY, YAMATSKOVSKAYA, PLISS, KALINOVSKII, SUPPINSKY and ZAMZHETSKY.

According to the testimony of KUCHER on November 8 of this year. arrested: Head of Operational Communications of the Bialystok District of the "Krayevoy Army" NOVAK, nicknamed "Janina", the captain of the former Polish army, dropped in early 1941 by parachute into the territory of the Bialystok region for subversive work against the USSR;

The messenger of the commandant of the Bialystok district of the "Krayevoy Army" nicknamed "Malga-Zhatka"

MYADUSHEVSKAYA; The owner of a safe house and signalman of the Bialystok district of the "Krayevoy Army", the headman of the village of Moscitska GOLOSHEVSKY Cheslav and the liaison commandant of the headquarters of the Bialystok district of the "Krayevoy Army" TCHAIKOVSKA.

In addition, a number of active members of the Home Army were arrested, who made their way to various positions in the Polish government and other bodies:

SHIDLOVSKII, the commander of the "Krayeva Army" company, who entered the post of commandant of the police of the Knyszenskaya commune (volost), who arranged for a number of members of the "AK" to serve in the police, including his brother. Both

SHIDLOVSKIE brothers were Gestapo agents. When they were arrested, their weapons were

confiscated; PEKUNKO, headman of the Krynkovskaya commune, commander of the company "Regional". During the arrest, weapons and illegal literature were confiscated;

Lisitsky and ZENEVICH, security corps liaisons of the delegation of the London government in exile in the Bialystok Voivodeship, LISITSKII and ZENEVICH, who entered the service of the guards of the internal prison of the Bialystok Voivodeship Security Department, where they communicated between the arrested and the members of the "AK" who are at large;

VA KRAEVSKY, police officer of the Botkinskaya volost, Belsky district. During the arrest, he showed armed resistance, as a result of which he was wounded;

SETCHINSKAYA A.A., an employee of the headman of the Botkinskaya volost of the Belsky district, a member of the women's section of the "Krayeva Army", the so-called "Kobeta-Voyskova".

The arrested members of the "Krayeva Army" and others
underground organizations seized:

mortars - 9

machine guns - 95

machine guns, rifles and pistols - 1232 grenades

and mines - 1240

cartridges - 94,100

radio sets -

9 radio receivers - 15

explosives - 74 kg We have given

instructions to all operational groups on the ground to identify a criminal element trying to disrupt the resettlement, and arrest them. Individuals who carried out hostile agitation against resettlement have been seized by us.

The resettlement commissions working in the counties are each provided with security in the amount of 5 fighters of the NKVD troops.

For inactivity in work, for failure to provide commandant service in the city of Bialystok, drunkenness and association with suspicious persons of Polish nationality, at our suggestion, the Military Council of the Second Belorussian Front removed Major SAPELKO from the post of military commandant of the city and Lieutenant Colonel RYADKOV was appointed commandant of the city instead. The bodies of "SMERSH" of the

Second Belorussian Front, together with the command, carried out an inspection of the personnel, the protection of warehouses with ammunition and fuel and lubricants located on the territory of Poland. As a result of the audit, 185 people who did not

inspire confidence were identified and expelled. From the 9th division of the 2nd Polish army, located

in Bialystok, on November 3 of this year. deserted with weapons 31 people. Through the organized persecution of deserters, 19 people were killed after crossing the border near the city of Grodno, and some were arrested, the rest are wanted. At night from 6 to 7 November of this year. a thorough check of the documents of

persons living in the city of Bialystok was carried out, as a result of which 41 people were arrested. members of "AK" and other criminal

element.

We are continuing the further operation to seize members of the Home Army, Polish underground organizations and German military intelligence agents. We assume November

11 this year. send the second echelon to the Ostashkovsky camp of the NKVD. The results will be

reported. ABAKUMOV, TsANAVA

Adopted on

"HF" on

November 8, 1944

by the RF GA. F. 9401

sch. Op. 2. D. 67. L. 301-308. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**285 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, A.I. Antonov
about the facts of illegal release from
service in the Red Army**

11/18/1944

No. 1237 /

b Top secret Copy of the
GOKO

to Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M.
MOLOTOV GENSHTAB KA - comrade.

ANTONOV Bodies of the NKVD uncovered cases of illegal release by the district military registration and enlistment offices and employees of military medical commissions of those liable for military service from service in the Red Army.

October 10 this year The NKVD of the Voroshilovgrad region arrested 5 employees of the Voroshilovgrad city military commissariat - the head of the 1st unit BYKOV, his deputy SMOLYANINOV, the clerk DOKHNO, a member of the military medical garrison commission AGEEV and the secretary of this commission KOCHNEV.

These persons issued fictitious certificates of illness to those liable for military service and released them altogether or for long periods from service in the Red Army, receiving bribes from two to ten thousand rubles for this. The investigation revealed 13 deserters of the

Red Army and persons evading military service, whom the criminals supplied with fictitious documents. 15 people have been arrested in the case. The case has been referred to the military

prosecutor for bringing the perpetrators

to trial by the Military Tribunal. In October, the NKVD of the Samarkand region uncovered a group of

employees of the Siab district military registration and enlistment office, who passed off fictitious bribes

certificates of unfitness for military service for those evading mobilization. Such certificates were issued to

the evading Yadgarov,
ARANBAYEV, SAFIEV and others.

Arrested in connection with the case were: the military commissar of the Siab district military commissariat PETRENKO, the head of the 2nd unit SPESIVTSEV and the clerk GABRIELOV.

The investigation into the case is ongoing.

In September of this year. The UNKVD in the Stavropol Territory opened a group of employees of the Molotov district military commissariat and medical workers who freed those liable for military service for bribes from service in the Red Army. Arrested in the case

were the district military commissar of the Molotov district SHPAKOV, the head of the 1st part of the district military commissariat PINKIN, the head of the outpatient clinic of the Molotov district health department, a member of the military medical commission ZHAVORONKOV, the head of the medical department KARPENKO and TSYGANKOV without specific occupations.

It was established that SHPAKOV and PINKIN illegally released 13 and deregistered 27 conscripts. In September, the NKVD of the

West Kazakhstan region revealed the criminal activities of the head of the Karatyubinsk district military commissariat KHASANOV.

It was established that KHASANOV helped servicemen who were on vacation to desert in exchange for bribes. So, for a large number

of products, he arranged for household work in the district military registration and enlistment office for a vacationer MUKATOV, who was obliged to appear in his unit. The case has been referred to the prosecutor. July 27

this year in the Zagorsk district
of the Moscow region was arrested
BUTYGIN evading service in the Red Army.

It was established that BUTYGIN was helped in evading service by the head of the 2nd part of the Zagorsk city military registration and enlistment office MIRONOV and senior instructor YAKOVLEV, to whom he gave bribes. MIRONOV

and YAKOVLEV are arrested. In July, Wreed
was arrested and prosecuted.

The military commissar of the Chastinsky district of the Molotov region SHIVRIN.

It has been established that, for bribes, SHIVRIN released from service in the Red Army those liable for military service - an authorized trust of canteens

CHERNYSHOV and the collective farmers GOLDOBIN and LUZIN.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA

RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 67. L. 366-368. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**286 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the
attachment of reports of the NKVD
of the Ukrainian SSR on the results of
operations to eliminate the armed
formations of the OUN**

11/29/1944

No. 1283/

b

Copy Top secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to Comrade I.V.

STALIN I am sending you

a copy of the reports of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR on the results of Chekist-military operations to eliminate large OUN gangs in the Stanislav, Rivne and Ternopil regions. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA From LVOV MOSCOW,

NKVD of the USSR to Comrade L.P. BERIA

November 27 this year In the triangle of villages Zalesye-Pakanovtsy-Zaloztse, Zalestnitsky district, Ternopil region, the NKVD task force and a police detachment of former partisans, consisting of 220 people, overtook and surrounded the remnants of the gangs of smoking atamans "Roman" and "Yastreb", defeated on November 17 of this year. The battle began at 10.00 and lasted until

20.00 on 27 November. As a result of the operation, 240 bandits were killed, including the new kuren chieftain, who united the remnants of the gangs after the murder of Roman and Hawk. He was dressed in the uniform of an artillery officer of the Red Army. Among the dead, the corpse of the

commandant of the SD kuren "Orlik" was also identified. Trophies captured: 8 light machine guns, 1 battalion mortars, 500 mines, 2 grenade launchers

rifle cartridge 30,000, pistols 12. A convoy of 55 carts loaded with food, uniforms, medicines and surgical instruments was captured. Among those killed are many Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Russians. The uniforms of the dead varied. Many

are dressed in the uniform of officers and soldiers of the Red Army. Our losses: 3 killed and 6 wounded. The UPA kuren was completely destroyed.

From November 20 to 23, according to intelligence data, the department for combating banditry of the UNKVD of the Rivne region, together with a unit of the 24th brigade of the internal troops of the NKVD, carried out a Chekist-military operation to eliminate the sabotage and terrorist group SHIROKOVA, which operated on the territory of the Mizochsky and Dubnovsky districts of the Rivne region. As a result of the operation, 25 bandits were killed and 50 were

captured, including the sub-district communications chief of the Security Service nicknamed "Tsukovinets", the over-district informant of the Security Service "Fyodor", the sub-district commandant of the Mizochsky district "Khmurny", the OUN political referee of the same area nicknamed "Bread", he is also "Vasily", and the OUN referent on organizational issues "Roman". Among those killed by the captured bandits, the following were identified: the head of the sabotage

group of the Rivne region, nicknamed "Shiroky", the head of the field gendarmerie, nicknamed "Ptashka", a member of the Rivne regional OUN wire and the regional gospodarchik, nicknamed "Green", the regional economic assistant "Thunder", the subdistrict commandant SB, nicknamed "Morozenko", commandant of the self-defense headquarters of the village of Veliky Moshanice, Mizochsky district, nicknamed "Yashka" and the stanitsa of the same village, nicknamed "Zarubovka".

Trophies taken: 1 light machine gun, 12 rifles, 2 submachine guns, 3 revolvers and pistols. 80 bandits' above-ground shelters were blown up. The detainees are under investigation.

On November 24, at 23:00, a gang of over 200 people attacked the Solotvino district center in the Stanislav region. The bandits set fire to the house of the head of the NKVD, in which they burned down:

head of the NKVD RO senior lieutenant of militia MATSENKO, his wife and three children and deputy. chief of police RYABKOV.

Bursting into the building of the NKVD, the bandits released 22 arrested people. The fighters of the fighter battalions of 90 people, not accepting the battle, fled. The senior detective of the NKVD RO GRISHIN and three people of the operational staff, entrenched on the second floor of the building, fired back, killing two bandits in the process. When the bandits were withdrawing, they were overtaken by the mobile group of the 87th border detachment. As a result of the battle, 66 bandits were killed and 18 were captured. Trophies were taken: 1 heavy machine gun, 3 light machine guns, 13 rifles, 2 machine guns, 3 pistols, 10 grenades, 2000 rounds of ammunition, 1 radio receiver. The ammunition depot was destroyed. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Rynasaya GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 20-23. Copy

No.

**287 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.
Molotov, G.M. Malenkov about
the activities of the Hungarian
intelligence**

12/01/1944

No. 1304 /

b Copy

Top secret GOKO - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks - to Comrade MALENKOV G.M. The NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the city of Uzhgorod (Czechoslovakia) uncovered the activities of the Hungarian intelligence agency Kinelgorito-Ostal (Department K) of the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the Hungarian Army.

Department "K" was part of the 8th military district, stationed in the city of Kosice, and served the Transcarpathian Ukraine. The department was engaged in the recruitment of agents,

their transfer to neighboring countries, the collection and processing of intelligence materials, the fight against Soviet intelligence and partisans and undercover services

local population.

The structure included counterintelligence reconnaissance
department. There was a school where intelligence agents were trained to be sent to the Soviet Union.

The department was headed by Colonel OSHVAT, who was later appointed deputy chief of the 2nd department of the General Staff. After him, the department was headed by Colonel SILVASHI.

November 3 this year arrested 4 people from among the public and agents of department "K", all former officers of the Hungarian army.

The arrested were handed over to the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 18th Army.

November 13 this year NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the city of Kecskemét (80 kilometers southeast of Budapest) liquidated the counterintelligence residency of the Hungarian intelligence, headed by the resident BENDE, born in 1881, Magyar, in 1926 he graduated from police school. A total of 9 people were arrested, all residents of the city of Kecskemét,

nationality of the Magyars.

During interrogation, BENDE testified that in October of this year. was recruited by the deputy chief of police of the city of Kecskemet, captain ORBAUSO and left in the city with the task of creating an agent network to collect information about persons helping the Red Army and Soviet intelligence, to hand over the collected information to ORBAUSO upon the return of the Hungarian army to the city of Kecskemet. BENDA managed to recruit 8 local residents into the agent network.

BENDE and his 8 agents were transferred to the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 27th

Army. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA GA RF. F.
9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 57-58. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**288 Special message L.P. Berii
I.V. Stalin with attached reports of
the NKVD of the Ukrainian,
Belorussian and Lithuanian SSRs on
the results of operations
to eliminate armed formations**

05.12.1944

No. 1313/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE - to

Comrade I.V. STALIN I

am sending you copies of the reports of the NKVD of the Ukrainian,
Byelorussian and Lithuanian SSRs on the results of operations to
eliminate the OUN

and Belopolsky gangs. People's Commissar of
Internal
Affairs of the USSR

(L. BERIA) 5.XII-1944

Copy Top secret

Received by

"VCh" From LVOV Moscow, NKVD of the

USSR to comrade BERIA According to the agent "Slava" of the
Podgalsky RO of the NKVD of the Ternopil region, we became aware
that in the village of Shumlyany, Podgale region, in the buildings
belonging to the local resident of PANAS Mikhail Kiprianovich, there is a working prin

In order to detect and liquidate this printing house, on the night of
December 2, an operation group of the NKVD RS with a military group
attached to it carried out an operation. During the operation, undercover

darkness, the PANASA estate was surrounded. Immediately after that, rifle and machine-gun fire was opened from the side of the PANASA estate.

During the clash, 5 bandits were killed, including PANAS M.K.

On the battlefield, they picked up: 2 light machine guns, 5 rifles, 2 machine guns, 10 grenades, 760

rounds of ammunition. , a full cash register with fonts, one cutting machine, 14 cans of different paints, one radio, one camera, 19 different stamp seals and 3 cans of fuel oil.

Also found and confiscated: 174,000 copies of various leaflets, 64 texts of OUN anti-Soviet slogans of different content, an archive of the Ternopil regional OUN wire on 156 sheets, a folder with UPA directives on 250 sheets, 156 lists with characteristics of UPA participants, 49 photographs and 7 packs photo paper. Among various manuscripts, a manuscript

of the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of the OUN, held in August 1943, was found. This manuscript bears the inscription: "Print 60,000 copies." This gives grounds to believe that the resolution of the 3rd Extraordinary OUN Congress, which was widely disseminated earlier, was printed in this printing house.

In the Rivne region, on the railway section Zdolbunovo - Dubno, there were 2 cases of train accidents on November 15 and November 22, and 3 cases on November 27 in the same area on the Zdolbunovo - Ozhenino section. In all cases, the accidents occurred as a result of undermining mines placed under the rails.

By the measures taken, it was established that a gang operates in the Zdolbunovsky district, the leader of which is someone nicknamed "Kavkaz". This gang included a sabotage group led by Yurko. The sabotage group had the task of blowing up trains and blowing up the bridge in the section between Zdolbunovo and Dubno. The sabotage actions of the Yurko group were covered by the entire gang.

On November 12, the gang attacked the garrison in the village of Knyakhinin in order to divert the attention of the fighters guarding the bridge over the Stubla River, and at that time to blow up the bridge. The bandits did not succeed in this plan.

Conducting undercover work and military reconnaissance, on November 27, the Kavkaz gang was discovered in a forest near the village of Tsirkuv. The operation to eliminate the gang took place from 27 to 30 November. At the first clash, the gang tried to break away from the troops and go deep into the Kremenets forests. To this end, it was divided into several parts. Its destruction took place in parts. As a result of the operation, 40 bandits were killed and 45 were

captured alive. Trophies were taken: 1 light machine gun, 16 rifles, 4 assault rifles, 3 pistols, 13 grenades. 200 kg of tol were confiscated from the gang. Among the dead were identified: the leader of the gang

"Kavkaz", the commander of the centurion "Zalizo", the leader of the sabotage group "Yurko". Among those captured alive: the sub-district commandant of the Security Service BOGUN, the sub-district commandant of the Security Service SIKORSKY. We are conducting an investigation. NKVD Ukrainian SSR

Ryasnaya
From MINSK

Moscow, the NKVD of the USSR to comrade BERIA

on December 3 of this year, in accordance with the developed plan, in the area of the town of Yamonty-Stokie, Lida district, Grodno region, a gang of "Ragner" in the amount of 11 people was overtaken. As a result

of the battle, 4 bandits were killed, including the leader of the Ragner gang and his brother LENEK. 3 bandits were captured, including the heavily wounded bandit TABOTA, who soon died.

The killed "Ragner" was identified by 5 people who knew him closely.

Trophies were captured: 1 machine guns, 1 machine guns, 3 rifles, 2 pistols, 210 cartridges. In addition, 2 round seals and documents of operational interest were captured from the bandits.

In recent days, during the operation against the gang "Ragner" killed and 12 bandits captured. The persecution of the gang continues.

NKVD BSSR BELCHENKO
From VILNA

Moscow, NKVD USSR to comrade BERIA From

November 30 to December 2 of this year. in the Remigolsky volost of the Panevezys district; Svilay volost, Birzhai district; Poselsky volost of the Ukmerge county; Panemunelis parish

Rokshissky district, according to the developed plans, Chekist-military operations were carried out to eliminate gangs. According to the radio messages

of the chiefs of the county task forces, as a result of these four operations, 89 bandits and accomplices were killed and 205 were arrested.

Confiscated from the bandits: one heavy and 2 light machine guns, 7 machine guns, 26 rifles, 3 pistols, 7 grenades, 627 rounds of ammunition.

TKACHENKO

GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 68-72. Copy. Typescript.

No.

289 Special message L.P. Berii

I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M.

Malenkov about the fight against the "anti-Soviet" underground in the Byelorussian SSR

12/12/1944

No. 1341/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret GOKO - to Comrade STALIN

I.V. Council of People's Commissars of the
USSR to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade MALENKOV G.M. Seconded to the Western regions of Belarus, comrade KOBULOV, together with the NKVD and the NKGB of Belarus, comrade BELCHENKO and TsANAVA, reports on the work done by the NKVD-NKGB of the Byelorussian SSR to combat the anti-Soviet underground and armed gangs in the Western regions of Belarus and on

further measures to clear these areas of the anti-Soviet element. As of December 1 of this year. opened and liquidated 288 anti-Soviet Polish and Belarusian organizations. 5069 members of these organizations, 700 agents of enemy intelligence agencies were arrested, and 13

German intelligence stations were liquidated. 22 emissaries of the Polish government in exile in London were seized and 11 were killed, as well as the Warsaw and Vilna centers of the "Home Army", sent to the Western regions of the BSSR to organize the armed struggle of the Poles against the Sov

In the course of Chekist-military operations to eliminate bandit groups, 800 bandits were killed, 1,543 deserters and 48,900 who evaded the call to the Red Army were detained. In addition, in the

Brest, Pinsk and Polesye regions, bordering Ukraine, 11 OUN bandit groups that had crossed over from the Rivne and Volyn regions of the Ukrainian SSR were liquidated. At

liquidation of these gangs, 385 OUN bandits were killed and 160 were captured alive. 8 operating

radio stations of the Polish nationalist underground and 6 illegal printing houses that produced anti-Soviet literature were identified and confiscated. Here is a summary of the most characteristic insurgent organizations

liquidated on the territory of the Western regions of the BSSR. In September of this year. A Chekist-military operation was carried out, as a result of which the

headquarters of the "Novogrudok District" was liquidated in the Baranovichi region, which led the Belopolsky underground in the Western regions of the BSSR. Killed 54 and captured alive 4 people. Among the dead, a lieutenant colonel of the Polish army under the nickname "Kotvich" was identified, who, on the instructions of the London government in exile, organized and headed the headquarters of the "Novogrudok district".

In July 1943, the German counterintelligence agencies created a large rebel organization "Ragner", called "Connection South". The organization received weapons and ammunition from the German counterintelligence and fought actively against the Soviet partisans in the Baranovichi and Grodno regions. After the liberation of the Western regions of the BSSR, the Ragner organization, consisting of 120 people, joined the "Home Army"

and led an armed struggle against the Soviet regime, committed sabotage and terrorist acts, distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, urging the Polish population to sabotage the activities of the Soviet government. The organization was headed by Lieutenant of the Polish Army ZAINCHKOVSKY Cheslav, nicknamed "Ragner", who was directly connected with the Polish government in exile in London and received instructions from the latter over the radio about subversive

activities.

As a result of the Chekist-military operations carried out at different times operations, 80 members of the Ragner gang were killed and arrested.

On December 3, as a result of another operation to pursue the gang, the latter was defeated - Ragner himself was killed and his headquarters was liquidated.

In the Baranovichi region, the widely branched Belopolskaya insurgent organization "Underground Polish Union" was liquidated. After the liberation of the Western regions of the BSSR by the Red Army, this organization, at the direction of the Polish government in exile in London, systematically carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and prepared for an armed uprising.

400 members of the organization were arrested in the case. In the Baranovichi and Molodechno regions, the Belarusian "Belarusian Self-Help" created by German intelligence agencies was liquidated. 60 members of the organization were arrested. In the same regions, the fascist youth organization "Union of Belarusian Youth", also created by German intelligence agencies, was liquidated. 90 people have been arrested in the case. In the Molodechno region, the anti-Soviet organization "Belarusian Independent Party", created by German intelligence, was liquidated. Members of the organization carried out espionage and sabotage and terrorist work. 20 people have been arrested in the case. During the liquidation of anti-Soviet organizations and bandit formations, the following were confiscated: 219 machine guns, 297 machine guns, 20 mortars, 12 PTRs, 7315 rifles and revolvers, and 227,000 cartridges.

Despite the NKVD-NKGB taking measures to eliminate the anti-Soviet underground, in the Western regions of the BSSR, especially in Grodno, Baranovichi and Molodechno, where the Polish population predominates, active hostile activity of Polish anti-Soviet organizations and gangs continues to take place.

Based on available intelligence and investigative materials, as well as seized documents, it was established that the Polish nationalist underground in the Western regions of Belarus is an integral part of the Home Army and receives instructions on anti-Soviet work from the Polish government in exile in London through the Warsaw and Vilna centers. A number of organizations of the anti-Soviet Polish and Belarusian underground were created by German intelligence agencies during the occupation of Belarus and left for subversive work against the USSR.

In order to eliminate Belopolsky and other anti-Soviet organizations and armed bands in the Western regions of the BSSR and to clear these regions of anti-Soviet elements of the NKVD-NKGB of the BSSR, the following measures are being taken:

1. A simultaneous Chekist-military operation is being prepared to seize members of anti-Soviet organizations and liquidate bandit groups.

2. From

among the anti-Soviet elements registered by the NKVD-NKGB of the BSSR living in the Western regions of the BSSR, former German henchmen, policemen, landowners, kulaks, persons suspected of being in connection with the enemy's espionage and punitive organs, and other anti-Soviet elements will be seized.

These persons will be sent to the camps of the NKVD with the subsequent registration of cases against them by the decision of the

Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. 3. By agreement with comrade. ULRICH, in order to expedite the consideration of cases against members of anti-Soviet organizations and bandit groups, an exit session of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is sent to Belarus with

the granting of the rights of military field courts. 4. In addition to the experienced operatives sent earlier to the NKVD-NKGB of the BSSR, another 200 people are sent

from the central office. 5. On the spot, comrade is informed about the ongoing activities. PONOMARENKO.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 103-107. Copy. Typescript.

No. 290 L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin with a certificate about the Poles in the NKVD

12/15/1944

No. 1359/

b Top secret STATE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE Comrade I.V. STALIN

*According to your

instructions Comrade. BERUT was given the opportunity to view the lists of all Poles imprisoned in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR.

List of 23 people selected by Comrade. BEUT, while presenting *.
We believe

that these persons can be released from the camps with the right to live freely on the territory of the USSR and the possibility of leaving for Poland. *Ask for your guidance*.

Appendix: according to the
text. L. BERIA V.

MERKULOV

Top secret
INFORMATION

about the Poles and Polish Jews in the camps of the NKVD,
whose release is requested by comrade.

TAKE 1. BERGER Gerta Frantsevna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on September 4, 1937 on suspicion of espionage, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on May 17, 1938 for a period of 5 years.

2. BOGDANOVICH Anna Mironovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Kyiv region on August 5, 1937, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD

USSR October 16, 1937 for anti-Soviet activities to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 10 years.

3. BOGEN Fruma Davydovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on October 19, 1937 on charges of distributing anti-Soviet Trotskyist literature and conducting anti-Soviet agitation, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on November 28, 1938 for counter-revolutionary activities to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years .

4. VOLF Elena Davydovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on November 17, 1937, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on February 10, 1938 on suspicion of espionage to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 5 years.

5. HOROVITS-VOYSLAVSKAYA Teofiliya Petrovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Kiev region on suspicion of espionage, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on October 16, 1937 for counter-revolutionary activities to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 10 years.

6. GROSSMAN Elizaveta Grigorievna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on August 23, 1937 on suspicion of espionage, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on December 4, 1937 for counter-revolutionary activities to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years. 7. GERTSBERG

Paulina Lvovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on August 20, 1937, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on September 16, 1937 on suspicion of espionage to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 8 years.

8. IGNASYAK Yanina Voitsekhovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on September 5, 1937, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR for ties with active participants in the POV and conducting anti-Soviet agitation on December 5, 1937 to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years.

At the request of the camp administration, the case on charges of IGNASYAK Ya.V. was revised by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, by a decree of which of February 2, 1944, for high production indicators, the sentence was reduced by 1 year 6 months.

9. KAMERAZ Khatskel Girshevich, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on September 3, 1937 on suspicion of espionage, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on December 14, 1937 for counter-revolutionary activities to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 10 years. 10. LOGINOVICH

Iosif Kaetanovich, aka KORCHIK Pavel, was arrested by the NKVD of the BSSR on February 19, 1936 on charges that from October 1917 to the day of his arrest he had actively fought against the revolutionary movement and Soviet power, participated in 1920 in an armed uprising against Soviet power; As a member of the Central Committee, and then secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland, he led splitting activities in the party and maintained contact with the Polish police.

LOGINOVICH I.K.

11. MAZUR Franz-Andrey Timofeevich, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on July 18, 1940, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on March 15, 1941 for anti-Soviet Trotskyist activities and for anti-Soviet agitation to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 5 years. 12. MARKSU

Elena Moiseevna, convicted by the permanent session of the Yaroslavl Regional Court on November 14, 1941 for anti-Soviet agitation to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years, with a defeat in political rights for a period of 5 years.

13. MATSEEVSKAYA Rozalia Fedorovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on July 27, 1937 on suspicion of espionage, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on February 16, 1938 to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 8 years.

14. MOTYLEVA Elizaveta Mikhailovna, arrested by the NKVD of the BSSR on December 27, 1937, convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on September 10, 1940 for participation in an anti-Soviet organization to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 5 years.

15. OLESINSKAYA-FORNALSKAYA Felisa Antonovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on December 16, 1936, on charges of crimes under Art. Art. 58-1 "a", 58-8 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR 26

September 1937 to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years. 16. PRAPORT Maria

Bernardovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on August 31, 1937, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on October 2, 1937 as a member of the family of a traitor to the motherland to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 8 years. Husband PRAPPORT M.B. - POSTOLOVSKY Mikhail Fedotovitch, former

secretary of the Moscow Region Bureau of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on August 8, 1937 for anti-Soviet activities to the Navy.

17. PRUKHNYAK Teodora Genrikhovna, arrested by the NKVD of the Moscow Region on September 9, 1937, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on May 14, 1938 for counter-revolutionary activities to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 8 years.

Husband PRUHNIAK T.G. - PRUKHNYAK Eduard Andreevich, a former member of the Communist Party of Poland, was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on August 21, 1937 for anti-Soviet activities to VMN.

18. SEKERSKAYA Yadviga Nikolaevna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on June 15, 1937, condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR as a member of the family of a traitor to the motherland to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 8 years.

Husband of Sekerskaya Ya.N. - BOBINSKY Stanislav Yanovich, former director of the Moscow Polytechnic Institute, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on September 20, 1937 for anti-Soviet activities to VMN.

19. SLAVIN Stepan Alekseevich, aka SHUSTER Gustav Abramovich, was arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on August 8, 1938 on charges of crimes under Art. Art. 58-1 "a", 17-58-8 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on August 26, 1937 to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 15 years. 20. TSYMBAL Elena Korneevna, arrested

by the UNKVD of the Odessa region, convicted by the Trotsky UNKVD of the Odessa region for anti-Soviet activities to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 10 years.

21. Schwartz Paulina Yakovlevna, aka Schwartzbard Evgenia, was arrested by the NKVD of the Ordzhonikidzevsky Territory, convicted by the Commission of the NKVD and the USSR Prosecutor's Office on February 16, 1938 for anti-Soviet activities to imprisonment in a forced labor camp for a period of 10 years. 22. SHISHKEVICH-

BUDZINSKAYA Anna Antonovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on July 19, 1937, convicted by a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on September 22, 1937 as a member of the family of a traitor to the motherland to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 8 years.

Husband of SHISHKEVICH-BUDZINSKAYA A.A. - BUDZINSKY Stanislav Yanovich, a former teacher of Leninism at the Higher School of Propaganda under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on August 21, 1937 for anti-Soviet activities to VMN.

23. YANKOVSKAYA Lyubov Mikhailovna, arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on September 14, 1937, condemned by the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on November 23, 1937 as a member of the family of a traitor to the motherland to imprisonment in a labor camp for a period of 8 years.

Husband of YANKOVSKAYA L.M. - SKULSKI-MARTENS Stefan Adamovich, a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland and an employee of the Comintern, was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for anti-Soviet activities to VMN.

Head of Department "A" of the NKGB of

the USSR, Commissar of State Security GERTSOVSKII December

13, 1944. Presidential

Administration of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 256. L. 109-113. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are resolutions: "To Comrade Beria. Agree. I. Stalin"; "T.t. Fedotov, Kuznetsov, Gertsovsky. Prepare a decision on their release and providing the necessary assistance for their return to Poland (Lublin). L. Beria. *—* Underlined in pencil.

No.

**291 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin and V.M.
Molotov with the report of
I.A. Serov on the activities of Jewish
organizations in Lublin**

12/15/1944

No. 1407/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret GOKO - to Comrade STALIN

I.V. Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV I am sending you a noteworthy report
comrade SEROV about the activities of Jewish organizations in
Lublin. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of
the USSR

(L. BERIA) From LUBLIN Top secret

Moscow, NKVD of the USSR - Comrade

BERIYA As we have established, in the mountains. Lublin in September
The so-called Joint Jewish Committee was organized, with the Minister of
PKNO SOMMERSHTEIN (Zionist) elected as chairman. The composition
of this

committee includes Zionists, Bundists and Jews from among the
members of the

PPR. At the same time, the former members of the Jewish organization
"Bund" gathered in the amount of 25 people, held an organizational meeting
and elected the Central Committee of the "Bund" of 3 people:
SCHULDEFRAIN - a member of the "Regional Rada Narodova" (head of
the "Bund" organization), GERSHERHORN - head Jewish essay PKNO
and YASHUNSKY - editor of the newspaper "Worker of the Central Organ
PPS".

The organization "Bund" adopted a program to support the teaching staff, publishing it in the newspaper of the teaching staff, and a letter was also addressed to OSUBK-MORAVSKY.

According to our intelligence data, the Bund organization is beginning to develop its political activities, in particular, it has carried out a registration of all persons of Jewish nationality living in the city of Lublin, and has established that there are 1,000 Jews in Lublin, 500 of whom hid their nationality ,

enrolled as Poles.

At a rally held in Lublin on December 10 about the government, transformation of the PKNO into temporary SCHULDEFRAIN asked the Central Committee of the "Bund" to speak, but they didn't give him.

In connection with the fact that in January 1945 a congress of the "Council of Polish Jews" (an anti-fascist organization that includes all major Jewish capitalists in America) is planned in America, the joint Jewish committee in Lublin decided to send a minister to participate in this congress. PKNO SOMMERSHTEIN.

The Union of Polish Jews in America deducts and sends to London the Polish government in exile large sums of gold to SCHERER (a member of the Polish National Council in London), ostensibly to transfer this money to Jews who suffered from the German occupation in Poland. The Polish government in exile sent the money received from American Jews to the headquarters of the commandant of the AK, General BURZA, where, in fact, this money was distributed to the underground organizations of the AK.

According to the information we received, together with SOMMERSHTEIN, SCHULDEFRAIN (a member of the Regional Rada of the People) should also go to America. Yesterday,

in a conversation with me, our agent "B" said that after the decision was made to send SOMMERSHTEIN and SCHULDENFREIN to America, some leading officials of the PKNO, Jews by nationality, began to express doubts that these representatives in America would not confuse, and most importantly, they would not have stayed there to live, in particular, such doubts are expressed by BERMAN - secretary of the Central Committee of the PPR, DREBNER - minister of the PKNO and others.

In addition, Witold BENKOVSKY, pseudonym "Vatslav", a representative of the Polish government in exile under General BUR, who was arrested by us, testified during interrogation:

"Plans to send two couriers to London through the mediation and assistance from Minister SOMMERSTEIN were relevant.

I thought that Minister SOMMERSHTEIN was in favor of an agreement with me as a trustee, the AK delegation. I intended to propose to Minister SOMMERSTEIN an idea that he could carry out - legally send couriers. This idea was that I would present to Minister SOMMERSTEIN two candidates of Poles who looked like Jews, whom Minister SOMMERSTEIN could send as his representatives to SCHERER, a member of the National Council in London.

These people could be presented by Minister SOMMERSHTEIN to the authorities of the Soviet Union as agitators of the Polish "Bund" among the Jewish community in exile."

According to the data we received from Comrade. SHATILOV, allegedly the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs agreed to send SOMMERSHTEIN to America with the task of speaking at the congress of the Union of Polish Jews and asking that the funds allocated be sent not to the Polish

government in exile in London, but to the PKNO. With respect to SOMMERSTEIN, we have established the following:

composition of the provisional Polish government;

b) SOMMERSTEIN is a member of the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Committee (Jewish Agency);

c) SOMMERSHTEIN was arrested by our authorities and kept in prison;

d) There is unverified information that SOMMERSHTEIN is an agent of British intelligence. Based

on the foregoing, we consider it inappropriate to direct SOMMERSHTEIN to America.

In addition, for the good of the cause, I ask for your permission to dissolve the Jewish organization in Lublin, the Bund, and the United Jewish Committee. SEROV GA

RF. F.

9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 233-236. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**292 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M.
Molotov, G.M. Malenkov on
the work of checkpoints for the
reception of Soviet citizens**

01/02/1945

No. 11/

b

Copy Top secret GOKO

- Comrade STALIN SNK USSR

- Comrade MOLOTOV Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks - Comrade MALENKOV of the NKVD of the USSR

reports that during the work of the filtration checkpoints for the reception of Soviet citizens returning to their homeland, as of December 30 1944, 96,956 people were accepted and tested.

Including on points:

Ukrainian SSR - 13,960

Byelorussian SSR - 7228

Moldavian SSR - 9688

Estonian SSR - 18,459

Leningrad region. - 45 011

Murmansk region. - 2610

Of this number, 38,428 people were issued permits and sent to places of permanent residence; 5827 people were transferred to the military registration and enlistment offices of persons of military age; 43,693 people were sent for further testing in the special camps of the NKVD.

Among those being checked, German accomplices, traitors and traitors to the Motherland 153 people.

The operational group of the Chisinau filtration point arrested: IVANOV F.D., born in 1916, a native of the village. Zvindilishti of the Latvian SSR, Russian, tried in 1940.

Once in the territory occupied by the Germans, together with the Germans, he committed atrocities against the Soviet people. IVANOV himself testified on this

issue: "In 1941, together with German soldiers, sitting on a tractor, I crushed Jews who did not have time to evacuate. It was in the mountains. Riga, and it should be noted that at that time I was not yet an employee of the German army, but simply a sympathizer of the latter. In

June 1942, Ivanov voluntarily entered the service of the Nazi army and guarded Soviet prisoners of war in the mountains. Libava and Krivoy Rog. MOISEEV I.F., born in

1912, resident of the Tambov region, non-partisan. While in captivity, in April 1943 he voluntarily joined the "ROA" and was the foreman of the camp for Soviet prisoners of war at the Sennaya station.

He was active in the dissemination of Vlasov literature and the involvement of prisoners of war in the "ROA".

He beat the Soviet people and mocked them.

YAKUSHEV I.I., a resident of the mountains. Stalingrad, in 1935 we are on trial for theft. Having been captured by the Germans, he voluntarily transferred to their service. He was the foreman of camp No. 6 for Soviet prisoners of war. Conducted anti-Soviet defeatist agitation among prisoners of war.

As a result of his betrayal, many Soviet people died, including prisoners of war SHANIN Alexander, KAGANOVICH Vladimir and others. KHMELKOV I.F., a resident of the

Krasnodar Territory, in the past served in the White Army, was arrested by the Cheka, before the war he was convicted of anti-Soviet activities.

Surrendering to the Germans as a prisoner and being in a camp in the mountains. Simferopol, voluntarily joined the auxiliary units "Gelfigen" and "Gavi" organized by the

Germans. Conducted active anti-Soviet, defeatist agitation among Soviet prisoners of war.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
GA RF. F. 9401 sch. Op. 2. D. 92. L. 6-8. Copy. Typescript.

No.

293 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov on the results of the "cleansing" of the liberated territory of Latvia

01/26/1944

No. 106 /

b GOKO - to Comrade STALIN I.V. Council

of People's Commissars of the USSR to Comrade

V.M. MOLOTOV Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade MALENKOV G.M. Tov. MERKULOV

reports from Riga the following data on ongoing measures to clear the Latvian SSR from enemy element.

During the period of work in the liberated territory of Latvia - from July 1944 to January 20 of this year. bodies of the NKVD-NKGB arrested 5223 people, of them in the mountains. Riga - 962 and along the front line - 542 person.

Among those arrested:

agents of intelligence and

counterintelligence agencies of the enemy - 625 official

employees of the intelligence and counterintelligence

agencies of the enemy - 379 members of Latvian nationalist

organizations - 479 traitors, traitors to the

Motherland, German

henchmen and accomplices - 2721 members of

gangs and their accomplices - 376

various anti-Soviet elements - 643 After the arrival of Comrade

MERKULOV with a group of operatives in

Riga, the necessary organizational measures were taken to strengthen the KGB bodies of Latvia and to better organize intelligence and operational work.

Particular attention is paid to the strengthening of the organs of the NKVD-NKGB in the front line. The entire

territory of the Latvian SSR is divided into 6 operational sectors, headed by qualified operational workers who arrived from Moscow. The operational sectors were given units of the NKVD troops located on the territory of Latvia.

To provide assistance and direct work in the county bodies, departments and departments of the NKGB of the Latvian SSR, 40 operational workers of the NKGB who arrived from Moscow and the internal regions of the USSR were distributed and additionally called for the same purpose 100 Human.

From 8 to 20 January of this year. bodies of the NKVD-NKGB of the Latvian SSR 1396 people of the enemy element were arrested.

As of January 15 of this year. The NKVD -NKGB of the Latvian SSR seized weapons and

ammunition: rifles -

12,370 manual machine guns and machine

guns - 1145 machine guns - 16

pistols and revolvers - 610 cartridges -

1,171,596 mortars - 1471

grenades and shells -

2510 revealed

11 Germans - German

citizens, civilians living in Riga. All of them were arrested and after the investigation will be sent to the camps. An operation is also being prepared to evict Germans from Latvia -

Soviet citizens, as well as stateless persons from among the Poles and Russians. On the territory of Latvia, the Germans organized 7 reconnaissance and sabotage schools.

At one time, a large number of intelligence officers trained in these schools were arrested by the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh. At present, 224 people have been identified from among the persons who worked in these schools as service personnel (cooks, waiters, cleaners, etc.) or who maintained personal contacts with cadets. Some of them are like

those who know by sight the contingent of scouts who studied at the school are used by Smersh to search for and identify the latter. The rest, in order to prevent their possible use by German intelligence, will be evicted as dubious and suspicious element.

A plan of intelligence and operational activities for the Lutheran, Catholic and Orthodox clergy in Latvia has been developed and is being implemented. The arrest of the head

of the Lutheran Church of the IRBE is being prepared, in respect of which there is evidence of his connection with German intelligence and a hostile attitude towards the Soviet authorities.

After his arrest, our agent, who enjoys authority among parishioners and clergy, will be promoted to the post of head of the Lutheran church.

Priest KAZLAS, who testified about the anti-Soviet activities of a number of other priests, and the actual head of the Catholic Church in Latvia, Prelate PASTOR A.I., were arrested in the Roman Catholic Curia. 7 people were arrested by the

Orthodox Church. Of the recently opened and liquidated cases

The following deserve attention: The

case of the Aizsargi military-fascist organization It was established that after the occupation of the Latvian SSR, the Germans recreated the Aizsargi military-fascist organization that existed under the bourgeois government in Latvia, headed by the former general of the Latvian army KURELIS (who escaped with the Germans) . Members of the Aizsargi organization

were actively used by the Germans for espionage and sabotage work, punitive actions against partisans, in the search for Soviet paratroopers, in organizing mass executions of Soviet citizens, etc.

Before the retreat of the Germans from Latvia in July - August 1944. General KURELIS, together with German intelligence, put together sabotage and terrorist groups from Aizsargs with the task of conducting subversive work in the rear of the Red Army. The Aizsargi organization is the most active anti-Soviet organization in Latvia.